'Descended from immigrants and revolutionists': how family immigration history shapes representation in Congress

Does recent immigrant lineage influence the legislative behavior of members of Congress on immigration policy? We examine the relationship between the immigrant background of legislators (i.e., their generational distance from immigration) and legislative behavior, focusing on roll-call votes for landmark immigration legislation and congressional speech on the floor. Legislators more proximate to the immigrant experience tend to support more permissive immigration legislation. Legislators with recent immigration backgrounds also speak more often about immigration in Congress, though the size of immigrant constituencies in their districts accounts for a larger share of this effect. A regression discontinuity design on close elections, which addresses selection bias concerns and holds district composition constant, confirms that legislators with recent immigrant backgrounds tend to support pro-immigration legislation. Finally, we demonstrate how a common immigrant identity can break down along narrower ethnic lines in cases where restrictive legislation targets specific places of origin. Our findings illustrate the important role of immigrant identity in legislative behavior and help illuminate the legislative dynamics of present-day immigration policy.Accepted manuscrip

Canvassers tend to seek out supporters who are like themselves, and that's not good for political participation.

Petition canvassers play an important role as political recruiters by introducing citizens to political issues and seeking their support. But not much is known about how these canvassers decide whom to recruit or about their methods. Research by Clayton Nall, Benjamin Schneer, and Daniel Carpenter sets forth a model of political recruiting that changes depending on canvassers' experiences, is constrained ..

How Electoral Institutions Shape Citizen Participation and Legislative Behavior

The electoral system is often treated as fixed, but throughout U.S. history significant changes in electoral institutions, or in political conditions dictated by electoral institutions, make it possible to identify more precisely the role that the electoral system plays in the democratic process. This dissertation examines three related questions, each focusing on an aspect of the influence of electoral rules on political behavior. How has the ability to directly elect representatives influenced other forms of citizen engagement with government? How has competitiveness influenced voter turnout? Finally, when separate elections lead to differences in partisan control over the branches of government, what is the effect on policymaking in Congress? The first chapter shows that petitioning campaigns have historically substituted for the communication and accountability obtained through direct elections. I estimate that rates of petitioning to the Senate declined by 30% when the passage of the 17th Amendment ended the practice of indirect election by state legislatures and replaced it with direct elections. The implication is that electoral reforms meant to improve representation may weaken other ties between citizens and lawmakers. The second chapter examines the relationship between electoral competition and turnout. Past research has found that citizens vote at higher rates in response to closer elections, either through instrumental voting at the individual level or through voter mobilization by elites. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that citizens living in competitive congressional districts differ markedly from those in uncompetitive districts along a range of dimensions other than turnout. Using an individual panel based on voter files from all 50 states and exploiting variation in competitiveness induced by the 2012 redistricting cycle yields a precisely estimated null effect of competitiveness on turnout. The third chapter re-examines whether divided government reduces legislative productivity. After developing the most comprehensive database to date of significant acts of Congress---from 1789-2010---this chapter shows that unified control corresponds with one additional significant act passed per Congress in the 19th Century and four additional such acts in the 20th Century. However, party control of government cannot explain the broad historical trends in the rate at which Congress passes significant legislation.Governmen

Divided government and significant legislation: A History of Congress from 1789 to 2010

This article presents and analyzes the most comprehensive database to date of significant acts of Congress—from 1789 to 2010—to test whether divided party control of government affects the number of important acts Congress passes. We find that unified control corresponds with one additional significant act passed per Congress in the nineteenth century and four additional such acts in the twentieth century. However, party control of government cannot explain the broad historical trends in the rate at which Congress passes significant legislation. Nixon in 1969 was far more successful with a Democratic Congress than was McKinley in 1897 with a Republican one

Replication Data for: How Electoral Institutions Shape Citizen Participation and Legislative Behavior

The electoral system is often treated as fixed, but throughout U.S. history significant changes in electoral institutions, or in political conditions dictated by electoral institutions, make it possible to identify more precisely the role that the electoral system plays in the democratic process. This dissertation examines three related questions, each focusing on a different aspect of the influence of electoral rules on political behavior. How has the ability to directly elect representatives influenced other forms of citizen engagement with government? For a given election, how has competitiveness influenced voter turnout? Finally, when separate elections lead to differences in partisan control over the branches of government, what is the effect on policymaking in Congress? The first chapter shows that petitioning campaigns have historically substituted for the communication and accountability obtained through direct elections. I estimate that rates of petitioning to the Senate declined by 30\% when the passage of the 17th Amendment ended the practice of indirect election by state legislatures and replaced it with direct elections. The implication is that electoral reforms meant to improve representation may weaken other ties between citizens and lawmakers. The second chapter examines the relationship between electoral competition and turnout. Past research has consistently found that citizens vote at higher rates in response to closer elections, either through instrumental voting at the individual level or through voter mobilization by elites. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that citizens living in competitive congressional districts differ markedly from those in uncompetitive districts along a range of dimensions other than turnout. Using an individual panel based on voter files from all 50 states and exploiting variation in competitiveness induced by the 2012 redistricting cycle yields a precisely estimated null effect of competitiveness on turnout. This finding suggests that neither instrumental voting nor elite mobilization theories operate as previously held in this context. The third chapter re-examines whether divided government reduces legislative productivity. After developing the most comprehensive database to date of significant acts of Congress---from 1789-2010---this chapter shows that unified control corresponds with one additional significant act passed per Congress in the 19th Century and four additional such acts in the 20th Century. However, party control of government cannot explain the broad historical trends in the rate at which Congress passes significant legislation

Analysis of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission Congressional and Legislative District Maps

We have been retained by the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission to analyze data from the congressional district maps drawn for the 2011 —2012 redistricting cycle and approved by the Commission. In this report, we estimate the extent of racially polarized voting, determine the identification and electability of the minority groups' candidates of choice, and (through a new method we introduce for the first time here) offer one way to evaluate whether stronger districts could have been drawn. We perform these analyses for both the benchmark map and proposed map, which allows for a judgment of whether the proposed map has a retrogressive effect. Our analyses are based on available quantitative information; much supplementary qualitative information will appear in other documents submitted by the Commission. We have conducted extensive analyses of this redistricting plan, with a large number of individual runs. The main body of this report explains the methodology (Section 2) and then gives the results (Section 3). The appendix gives more results, and our web appendix gives much more extensive and detailed results. Overall, we find that the two voting rights districts have similar levels of racially polarized voting between the baseline and new plans. On the basis of the quantitative information we have used, it seems straightforward to identify the candidate of choice of the Hispanic community and both new districts would seem to have the ability to elect these candidates. We also find that it would be difficult, and unnecessary if it were possible, to draw districts more favorable to minorities. We see no evidence of retrogression

Replication Data for: Post-Political Careers: How Politicians Capitalize on Public Office

Replication data and code for "Post-Political Careers: How Politicians Capitalize on Public Office.

Replication Data for: Capitol Gains: The Returns to Elected Office from Corporate Board Directorships

Replication data and code for "Capitol Gains: The Returns to Elected Office from Corporate Board Directorships.