Polynomial sequences of binomial-type arising in graph theory

In this paper, we show that the solution to a large class of "tiling" problems is given by a polynomial sequence of binomial type. More specifically, we show that the number of ways to place a fixed set of polyominos on an $n\times n$ toroidal chessboard such that no two polyominos overlap is eventually a polynomial in $n$, and that certain sets of these polynomials satisfy binomial-type recurrences. We exhibit generalizations of this theorem to higher dimensions and other lattices. Finally, we apply the techniques developed in this paper to resolve an open question about the structure of coefficients of chromatic polynomials of certain grid graphs (namely that they also satisfy a binomial-type recurrence).Comment: 15 page

Information complexity is computable

The information complexity of a function $f$ is the minimum amount of information Alice and Bob need to exchange to compute the function $f$. In this paper we provide an algorithm for approximating the information complexity of an arbitrary function $f$ to within any additive error $\alpha > 0$, thus resolving an open question as to whether information complexity is computable. In the process, we give the first explicit upper bound on the rate of convergence of the information complexity of $f$ when restricted to $b$-bit protocols to the (unrestricted) information complexity of $f$.Comment: 30 page

Load limiting energy absorbing lightweight debris catcher

In the representative embodiment of the invention disclosed, a load limiting, energy absorbing net is arranged to overlay a normally-covered vent opening in the rear bulkhead of the space orbiter vehicle. Spatially-disposed flexible retainer straps are extended from the net and respectively secured to bulkhead brackets spaced around the vent opening. The intermediate portions of the straps are doubled over and stitched together in a pattern enabling the doubled-over portions to progressively separate at a predicable load designed to be well below the tensile capability of the straps as the stitches are successively torn apart by the forces imposed on the retainer members whenever the cover plate is explosively separated from the bulkhead and propelled into the net. By arranging these stitches to be successively torn away at a load below the strap strength in response to forces acting on the retainers that are less than the combined strength of the retainers, this tearing action serves as a predictable compact energy absorber for safely halting the cover plate as the retainers are extended as the net is deployed. The invention further includes a block of an energy-absorbing material positioned in the net for receiving loose debris produced by the explosive release of the cover plate

Fast Dynamic Pointer Following via Link-Cut Trees

In this paper, we study the problem of fast dynamic pointer following: given a directed graph $G$ where each vertex has outdegree $1$, efficiently support the operations of i) changing the outgoing edge of any vertex, and ii) find the vertex $k$ vertices `after' a given vertex. We exhibit a solution to this problem based on link-cut trees that requires $O(\lg n)$ time per operation, and prove that this is optimal in the cell-probe complexity model.Comment: 7 page

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of $n$ competitors. Specifically, $n$ competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r$ maps the result of all $\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches (called a tournament, $T$) to a distribution over winners. Rule $r$ is Condorcet-consistent if whenever $i$ wins all $n-1$ of her matches, $r$ selects $i$ with probability $1$. We consider strategic manipulation of tournaments where player $j$ might throw their match to player $i$ in order to increase the likelihood that one of them wins the tournament. Regardless of the reason why $j$ chooses to do this, the potential for manipulation exists as long as $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ increases by more than $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ decreases. Unfortunately, it is known that every Condorcet-consistent rule is manipulable (Altman and Kleinberg). In this work, we address the question of how manipulable Condorcet-consistent rules must necessarily be - by trying to minimize the difference between the increase in $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ and decrease in $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ for any potential manipulating pair. We show that every Condorcet-consistent rule is in fact $1/3$-manipulable, and that selecting a winner according to a random single elimination bracket is not $\alpha$-manipulable for any $\alpha > 1/3$. We also show that many previously studied tournament formats are all $1/2$-manipulable, and the popular class of Copeland rules (any rule that selects a player with the most wins) are all in fact $1$-manipulable, the worst possible. Finally, we consider extensions to match-fixing among sets of more than two players.Comment: 20 page

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational and will perfectly reason about how their bids today affect the seller's decisions tomorrow. In this work we initiate a different direction: the buyer simply runs a no-regret learning algorithm over possible bids. We provide a fairly complete characterization of optimal auctions for the seller in this domain. Specifically: - If the buyer bids according to EXP3 (or any "mean-based" learning algorithm), then the seller can extract expected revenue arbitrarily close to the expected welfare. This auction is independent of the buyer's valuation $D$, but somewhat unnatural as it is sometimes in the buyer's interest to overbid. - There exists a learning algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ such that if the buyer bids according to $\mathcal{A}$ then the optimal strategy for the seller is simply to post the Myerson reserve for $D$ every round. - If the buyer bids according to EXP3 (or any "mean-based" learning algorithm), but the seller is restricted to "natural" auction formats where overbidding is dominated (e.g. Generalized First-Price or Generalized Second-Price), then the optimal strategy for the seller is a pay-your-bid format with decreasing reserves over time. Moreover, the seller's optimal achievable revenue is characterized by a linear program, and can be unboundedly better than the best truthful auction yet simultaneously unboundedly worse than the expected welfare