Encryption under threat: as states across the globe weaken cyber-security - Germany should oppose the trend

An inadvertent worldwide alliance against encryption is emerging, as Western democracies join authoritarian regimes in weakening communication encryption and exploiting spyware. This accelerating global trend undermines efforts to enhance cyber-security. Germany should oppose such developments and intensify its efforts to champion encryption. This will also mean finding alternative instruments to keep terrorism suspects under surveillance without degrading the software security of the entire population. (author's abstract

Cyber deterrence is overrated: analysis of the deterrent potential of the new cyber doctrine and lessons for Germany's "active cyper defence"

Proponents of active, offensive cyber operations argue that they could have a deter­rent effect on potential cyber attackers. The latter would think twice about attacking if a digital counter-attack might be the consequence. The idea that offensive cyber capabilities should have a deterrent effect was one reason why the new US cyber doctrine was adopted in 2018. The same assumption is implicit in the debate about cyber counterattacks ("hack backs") in Germany. Yet these assessments are based on a superficial understanding of deterrence. Cyber deterrence by the threat of retaliation works differently than that of nuclear deterrence. Problems of attribution, displays of power, controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities increase the risk of deterrence failure. Thus, the German cyber security policy would be well advised to increase its "deterrence by denial", cyber security and the resilience of its systems. (Autorenreferat

Scenario estimates of rare earth recycling potentials from NdFeB magnet material

Rare earth element (REE) containing neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets play a major role in green technologies, which largely constitute efficient motor and generator applications. Examples include wind turbines, hybrid and electric cars and bicycles, and other efficient motor and generator applications used in industrial, domestic and other infrastructure contexts. Potential geopolitical supply risks for neodymium and dysprosium, the main rare earth elements used in these magnets, have been a topic for discussion in recent years. Recycling, substitution at material and component level, and efficient use of critical rare earths have been discussed as strategies to mitigate rare earth metal criticality felt outside China, the main rare earth producing country. Substitution for heavy rare earths, the most critical REEs for use in NdFeB magnets, has been the strategy largely followed by companies outside China. Recycling is being discussed as the main alternative strategy, and has been a focus of research activities in recent years. Recycling activities for pre-consumer scrap are starting to become economically viable, while recycling of end-of-life magnets is only at research or pilot scale level. However, besides phosphors used in energy efficient lighting, NdFeB magnets constitute one of the most interesting source materials of secondary rare earths. Here, we present our detailed and comprehensive estimates of global recycling potentials from EOL magnets from 11 different NdFeB application groups and industrial scraps from NdFeB production until 2030, quantified through a dynamic material flow analysis study. Recycling potentials for REEs used in NdFeB magnets, namely neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr), terbium (Tb) and dysprosium (Dy), were calculated for years 2020-2030, derived from two demand scenarios to reflect uncertainties in historic NdFeB demand figures and future demand development. A detailed review of the literature was performed to obtain qualitative and quantitative data for NdFeB demand in 11 application groups, and complemented with expert opinions. These were provided by magnet manufacturers and other industry experts. Literature sources included peer-reviewed publications, corporate and other sources. Information on market trends for applications using NdFeB in individual application groups, on technology trends for NdFeB magnet applications and available alternatives on a component (motor) and (magnet) material level was compiled. Latest technological trends in magnet manufacturing, i.e. of heavy rare earth content reduction efforts, and their effects on both the demand for individual rare earths and the composition of EOL magnet material and industrial scraps are taken into account. In order to derive REE recycling potentials from NdFeB / REE demand scenario estimates, information on product lifetimes, existing collection rates for individual applications and observations regarding potential disassembly efforts were considered. Assumptions regarding losses during the actual recycling processes were based on information from life cycle assessment studies (Sprecher et al., 2014; Walachowicz et al., 2014). The most important NdFeB application groups in terms of recycling potentials were identified. Scenario estimates for the respective percentages of heavy and light rare earth demand which can be met via recycling in years 2020-30 will be presented. The results will be of interest to players in the field of rare earth recycling, and researchers working in the fields of urban mining and sustainable resource utilization. They are currently being used for a follow-on scenario LCA study to estimate environmental impacts from rare earth primary production which can be avoided by NdFeB recycling. References Sprecher B, Xiao Y, Walton A, Speght J, Harris R, Kleijn R, et al. Life Cycle Inventory of the Production of Rare Earths and the Subsequent Production of NdFeB Rare Earth Permanent Magnets. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2014(48):3951–8. dx.doi.org/10.1021/es404596q. Walachowicz F, March A, Fiedler S, Buchert M, Merz C, Sutter J. Verbundprojekt: Recycling von Elektromotoren - MORE: Teilprojekt: Ökobilanz der Recyclingverfahren. Projekt gefördert im Rahmen des Programms Schlüsseltechnologien für die Elektromobilität (STROM) des BMBF: Siemens, Öko-Institut; 2014

Noncontact measurement of central lens thickness

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Disinformation and elections to the European Parliament

Elections to the European Parliament (EP) will take place in May 2019. Politicians and experts fear that the election process might be disrupted by disinformation cam­paigns and cyber attacks. In December 2018, the European Commission presented an action plan against disinformation. It provided 5 million euros for raising awareness amongst voters and policymakers about manipulation, and for increasing the cyber security of electoral systems and processes. The strategy relies on voluntary and non­binding approaches by Internet companies to fight disinformation. To protect the integrity of elections in the medium term, independent research into technical, legal and market-regulating reforms must be boosted. The objective should be to preserve the functionality of democracies and elections in the age of digitalisation. (author's abstract

Cyber operations in Russia's war against Ukraine: uses, limitations, and lessons learned so far

One year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, certain assumptions about the utility of cyber operations during wartime can now be put to the test. Russian cyber salvos opened this war, but they failed to achieve their objectives in the face of a resilient cyber defender. Joint cyber/conventional warfighting is still hard to implement due to its uncertain effects, the potential for spill-over, malware development cycles, and differing operational tempos. Cyber operations against Ukraine have not (yet) achieved major strategic effects in reducing Ukraine's capacity to resist. Additionally, Russian information operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences fell on deaf ears. The greatest value of cyber operations therefore still appears to lie in their intelligence and reconnaissance functions. (author's abstract

Hardness and Approximation of Octilinear Steiner Trees

Given a point set K of terminals in the plane, the octilinear Steiner tree problem is to find a shortest tree that interconnects all terminals and edges run either in horizontal, vertical, or 45° diagonal direction. This problem is fundamental for the novel octilinear routing paradigm in VLSI design, the so-called X-architecture. As the related rectilinear and the Euclidian Steiner tree problem are well-known to be NP-hard, the same was widely believed for the octilinear Steiner tree problem but left open for quite some time. In this paper, we prove the NP-completeness of the decision version of the octilinear Steiner tree problem. We also show how to reduce the octilinear Steiner tree problem to the Steiner tree problem in graphs of polynomial size with the following approximation guarantee. We construct a graph of size O(n^2/epsilon^2) which contains a (1+epsilon)-approximation of a minimum octilinear Steiner tree for every epsilon > 0 and n = |K|. Hence, we can apply any k-approximation algorithm for the Steiner tree problem in graphs (the currently best known bound is k=1.55) and achieve an (k+epsilon)-approximation bound for the octilinear Steiner tree problem. This approximation guarantee also holds for the more difficult case where the Steiner tree has to avoid blockages (obstacles bounded by octilinear polygons)

The EU's revised cybersecurity strategy: half-hearted progress on far-reaching challenges

In September 2017 the EU updated its 2013 Cyber Security Strategy. The new version is intended to improve the protection of Europe’s critical infrastructure and boost the EU’s digital self-assertiveness towards other regions of the world. But the reformed strategy leaves open a number of questions as to how its objective of an “open, safe and secure cyberspace” will be credibly defended, both internally and externally. The EU has neither properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues. Moreover, controversial topics – such as the harmonisation of criminal law or the use of encryption – have been entirely omitted. Member states should abandon their standalone efforts and speed up the legal regulation of cybersecurity at the EU level. (Autorenreferat

Cyber-Sicherheit im Weltraum: Verwundbarkeiten, Angriffsvektoren und Schutzmaßnahmen

Die IT-Sicherheit von Weltrauminfrastrukturen wird relevanter, während sich zahl­reiche Staaten einen neuen Wettlauf um das All liefern. Cyber-Operationen gegen entsprechende Ziele nehmen zu; so wurde etwa im Zuge des russischen Einmarschs in die Ukraine ein Kommunikationssatelliten-Netzwerk von Hackern angegriffen. Regie­rungen sollten daher Mindeststandards für die IT-Sicherheit im Weltraum definieren; ebenso gilt es, frühzeitig einen Informationsaustausch zwischen Staaten und privaten Akteuren zu initiieren, was Cyber-Bedrohungen und "best practices" zur Härtung der Infrastrukturen betrifft. Innerhalb von EU und Nato könnten wechselseitig Daten über Bedrohungslagen weitergegeben werden; ebenso ist die Schaffung von Computer Emergency Response Teams zu erwägen. Auch mit "Hacking-Wettbewerben" und ge­meinsamen Übungen ließe sich dazu beitragen, die IT-Sicherheit im All zu verbessern. (Autorenreferat

Überschätzte Cyber-Abschreckung: Analyse der in der neuen US Cyber-Doktrin vorgesehenen Abschreckungspotenziale und Lehren für Deutschlands "aktive Cyberabwehr"

Befürworter offensiver Cyber-Operationen argumentieren, dass sie abschreckend auf etwaige Cyber-Angreifer wirken könnten, da die Angreifer mit einem digitalen Gegen­schlag rechnen müssten. Diese Vorstellung, die für die neue US Cyber-Doktrin von 2018 bestimmend war, schwingt implizit auch in der Debatte über digitale Gegen­angriffe in Deutschland mit. Diesem Kalkül liegt jedoch eine verkürzte Vorstellung von Abschreckung zugrunde. Abschreckung per Androhung von Vergeltung funktioniert im digitalen Raum nach anderen Prinzipien als etwa nukleare Abschreckung. Probleme der Attribution, Demonstration, Kontrollierbarkeit und Glaubwürdigkeit digitaler Fähigkeiten erhöhen die Gefahr, dass Abschreckung scheitert. Daher wäre die deutsche Cyber-Sicherheitspolitik gut beraten, die defensive Cyber-Sicherheit und die Robustheit (Resilienz) von Systemen zu steigern. (Autorenreferat