Bosonic stimulation of cold 1s excitons into a harmonic potential minimum in Cu2_2O

Density distribution of cold exciton clouds generated into a strain-induced potential well by two-photon excitation in Cu$_2$O is studied at 2 K. We find that an anomalous spike, which can be interpreted as accumulation of the excitons into the ground state, emerges at the potential minimum. The accumulation can be due to stimulated scattering of cold excitons, mediated by acoustic phonon emission. Possibility of the formation of the thermodynamic Bose-Einstein condensate of paraexcitons has been discussed.Comment: Submitted to Solid State Communications on 17 December, 200

Wired warfare 3.0: protecting the civilian population during cyber operations

As a general matter, international humanitarian law is up to the task of providing the legal framework for cyber operations during an armed conflict. However, two debates persist in this regard, the resolution of which will determine the precise degree of protection the civilian population will enjoy during cyber operations. The first revolves around the meaning of the term “attack” in various conduct of hostilities rules, while the second addresses the issue of whether data may be considered an object such that operations destroying or altering it are subject to the prohibition on attacking civilian objects and that such effects need be considered when considering proportionality and the taking of precautions in attack. Even if these debates were to be resolved, the civilian population would still face risks from the unique capabilities of cyber operations. This article proposes two policies which parties to a conflict should consider adopting in order to ameliorate such risks. They are both based on the premise that military operations must reflect a balance between military concerns and the interest of States in prevailing in the conflict

International humanitarian law and the targeting of non-state intelligence personnel and objects

This Article examines the targetability of individuals and organizations performing intelligence functions for a non-State group involved in an armed conflict. Specifically, it considers the circumstances under which they lose the international humanitarian law (IHL) protections from, and during, attacks that they would otherwise enjoy as civilians. To do so, the piece deconstructs IHL’s “organized armed group” construct to determine when an intelligence organization can be characterized as a component thereof. Noting that some non-State groups consist of both entities involved in the hostilities and organizations having no relationship to them, the Article introduces the concept of a non-State group’s “overall OAG,” a notion that parallel’s the characterization of a State’s various military units as its “armed forces.” Additionally, the Article assesses the circumstances under which individuals engaged in activities intelligence who are not members of an OAG may be targeted on the basis of their “direct participation in the hostilities.

The law of cyber targeting

Cyber technology on the battlefield has outpaced the law, or at least full understanding of how extant law governs emerging capabilities—a strategically perilous state of affairs

“On target”: precision and balance in the contemporary law of targeting

The law of targeting lies at the heart of international humanitarian law (IHL). As such it is the fulcrum around which discussion of combat operations revolves. The efficacy of this body of law depends on maintenance of the delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns. Mischaracterization or misapplication of IHL norms risks imbalance, thereby jeopardizing the innocent and potentially eroding State support for IHL’s application. Regrettably, while some of the current debate and commentary surrounding, inter alia, drone operations, autonomous weapons systems, cyber operations, and the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Ukraine, to name just a few, is highly sophisticated, much of it has been characterized by imprecise, skewed, or wrong assertions regarding the law of targeting. It is therefore a propitious moment to revisit the structure and content of targeting law. After briefly placing the law of targeting in the broader context of IHL, this article examines the five constituent elements of a targeting operation: (1) target; (2) weapon; (3) execution of the attack; (4) collateral damage and incidental injury; and (5) location. The legality of an engagement depends on full compliance with the rules falling into each category

State opinio juris and international humanitarian law pluralism

International humanitarian law has developed through a pluralistic process. Its history reveals a pattern of rough proportionality between State opinio juris and non-State expressions of law. These diverse sources have maintained a respectable yet realistic balance between humanity and military necessity. However, current IHL dialogue presents a stark contrast to the vibrant and pluralistic exchanges of the past. The substantive input of non-State actors such as non-governmental organizations, tribunals, and scholars far outpaces the work of States. Parity of input, especially in quantitative terms, is surely too much to demand and surely not necessary given the special status of State opinio juris. However, States’ legal agencies and agents should be equipped, organized, and re-empowered to participate actively in the interpretation and development of IHL. This article, extracted from a larger work, argues that reinvigorating opinio juris would reestablish the pluralistic IHL dialogue that formerly tested, updated, and enriched the balance between military necessity and humanity

Beyond state-centrism: international law and non-state actors in cyberspace

Classically, States and non-State actors were differentiated not only by disparities in legal status but also by significant imbalances in resources and capabilities. Not surprisingly, international law developed a State-centric bias to account for these imbalances. Cyberspace and cyber operations, however, have closed a number of formerly significant gaps between States’ and non-State actors’ abilities to compromise international peace and security. In fact, some non-State actors now match, if not exceed, the cyber capabilities of many States in this respect. Where public international law had long proved chiefly relevant to States’ interactions with other States, cyber operations by non-State actors increase the frequency with which public international law provides relevant and binding legal rules. This article surveys existing public international law for norms relevant to the cyber interactions of cyber-empowered States and non-State actors. Specifically, the article illustrates how the principles of sovereignty, State responsibility and the jus ad bellum are particularly relevant to States engaged in struggles with non-State actors for security and supremacy in cyberspace