The Impact of Drug Trafficking on Informal Security Actors in Kenya

The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya.© 2014 GIGA. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Africa Spectrum is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License

Community-Based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes

yesThe proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public and academic attention alike, not least in the pages of this journal. To move the debate on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) forward, this article seeks to enhance our conceptual understanding of parochial armed groups which are not primarily driven by ideological or religious objectives. Thus, this article clarifies similarities as well as differences between subtypes of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) on the one hand, and between CBAGs and other NSAGs, on the other hand. By doing so, a typology is developed that classifies militias, gangs and vigilantes on the basis of their political, economic and security-related dimensions. The resulting ideal types are discussed through the lenses of different explanatory frameworks and policy debates in the field of contemporary security studies. A major typological issue is the tendency for CBAGs to ‘turn bad’ and become threats to the stability they were expected to transform, becoming a serious problem in countries where they operate. It is concluded that the challenge of CBAGs ultimately needs to be addressed by putting in place a functioning state that can tackle the underlying woes that led to their proliferation in the first place

Urban water access and use in the Kivus: evaluating behavioural outcomes following an integrated WASH intervention in Goma and Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo

Increasing the availability and reliability of community water sources is a primary pathway through which many water supply interventions aim to achieve health gains in communities with limited access to water. While previous studies in rural settings have shown that greater access to water is associated both with increased overall consumption of water and use of water for hygiene related activities, there is limited evidence from urban environments. Using data collected from 1253 households during the evaluation of a community water supply governance and hygiene promotion intervention in the cities of Goma and Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo, we conducted a secondary analysis to determine the impact of these interventions on household water collection and use habits. Using multiple and logistic regression models we compared differences in outcomes of interest between households in quartiers with and without the intervention. Outcomes of interest included litres per capita day (lpcd) of water brought to the household, lpcd used at the household, and lpcd used for hygiene-related activities. Results demonstrated that intervention households were more likely to use community tapstands than households located in comparison quartiers and collected on average 16.3 lpcd of water, compared with 13.5 lpcd among comparison households (adj. coef: 3.2, 95 CI: 0.84 to 5.53, p = 0.008). However, reported usage of water in the household for domestic purposes was lower among intervention households (8.2 lpcd) when compared with comparison households (9.4 lpcd) (adj. coef: −1.11, 95 CI: −2.29 to 0.07), p = 0.066) and there was no difference between study groups in the amount of water allocated to hygiene activities. These results show that in this setting, implementation of a water supply governance and hygiene promotion intervention was associated with a modest increase in the amount of water being bought to the household, but that this did not translate into an increase in either overall per capita consumption of water or the per capita amount of water being allocated to hygiene related activities

Immune response of healthy horses to DNA constructs formulated with a cationic lipid transfection reagent

Background Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) vaccines are used for experimental immunotherapy of equine melanoma. The injection of complexed linear DNA encoding interleukin (IL)-12/IL-18 induced partial tumour remission in a clinical study including 27 grey horses. To date, the detailed mechanism of the anti-tumour effect of this treatment is unknown. Results In the present study, the clinical and cellular responses of 24 healthy horses were monitored over 72 h after simultaneous intradermal and intramuscular application of equine IL-12/IL-18 DNA (complexed with a transfection reagent) or comparative substances (transfection reagent only, nonsense DNA, nonsense DNA depleted of CG). Although the strongest effect was observed in horses treated with expressing DNA, horses in all groups treated with DNA showed systemic responses. In these horses treated with DNA, rectal temperatures were elevated after treatment and serum amyloid A increased. Total leukocyte and neutrophil counts increased, while lymphocyte numbers decreased. The secretion of tumour necrosis factor alpha (TNFα) and interferon gamma (IFNγ) from peripheral mononuclear blood cells ex vivo increased after treatments with DNA, while IL-10 secretion decreased. Horses treated with DNA had significantly higher myeloid cell numbers and chemokine (C-X-C motif) ligand (CXCL)-10 expression in skin samples at the intradermal injection sites compared to horses treated with transfection reagent only, suggesting an inflammatory response to DNA treatment. In horses treated with expressing DNA, however, local CXCL-10 expression was highest and immunohistochemistry revealed more intradermal IL-12-positive cells when compared to the other treatment groups. In contrast to non-grey horses, grey horses showed fewer effects of DNA treatments on blood lymphocyte counts, TNFα secretion and myeloid cell infiltration in the dermis. Conclusion Treatment with complexed linear DNA constructs induced an inflammatory response independent of the coding sequence and of CG motif content. Expressing IL-12/IL-18 DNA locally induces expression of the downstream mediator CXCL-10. The grey horses included appeared to display an attenuated immune response to DNA treatment, although grey horses bearing melanoma responded to this treatment with moderate tumour remission in a preceding study. Whether the different immunological reactivity compared to other horses may contributes to the melanoma susceptibility of grey horses remains to be elucidated

Beyond Gang Truces and Mano Dura Policies: Towards Substitutive Security Governance in Latin America

With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-gang efforts in Latin America has focused mainly on coercive 'mano dura' policies and cooperative gang truces. Yet, there remains a paucity of studies going beyond such carrots-and-sticks approaches towards gangs. To fill this gap, this study investigates the possibilities and limitations of substitutive security governance across Latin America and the Caribbean. More specifically, this article looks at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Medellín, Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVRP) efforts in Haiti and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Guatemala and Rio de Janeiro. It will be argued that communities are driven to support gangs against the oppressive state when they are indiscriminately targeted through muscular operations. Likewise, engaging gangs in dialogue grants them legitimacy and further weakens the position of the state. Therefore, the only sustainable solution lies in substitutive security governance, which aims to replace the functions gangs fulfil for their members, sponsors, and the community in which they are nested with a modern and accountable state that is bound by the rule of law. Still, substitutive strategies vis-à-vis gangs have their own limitations, which can only be overcome by way of an integrated and coordinated framework

Approaching community-based armed groups during DRC’s Ebola epidemic

The combination of political, economic and security factors behind attacks on health workers and facilities during the 2018–20 Ebola outbreak in the DRC shows that we need to expand responses to epidemics beyond a focus on health aspects. Instead, a more comprehensive approach must also encompass efforts to engage, manage and transform community-based armed groups

Drogenhandel und informelle Sicherheitskräfte in Kenia

The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya.Der kenianische Staat gerät derzeit von zwei Seiten unter Druck: Erstens haben zahlreiche nichtstaatliche bewaffnete Gruppen in Gebieten, in denen der Staat praktisch nicht präsent ist, den Sicherheitssektor übernommen; zweitens gewinnt der Drogenhandel immer mehr an Boden, weil das Land zunehmend als bedeutender Drogenumschlagplatz genutzt wird. Der Beitrag untersucht die Beziehungen zwischen Drogenhandel und informellen Sicherheitsstrukturen in Kenia und zieht einen Vergleich zu ähnlichen Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika und Westafrika. Aufgrund seiner Feldforschungen in Kenia kommt der Autor zu dem Schluss, dass profitorientierte informelle Sicherheitsakteure in Mombasa für Drogenhändler arbeiten, währed entsprechende Gruppen in Nairobi eher von Politikern angeheuert werden. Zudem scheinen glaubensbasierte Gruppen in beiden Städten weniger empfänglich für Manipulationsversuche von Drogenhändlern zu sein. Abschließend skizziert der Autor die potenziellen Konsequenzen einer Ausweitung des Drogenhandels in Kenia

Drogenhandel und informelle Sicherheitskräfte in Kenia

The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya.Der kenianische Staat gerät derzeit von zwei Seiten unter Druck: Erstens haben zahlreiche nichtstaatliche bewaffnete Gruppen in Gebieten, in denen der Staat praktisch nicht präsent ist, den Sicherheitssektor übernommen; zweitens gewinnt der Drogenhandel immer mehr an Boden, weil das Land zunehmend als bedeutender Drogenumschlagplatz genutzt wird. Der Beitrag untersucht die Beziehungen zwischen Drogenhandel und informellen Sicherheitsstrukturen in Kenia und zieht einen Vergleich zu ähnlichen Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika und Westafrika. Aufgrund seiner Feldforschungen in Kenia kommt der Autor zu dem Schluss, dass profitorientierte informelle Sicherheitsakteure in Mombasa für Drogenhändler arbeiten, währed entsprechende Gruppen in Nairobi eher von Politikern angeheuert werden. Zudem scheinen glaubensbasierte Gruppen in beiden Städten weniger empfänglich für Manipulationsversuche von Drogenhändlern zu sein. Abschließend skizziert der Autor die potenziellen Konsequenzen einer Ausweitung des Drogenhandels in Kenia

Negotiating humanitarian space with criminal armed groups in urban Latin America

Humanitarian and development agencies intervening in Latin American cities increasingly face the challenge posed by criminal armed groups (CAGs). Yet, there is a need for evidence-based comparative studies on how international agencies deal with them. Drawing on data collected in Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico, this paper presents a novel typology of humanitarian organisations' access strategies that distinguishes between different levels of interaction with CAGs. The paper shows how humanitarian agencies assess a variety of risks and balance the potential consequences of their engagement with CAGs with the need to maintain constructive and trustful relationships with the state and the community with which they work. It finds that indirect dialogue or negotiation with CAGs via community leaders who act as intermediaries might provide a low-risk alternative to direct negotiation with CAG leaders, provided that ‘do no harm’ and humanitarian protection considerations vis-à-vis communities and intermediaries play a central role