Remember me? The role of gender and racial attributes in memory

Remembering people is at the core of many social and economic relationships. We present evidence of systematic biases in the way we remember people, based on two experiments. The first experiment is conducted in a real professional setting - academia. Participants of two academic conferences are asked to recall ‘who presented what’ a month after attending the conferences. The second experiment is a controlled version of the first. Participants are shown pictures of people, matched with the title of a paper. We exogenously vary the relative shares of women and non-white individuals. In both experiments, we find evidence that women and ethnic minorities are more likely to be remembered in settings where they are in a small minority. In contrast, they are more likely to be confused with each other when they are in larger fraction. These findings are in line with a theory of categorization. People with minority attributes appear to be “blended together.” We conjecture that these biases in remembering could have important implications for the formation of professional networks

Does Monitoring Work? A Field Experiment with Multiple Forms of Counterproductive Behaviour

This paper provides .eld experimental evidence on the effects of monitoring in a context where workers can engage in various forms of counterproductive behaviour and only one of them is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us (identifying euro coins) for which they are paid a .at fee. There are various ways they can behave counterproductively: they can perform sloppily, not complete the task within the requested time or even steal some of the coins. We study how monitoring one productivity dimension (sloppiness) spills over to others (tardiness and theft). We find that introducing lax monitoring does not improve performance, but increases tardiness substantially. Strict monitoring increases tardiness to the same extent, but also leads to substantial improvements in performance. Theft, on the other hand, occurs more rarely and its prevalence is not affected by the monitoring scheme. We conclude that monitoring does have a discipling effect on workers, but at the same time, workers retaliate for being monitored and do so in the least costly manner for themselves (both in monetary and non-monetary terms)

The Desire to Influence Others

We introduce the give-or-destroy game that allows us to fully elicit an individual\u27s social preference schedule. We find that about one third of the population exhibits both pro-social and anti-social preferences that are independent of payoff comparisons with those who are affected. We call this type of preference a desire to influence others. The other two thirds of the population consist to almost equal parts of payoff maximizers and pro-socials. Furthermore, we find that full information and experimenter demand may increase the extent of pro-social preferences, but neither treatment affects the extent of anti-social preferences or the distribution of social types in the population

Sloppy Work, Lies and Theft: A Novel Experimental Design to Study Counterproductive Behaviour

We propose a novel experimental design to study counterproductive behaviour in a principal agent setting. The design allows us to study and derive clean measures of different forms of counterproductive behaviour in a controlled but non obtrusive manner. We ask participants to complete a specific task (identify euro coins) and report their output. Participants can engage in various forms of counterproductive behaviour, none of them being offered to them explicitly. They can make mistakes in the identification task, lie in their report or even steal coins. We present an application of the design to study the effects of different pay schemes (competition, fixed pay and piece rate) on counterproductive behaviour. On average counterproductive behaviour amounts to 10 percent of the average productivity, almost all arising through mistakes and overreporting of output. We find essentially no evidence of theft. Moreover, we find that both productive and counterproductive behaviour are significantly higher under competition than under the two other pay schemes

The spillover effects of monitoring:A field experiment

Published Online: March 13, 2015We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are harsh, but substantially reduces punctuality irrespectively of the associated incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with 10% of participants stealing overall. Our findings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted

The spillover effects of monitoring:A field experiment

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted

Rewarding behavior with a sweet food strengthens its valuation

Sweet foods are commonly used as rewards for desirable behavior, specifically among children. This study examines whether such practice may contribute to reinforce the valuation of these foods. Two experiments were conducted, one with children, the other with rats. The first study, conducted with first graders (n = 214), shows that children who receive a food reward for performing a cognitive task subsequently value the food more compared to a control group who received the same food without performing any task. The second study, conducted on rats (n = 64), shows that rewarding with food also translates into higher calorie intake over a 24-hour period. These results suggest that the common practice of rewarding children with calorie-dense sweet foods is a plausible contributing factor to obesity and might therefore be ill advised. © 2021 This is an open access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication

Pandem-icons — exploring the characteristics of highly visible scientists during the Covid-19 pandemic

The Covid-19 pandemic escalated demand for scientific explanations and guidance, creating opportunities for scientists to become publicly visible. In this study, we compared characteristics of visible scientists during the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic (January to December 2020) across 16 countries. We find that the scientists who became visible largely matched socio-cultural criteria that have characterised visible scientists in the past (e.g., age, gender, credibility, public image, involvement in controversies). However, there were limited tendencies that scientists commented outside their areas of expertise. We conclude that the unusual circumstances created by Covid-19 did not change the phenomenon of visible scientists in significant way

Halochromic coordination polymers based on a triarylmethane dye for reversible detection of acids

Chromeazurol B (Na2HL) is a pH-sensitive (halochromic) dye based on a hydroxytriarylmethane core and two carboxylate functional groups, which makes it suitable for the synthesis of coordination polymers. Two new coordination polymers [NaZn4(H2O)3(L)3]·3THF·3H2O (1) and [Zn3(H2O)3(μ2- OH2)(μ3-OH)(HL)2(H2L)]·2THF·3H2O (2) incorporating Chromeazurol B linkers have been prepared and characterised. The structure of 1 comprises pentanuclear heterometallic {Zn4Na} nodes linked by six L3– anions to give a layered structure with a honeycomb topology. 2 crystallizes as a double-chain ribbon (ladder) structure with two types of metal node: a mononuclear Zn(II) cation and tetranuclear {Zn(II)}4 cluster. Chromeazurol B anions link each tetranuclear cluster to four individual Zn(II) cations and each Zn(II) cation with four tetranuclear clusters. Both compounds show pH-sensitivity in water solution which can be observed visually, giving the first example of a halochromic coordination polymer. The halochromic properties of 1 towards HCl vapors were systematically investigated. As-synthesized violet-grey 1 reversibly changes color from orange to pink in the presence of vapors of 2M and 7M HCl, respectively. The coordination of the Chromeazurol B anion at each color stage was examined by diffuse reflectance spectroscopy and FT-IR measurements. The remarkable stability of 1 to acid and the observed reversible and reproducible color changes provide a new design for multifunctional sensor materials