America in a Changing World

Commencement address given by William B. Saxbe, Ambassador to India, to the Spring 1975 graduating class of The Ohio State University, Ohio Stadium, Columbus, Ohio, June 13, 1975

Application to the Court

This Application to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Eastern Division by the Attorney General of Ohio, William B. Saxbe, pertains to the addition of Attorney Gertrude Bauer Mahon, as special counsel in the habeas corpus suit of Sheppard v. Maxwell

Student Unrest, and the Law

Many people have recently expressed alarm about the student unrest in our universities and on our college campuses. I am delighted to have this opportunity to submit an article to The Cleveland State Law Review, for it provides a forum for me to express my views on the subject

Brief of Respondent

Samuel H. Sheppard, on April 11, 1963, was granted leave to file his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in forma pauperis. At the time of hearing Sheppard\u27s application for leave to file in forma pauperis, counsel for the petitioner propounded that the discretion which formerly reposed in Federal District Courts as to whether a writ of habeas corpus should or should not be granted no longer exists and that the writ must issue. Cases cited in support of this position were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 18, 1963: Townsend v. Sain, No. 8, October Term, 1962, and Fay v. Noia, No. 84, October Term, 1962. This Court has directed that briefs be submitted dealing only with the question of whether it may exercise its discretion with respect to whether a writ of habeas corpus shall or shall not be issued. The Attorney General stated that these decisions had no application to the question at hand and did not in any way deny to the District Courts their long standing power to exercise sound judicial discretion; it merely elaborated certain rules which will be applied to the exercise of such discretion

Brief of Respondent

Samuel H. Sheppard, on April 11, 1963, was granted leave to file his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in forma pauperis. At the time of hearing Sheppard\u27s application for leave to file in forma pauperis, counsel for the petitioner propounded that the discretion which formerly reposed in Federal District Courts as to whether a writ of habeas corpus should or should not be granted no longer exists and that the writ must issue. Cases cited in support of this position were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 18, 1963: Townsend v. Sain, No. 8, October Term, 1962, and Fay v. Noia, No. 84, October Term, 1962. This Court has directed that briefs be submitted dealing only with the question of whether it may exercise its discretion with respect to whether a writ of habeas corpus shall or shall not be issued. The Attorney General stated that these decisions had no application to the question at hand and did not in any way deny to the District Courts their long standing power to exercise sound judicial discretion; it merely elaborated certain rules which will be applied to the exercise of such discretion

Brief of Resondents

This Brief outlines the Respondents (State/Prosecution) side of legal support for why the Sheppard Case was conducted in a partial and Constitutional manner. The two questions they present include: DID THE PUBLICITY RELATING TO THE PETITIONER DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL? and WAS THE PETITIONER DEPRIVED OF A PUBLIC TRIAL? Using precedent and examination of the Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) case and the case of Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct., 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d, 663 (1963), (perhaps the two cases most favorable to petitioner\u27s position) reveal where the United States Supreme Court has drawn the boundaries for what constitutes a fair trial in the face of adverse publicity. These cases with such a pattern of facts reveals situations that caused the United States Supreme Court to reverse both convictions. Although slightly similar to Sheppard, various factors suggest that the deep-rooted prejudice that existed in the Rideau and Irvin cases did not exist in the Sheppard case–as noted by respondents. After an examination of the relevant factors surrounding the Sheppard jury and the publicity in the community, respondent finds that it can merely repeat the words of the United States District Court in United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 (1962): Publicity, in and of itself does not, foreclose a fair trial. The courts do not function in a vacuum and jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of what goes on about them. * * * In considering the mentioned complaints it is necessary to keep in mind the following legal principles: The mere fact of unfavorable publicity does not of itself raise a presumption of prejudice but prejudice must manifest itself so as to corrupt due process. Dennis v. U.S., 302 F 2d 5 (1962). Mere exposure to adverse publicity does not necessarily result in bias, prejudgment or other disqualification. U.S. v. Applegarth, 206 F. Supp. 686, 687 (1962). The mere fact that a juror has read newspaper accounts relative to a criminal charge is not in itself sufficient grounds for excusing a jury. Blumenfield v. U.S, 284 F. 2d 46, 51 (1960). Also, regarding the petitioner\u27s (Sheppard) assertion that the action of the trial court in setting aside the major portion of the courtroom for representatives of the news media was violative of his right to a public trial. Respondent contends that the trial court was justified in its actions. Equally, the respondent is aware that the petitioner is going to present statements to the effect that the trial judge expressed his belief in the guilt of the petitioner before the trial commenced. Accordingly, respondent invites the Court\u27s attention to the recent case of Hendrix v. Hand, 312 F. 2d (1962) wherein the Court of Appeals, in a habeas corpus proceeding held that the mere fact that a trial judge in a state criminal prosecution signed a statement in advance of trial relating to the judge\u27s belief that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged did not establish any infringement of defendant\u27s right to a fair trial

Answer and Return of Writ

Respondent says that the record in this case affirmatively shows that the petitioner (Sheppard) was awarded a full and fair hearing in the state courts, resulting in reliable findings of fact, and that the state courts applied correct constitutional standards in disposing of the various claims of the petitioner. Respondent denies that the trial court erred in refusing to grant petitioner (Sheppard) a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Respondent denies that any relevant material or substantial evidence was suppressed by the prosecution or that any unjust tactics were used by the prosecuting authorities in the trial of this case. Respondent denies that the petitioner (Sheppard) was prevented from having a fair and impartial trial by the action of the trial judge as a result of the actions of the bailiffs in permitting the jurors to make telephone calls. Respondent denies that the trial judge coerced the jury into reaching a verdict, and avers that the fact that the jury deliberated for a period of five days merely shows the carefulness and consideration that the jury gave the mass of testimony and over 200 exhibits in the case. Respondent denies each and every other allegation in the petition not herein admitted to be true. Affirmatively, respondent alleges that petitioner was convicted in a court that had jurisdiction of his person and of the crime involved, that petitioner was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights, and that the facts upon which petitioner (Sheppard) relies, even if true, constitute mere error in the trial court, which is not cognizable in an action of habeas corpus. For the foregoing reasons, respondent prays that the petition herein be dismissed

Answer and Return of Writ

Respondent says that the record in this case affirmatively shows that the petitioner (Sheppard) was awarded a full and fair hearing in the state courts, resulting in reliable findings of fact, and that the state courts applied correct constitutional standards in disposing of the various claims of the petitioner. Respondent denies that the trial court erred in refusing to grant petitioner (Sheppard) a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Respondent denies that any relevant material or substantial evidence was suppressed by the prosecution or that any unjust tactics were used by the prosecuting authorities in the trial of this case. Respondent denies that the petitioner (Sheppard) was prevented from having a fair and impartial trial by the action of the trial judge as a result of the actions of the bailiffs in permitting the jurors to make telephone calls. Respondent denies that the trial judge coerced the jury into reaching a verdict, and avers that the fact that the jury deliberated for a period of five days merely shows the carefulness and consideration that the jury gave the mass of testimony and over 200 exhibits in the case. Respondent denies each and every other allegation in the petition not herein admitted to be true. Affirmatively, respondent alleges that petitioner was convicted in a court that had jurisdiction of his person and of the crime involved, that petitioner was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights, and that the facts upon which petitioner (Sheppard) relies, even if true, constitute mere error in the trial court, which is not cognizable in an action of habeas corpus. For the foregoing reasons, respondent prays that the petition herein be dismissed

Pre-Trial Order No. 3

Twenty-two (22) stipulation of issues to be considered by the court in this case; each stipulation is agreed to by counsel for the petitioner and the respondent. Each of the stipulations (questions) presented frame the issue of a violated constitutional right of Sam Sheppard