14,880 research outputs found

    Elementary derivations of identities for bilateral basic hypergeometric series

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    We give elementary derivations of several classical and some new summation and transformation formulae for bilateral basic hypergeometric series. For purpose of motivation, we review our previous simple proof ("A simple proof of Bailey's very-well-poised 6-psi-6 summation", Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., to appear) of Bailey's very-well-poised 6-psi-6 summation. Using a similar but different method, we now give elementary derivations of some transformations for bilateral basic hypergeometric series. In particular, these include M. Jackson's very-well-poised 8-psi-8 transformation, a very-well-poised 10-psi-10 transformation, by induction, Slater's general transformation for very-well-poised 2r-psi-2r series, and Slater's transformation for general r-psi-r series. Finally, we derive some new transformations for bilateral basic hypergeometric series of Chu-Gasper-Karlsson-Minton-type.Comment: LaTeX2e, 35 pages, revised abstract and introductio

    A simple proof of Bailey's very-well-poised 6-psi-6 summation

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    We give elementary derivations of some classical summation formulae for bilateral (basic) hypergeometric series. In particular, we apply Gauss' 2-F-1 summation and elementary series manipulations to give a simple proof of Dougall's 2-H-2 summation. Similarly, we apply Rogers' nonterminating 6-phi-5 summation and elementary series manipulations to give a simple proof of Bailey's very-well-poised 6-psi-6 summation. Our method of proof extends M. Jackson's first elementary proof of Ramanujan's 1-psi-1 summation.Comment: LaTeX2e, 10 pages, submitted to Proc. AMS, revised version, proofs of 1-psi-1 and 2-H-2 summations include

    Embodied cognition and temporally extended agency

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    According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied this. I will argue that there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position

    Dual-system theory and the role of consciousness in intentional action

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    According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action

    Bilateral identities of the Rogers-Ramanujan type

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    We derive by analytic means a number of bilateral identities of the Rogers-Ramanujan type. Our results include bilateral extensions of the Rogers-Ramanujan and the G\"ollnitz-Gordon identities, and of related identities by Ramanujan, Jackson, and Slater. We give corresponding results for multiseries including multilateral extensions of the Andrews-Gordon identities, of Bressoud's even modulus identities, and other identities. The here revealed closed form bilateral and multilateral summations appear to be the very first of their kind. Given that the classical Rogers-Ramanujan identities have well-established connections to various areas in mathematics and in physics, it is natural to expect that the new bilateral and multilateral identities can be similarly connected to those areas. This is supported by concrete combinatorial interpretations for a collection of four bilateral companions to the classical Rogers-Ramanujan identities.Comment: 25 page

    On Warnaar's elliptic matrix inversion and Karlsson-Minton-type elliptic hypergeometric series

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    Using Krattenthaler's operator method, we give a new proof of Warnaar's recent elliptic extension of Krattenthaler's matrix inversion. Further, using a theta function identity closely related to Warnaar's inversion, we derive summation and transformation formulas for elliptic hypergeometric series of Karlsson-Minton-type. A special case yields a particular summation that was used by Warnaar to derive quadratic, cubic and quartic transformations for elliptic hypergeometric series. Starting from another theta function identity, we derive yet different summation and transformation formulas for elliptic hypergeometric series of Karlsson-Minton-type. These latter identities seem quite unusual and appear to be new already in the trigonometric (i.e., p=0) case.Comment: 16 page
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