Moral status of accidents

No one is naive enough to expect that all moral beliefs are universal. Today, some countries legally beat and imprison homosexuals, and others recognize gay marriage; in some places, killing a bull is a sport, and, in others, it is an abomination; in some places, corporal punishment is the obligation of a responsible parent and, in others, grounds for forced removal. Indeed, the burden of proof seems to be on the other side: Is there anything universal about human moral cognition? In PNAS, Barrett et al. (1) test one candidate for a universal principle of human morality: that an action’s moral value depends not only on the action’s consequences but on the person’s intentions

For Love or Money: A Common Neural Currency for Social and Monetary Reward

Two papers in the current issue of Neuron (Izuma et al. and Zink et al.) report that activity in specific regions of the brain, especially the striatum, reflects a common signal of reward in both the economic (e.g., money) and social (e.g., praise and status) domains

The Power of Being Heard: The Benefits of \u27Perspective-Giving\u27 in the Context of Intergroup Conflict

Although hundreds of dialogue programs geared towards conflict resolution are offered every year, there have been few scientific studies of their effectiveness. Across 2 studies we examined the effect of controlled, dyadic interactions on attitudes towards the ‘other’ in members of groups involved in ideological conflict. Study 1 involved Mexican immigrants and White Americans in Arizona, and Study 2 involved Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Cross-group dyads interacted via video and text in a brief, structured, face-to-face exchange: one person was assigned to write about the difficulties of life in their society (‘perspective-giving’), and the second person was assigned to accurately summarize the statement of the first person (‘perspective-taking’). Positive changes in attitudes towards the outgroup were greater for Mexican immigrants and Palestinians after perspective-giving and for White Americans and Israelis after perspective-taking. For Palestinians, perspective-giving to an Israeli effectively changed attitudes towards Israelis, while a control condition in which they wrote an essay on the same topic without interacting had no effect on attitudes, illustrating the critical role of being heard. Thus, the effects of dialogue for conflict resolution depend on an interaction between dialogue condition and participants\u27 group membership, which may reflect power asymmetries

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem

Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others’ goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind

Continuity in the neural system supporting children's theory of mind development: Longitudinal links between task-independent EEG and task-dependent fMRI.

Children's explicit theory of mind (ToM) understandings change over early childhood. We examined whether there is longitudinal stability in the neurobiological bases of ToM across this time period. A previous study found that source-localized resting EEG alpha attributable to the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) was associated with children's performance on a battery of theory of mind tasks. Here, we investigated a small subset of children (N = 12) in that original study as a preliminary investigation of whether behavioral measures of ToM performance, and/or EEG localized to the DMPFC or RTPJ predicted ToM-specific fMRI responses 3.5 years later. Results showed that preschoolers' behavioral ToM-performance positively predicted later ToM-specific fMRI responses in the DMPFC. Preschoolers' resting EEG attributable to the DMPFC also predicted later ToM-specific fMRI responses in the DMPFC. Given the small sample, results represent a first exploration and require replication. Intriguingly, they suggest that early maturation of the area of the DMPFC related to ToM reasoning is positively linked with its specific recruitment for ToM reasoning later in development, affording implications for characterizing conceptual ToM development, and its underlying neural supports

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem

Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others' goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 0645960)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 095518)National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant 1R01 MH096914-01A1

A Common Neural Code for Perceived and Inferred Emotion

Although the emotions of other people can often be perceived from overt reactions (e.g., facial or vocal expressions), they can also be inferred from situational information in the absence of observable expressions. How does the human brain make use of these diverse forms of evidence to generate a common representation of a target's emotional state? In the present research, we identify neural patterns that correspond to emotions inferred from contextual information and find that these patterns generalize across different cues from which an emotion can be attributed. Specifically, we use functional neuroimaging to measure neural responses to dynamic facial expressions with positive and negative valence and to short animations in which the valence of a character's emotion could be identified only from the situation. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we test for regions that contain information about the target's emotional state, identifying representations specific to a single stimulus type and representations that generalize across stimulus types. In regions of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a classifier trained to discriminate emotional valence for one stimulus (e.g., animated situations) could successfully discriminate valence for the remaining stimulus (e.g., facial expressions), indicating a representation of valence that abstracts away from perceptual features and generalizes across different forms of evidence. Moreover, in a subregion of MPFC, this neural representation generalized to trials involving subjectively experienced emotional events, suggesting partial overlap in neural responses to attributed and experienced emotions. These data provide a step toward understanding how the brain transforms stimulus-bound inputs into abstract representations of emotion.National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant 1R01 MH096914-01A1

Look at this: the neural correlates of initiating and responding to bids for joint attention

When engaging in joint attention, one person directs another person's attention to an object (Initiating Joint Attention, IJA), and the second person's attention follows (Responding to Joint Attention, RJA). As such, joint attention must occur within the context of a social interaction. This ability is critical to language and social development; yet the neural bases for this pivotal skill remain understudied. This paucity of research is likely due to the challenge in acquiring functional MRI data during a naturalistic, contingent social interaction. To examine the neural bases of both IJA and RJA we implemented a dual-video set-up that allowed for a face-to-face interaction between subject and experimenter via video during fMRI data collection. In each trial, participants either followed the experimenter's gaze to a target (RJA) or cued the experimenter to look at the target (IJA). A control condition, solo attention (SA), was included in which the subject shifted gaze to a target while the experimenter closed her eyes. Block and event-related analyses were conducted and revealed common and distinct regions for IJA and RJA. Distinct regions included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for RJA and intraparietal sulcus and middle frontal gyrus for IJA (as compared to SA). Conjunction analyses revealed overlap in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) for IJA and RJA (as compared to SA) for the event analyses. Functional connectivity analyses during a resting baseline suggest joint attention processes recruit distinct but interacting networks, including social-cognitive, voluntary attention orienting, and visual networks. This novel experimental set-up allowed for the identification of the neural bases of joint attention during a real-time interaction and findings suggest that whether one is the initiator or responder, the dMPFC and right pSTS, are selectively recruited during periods of joint attention