Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, little is known about how this affects behavior in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). We find that the individual behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not find the corresponding relationship involving outcomes in the game. Specifically, there is no evidence of a significantly different convergence of game outcomes across treatments. As an explanation of these two results, we find evidence that low load subjects are better able to adjust their choice in response to outcomes in previous periods.cognitive resources; experimental economics; experimental game theory; public goods game

Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, little is known about how this affects behavior in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). We find that the behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not find the corresponding relationship involving outcomes in the game. Specifically, there is no evidence of a significantly different convergence of game outcomes across treatments. As an explanation of these two results, we find evidence that low load subjects are better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.cognitive resources; experimental economics; experimental game theory; public goods game

Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation

Language is an imperfect and uneven means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver's guess. As would be expected, we find that larger communication costs are associated with worse outcomes for both sender and receiver. Consistent with the communication literature, albeit in very different setting, we find that there is overcommunication. For the receiver, there is a positive relationship between the payoffs relative to the equilibrium predictions and communication costs. This relationship is negative for the senders. We also find that the response time of both the sender and receiver are positively related to their payoffs.communication; cheap talk; overcommunication

A Hedonic Analysis of the Value of Parks and Green Spaces in the Dublin Area [on housing market]. ESRI WP331. November 2009

We use a hedonic house price model to estimate the value of green spaces and parks to homeowners in the Dublin area. Using a dataset of house sales between 2001 and 2006 and combining it with available data on the location of green spaces in Dublin it is possible to assess the different values assigned to green areas by homeowners. We find that the value of green space depends first of all on how far from the property it is located. We also find a difference in the values assigned to open access parks and green spaces. For every 10% increase in the share of green space and park area near a house, its average price increases by 7% to 9%. We also attempted to identify different individual parks and rank them according to their value, however due to spatial multicollinearity the results were mixed

A quantitative content analysis of UK newsprint coverage of proposed legislation to prohibit smoking in private vehicles carrying children

This project was funded by Cancer Research UK (MC_U130085862) and the Scottish School of Public Health Research. Cancer Research UK and the Scottish School of Public Health Research were not involved in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data, writing of the manuscript or the decision to submit the manuscript for publication. Shona Hilton, Karen Wood and Chris Patterson were funded by the UK Medical Research Council as part of the Understandings and Uses of Public Health Research programme (MC_UU_12017/6) at the MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow. Thanks to Josh Bain and Alan Pollock for coding assistance.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

An economist and a psychologist form a line: What can imperfect perception of length tell us about stochastic choice?

Standard choice experiments are hampered by the fact that utility is either unknown or imperfectly measured by experimenters. As a consequence, the inferences available to researchers are limited. By contrast, we design a choice experiment where the objects are valued according to only a single attribute with a continuous measure and we can observe the true preferences of subjects. Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice objects but can improve the precision of their perception with cognitive effort. Subjects are given a choice set involving several lines of various lengths and are told to select one of them. They strive to select the longest line because they are paid an amount that increases with the length of their choice. Our design allows us to observe the search history, the response times, and make unambiguous conclusions about the optimality of choices. We find a negative relationship between the demanding nature of the choice problems and the likelihood that subjects select the optimal lines. We also find a positive relationship between the demanding nature of the choice problems and the response times. However, we find evidence that suboptimal choices are associated with longer response times than are optimal choices. This result appears to be consistent with Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2018). Additionally, our experimental design permits a multinomial discrete choice analysis. Our results suggest that the errors in our data are better described as having a Gumbel distribution rather than a normal distribution. We also observe effects consistent with memory decay and attention. Finally, we find evidence that choices in our experiment exhibit the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property

Tail asymptotics for busy periods

The busy period for a queue is cast as the area swept under the random walk until it first returns to zero, $B$. Encompassing non-i.i.d. increments, the large-deviations asymptotics of $B$ is addressed, under the assumption that the increments satisfy standard conditions, including a negative drift. The main conclusions provide insight on the probability of a large busy period, and the manner in which this occurs: I) The scaled probability of a large busy period has the asymptote, for any $b>0$, \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \log P(B\geq bn) = -K\sqrt{b}, \hbox{where} \quad K = 2 \sqrt{-\int_0^{\lambda^*} \Lambda(\theta) d\theta}, \quad \hbox{with $\lambda^*=\sup\{\theta:\Lambda(\theta)\leq0\}$,} and with $\Lambda$ denoting the scaled cumulant generating function of the increments process. II) The most likely path to a large swept area is found to be a simple rescaling of the path on $[0,1]$ given by, [\psi^*(t) = -\Lambda(\lambda^*(1-t))/\lambda^*.] In contrast to the piecewise linear most likely path leading the random walk to hit a high level, this is strictly concave in general. While these two most likely paths have very different forms, their derivatives coincide at the start of their trajectories, and at their first return to zero. These results partially answer an open problem of Kulick and Palmowski regarding the tail of the work done during a busy period at a single server queue. The paper concludes with applications of these results to the estimation of the busy period statistics $(\lambda^*, K)$ based on observations of the increments, offering the possibility of estimating the likelihood of a large busy period in advance of observing one.Comment: 15 pages, 5 figure