Hoe stabiel is de toekomstboom?

Op 18 januari 2007 raasde een storm over West-Europa die tientallen dodelijke menselijke slachtoffers maakte en enorme materiële schade aanrichtte. De storm ontwortelde een miljoen bomen. Hadden we schade kunnen voorkomen of is dit het soort natuurgeweld waartegen geen kruid gewassen is? Hoofdlijnen uit Alterra rapport over "Storm, bos, beheer en stabiliteit

"In this chambered tumulus were found cleft skulls ...": an assessment of the evidence for cranial trauma in the British Neolithic

Interpersonal violence is a powerful expression of human social interaction. Yet a consideration of violence in the past has done relatively little to inform our discussions of the British Neolithic. Here, we present the results of an examination of some 350 earlier Neolithic crania from mainly southern Britain. Of these, 31 show healed or unhealed injuries suggestive of interpersonal violence. We suggest a conservative estimate of 2% fatal cranial injuries, and 4 or 5% healed injuries. These data are used as a platform to discuss possible contexts for, and consequences of, violence. We argue that, regardless of its actual prevalance, the reality or the threat of interpersonal violence can have an important affect on both the behaviour of individuals and the structure of society

East-central Florida pre-Columbian wood sculpture: Radiocarbon dating, wood identification and strontium isotope studies

A suite of scientific approaches are applied to four pre- Columbian wood sculptures from east-central Florida, comprising new radiocarbon determinations, wood identification and strontium isotope analysis. The dates for three large zoomorphic carvings recovered from the St. Johns River at Hontoon Island place them between ca. AD 1300 and 1600, suggesting that they belonged to a tradition of erecting largescale pine carvings spanning at least some centuries. Two of the carvings have strontium isotope signals consistent with the immediate vicinity of the site, while the third differs significantly. Baseline data for biologically available strontium from sampled modern trees indicates considerable isotopic variability over short distances, making it difficult to determine the source of the wood used for this third carving. The only anthropomorphic sculpture, recovered from the vicinity of Tomoka State Park, dates to a similar time period, ca. AD 1440-1620. Our study confirms the wood's previous identification as belonging to the genus Peltophorum, a tropical hardwood thought not to be native to Florida. Its strontium isotope value is consistent with its find location, but equally may be found over much of southern Florida, where perhaps the species grew in the past. The results clarify the chronology for a stylistically distinctive carving tradition, as well as raising questions concerning the exchange of organic materials over varying distances. Highlights • 14C results for four east-central Florida carvings (Hontoon Island; Tomoka State Park) range ca. AD 1300-1600, spanning the proto-historic/historic periods • 87Sr/86Sr results for two of the three Hontoon carvings are consistent with the immediate locale, while the third suggests a different provenance • Pinus sp. was used at Hontoon, while Peltophorum sp., currently not native to Florida, was used at Tomoka</p

Prehistoric land-cover and land-use history in Ireland at 6000 BP

Land cover and use are compared for Neolithic Ireland, revealing complex inter-relationships between land cover and the archaeological record. Land-cover data can be misinterpreted when isolated from the land-use activities that help shape them, while land-cover data complements land-use datasets

Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation

In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction the seemingly pre-conceptual aspects of a priori synthesis, namely those of the synthesis of apprehension and the imagination, are more prominently featured than in the B-Deduction. And the fact that in the A-Deduction judgement does not appear to play any significant role reinforces the view that the A-Deduction is less strongly conceptualist. I believe that Kant is a conceptualist also in the A-Deduction (as much as in the B-Deduction) in the sense that all syntheses, which are expounded in the second section of the A-Deduction, must be seen as involving the categories or the understanding as the seat of the categories. However, despite some apparent strong modal claims regarding apperception in the A-Deduction, I argue that Kant is a moderate conceptualist in the sense that he allows for the real possibility that some representations are apprehended that are not subsumed or subsumable under the categories, or determined or determinable by the understanding as the seat of the categories. Not all representations must be synthesised and hence be conceptualised (by means of the categories), nor are all representations necessarily conceptualisable (by means of the categories). Often it is argued that the application of the categories must be seen as separate from or prior to conceptualisation (that is, employment of concepts in a judgement), so that the categories must be considered to apply to representations at least to the extent that the productive imagination or recognitive synthesis is involved, even if no empirical concepts are applied in an actual judgement. But it is difficult to see how categories can apply outside the context of an actual judgement in which ipso facto empirical concepts are employed, because, after all, categories are nothing but logical functions of judgement (e.g. B143). More in particular, I shall argue for the claims that (1) appearances to the contrary, all three levels of syntheses in the A-Deduction, including the synthesis of recognition, are interdependent and are not to be seen as operating singly or independently of each other, and hence of the categories; (2) ‘mere’ apprehension, or ‘mere’ intuition, is not dependent on the understanding and the application or possible application of the categories; and that (3) ‘mere’ apprehension does not even invoke a priori synthesis of apprehension and hence is as such fully lawless in terms of Kantian a priori laws. In this context, I also address Kant’s argument in the A-Deduction about the role of the imagination in the production of spatial objects and explain his apt use of the example of cinnabar to show that the kind of association that is at issue here concerns the possibility of knowledge, not the possibility of mere association, as is often assumed