Profit Versus Non Profit: A Third Way? The Case of the Italian Mutual Cooperative Banks.

The traditional distinction between profit and non profit firms does not necessarily apply to some types of cooperative firms, such as the Italian mutual cooperative banks (MCBs). These MCBs present a peculiar governance structure, a combination between a public company governance model and a non-profit one. Similarly to a "not for profit organization", the ownership of the MCBs is widely diffused among borrowerowners, but dividends are not typically redistributed. Like in "public company bank", MCBs have a spread ownership and a board of directors. MCBs work in order to maximise social utility rather than profits, as a social entrepreneurship. MCBs represent a kind of third way governance model in the financial sector. The board of directors of a MCB acts as a public-good administrator in deciding on how to invest, with a deep impact on the local community. However, the governance of these banks is affected by structural problems. The mutual and co-operative nature of these banks is challenged by the increase in the number of members-owners and in the heterogeneity of the member-owners group. This study aims at investigating the democratic voting mechanism of the board (one-head one-vote) and its appropriateness given enlargement of the member's community. The research would tackle the issue of governance structure and incentive to efficient behavior.cooperative firm; mutualism; cooperative banks; corporate governance; italian banking sector

Timing of Investment and Dynamic Pricing in Privatized Sectors.

Firms in equipment-intensive sectors, where investment in production is performed at diminishing marginal cost, spend billions of dollars in equipment and production capacity. Typically, this expenditure is induced by either the replacement of existing equipment, which deteriorates with age and can result in higher operating costs and lower production capacity, or further investment, to benefit from any technological improvement embedded in new equipment. We identify the optimal price policy, and the ensuing optimal sequence of investment timing a privatized firm selects through time and compare them with choices made at the time when such a type of firm was under public-ownership.planning investment; dynamic programming; economic behavior; privatization

Job flows in Italian SMEs: a longitudinal analysis of growth, size and age

The paper proposes an empirical investigation of job flows for continuing manufacturing firms in Italy from 1996 to 2004 using high quality data on work forces and other characteristics of the firm. The magnitude of the job flows for small and medium-sized limited liability companies in Italy is lower than what observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, but it is still in line with evidence for firms in the Euro area. Second, the magnitude of job flows significantly shrunk in the aftermath of the economic downturn in 2001. Firms fared worse than in the late nineties and the labour market became less efficient in allocating job flows. Third, gross job creation and gross job destruction decrease as firm get larger, but when added to compute an indicator of net employment growth, size does not seem to affect firms’ expansion. On the contrary, age significantly hinges on the growth opportunities of small and medium-sized enterprises. The econometric analysis corroborates the major findings of our descriptive investigation referring to the role of size and age. In particular, it shows that classification methods used to define size classes strongly influence the estimated relationship between growth and size industrial regimes play a role in shaping job flows. Our result show that firms in supplier dominated industries fared significantly lower than enterprises in other sectors during the sample period

L'impresa famigliare: un reperto di antiquariato o una specificità istituzionale?

Secondo Alfred Chandler l'impresa famigliare è un modello di controllo che via via è destinato a lasciare posto alla moderna grande impresa manageriale. La persistenza della natura famigliare del capitalismo britannico sarebbe stata una delle cause del declino britannico per gran parte del novecento. In realtà , l'impresa famigliare è una tipologia d'impresa molto diffusa in tutti i Paesi del mondo. L'impresa manageriale a proprietà diffusa invece è una tipologia presente quasi esclusivamente negli Stati Uniti, nel Regno Unito e in pochi altri paesi anglo-sassoni. L'impresa famigliare rappresenta una versione della più generale categoria delle imprese a proprietà concentrata. I diversi tipi di governo societario dipendono dalle caratteristiche istituzionali dei vari Paesi e non è possibile affermare che l'impresa famigliare sia destinata all'estinzione. Vi sono varie ragioni che possono spiegare la diffusione di questa tipologia d'impresa: ragioni d'efficienza e ragioni legate a fattori culturali. Analisi empiriche recenti sembrano del resto evidenziare che le imprese famigliari conseguono risultati migliori in termini di redditività rispetto alle imprese non famigliari. Sembra rilevante la generazione e il ruolo della famiglia nella gestione dell'impresa. In Italia la proprietà e il controllo famigliari sono prevalenti.family firm; models of corporate control; private benefits of control; ownership structure in Italy

Innovazione commerciale e crescita delle imprese nei settori tradizionali.

In questo lavoro si considera il ruolo delle innovazioni commerciali intese come marchio, spese in pubblicità , individuazione di nuovi canali distributivi etc. nella crescita delle imprese operanti in settori tradizionali. L'esperienza di rapida crescita di molte imprese come ad esempio IKEA mostra come le dinamiche virtuose, più che su puri avanzamenti tecnologici, siano in larga parte da attribuire ad appropriate strategie competitive incentrate sull'innovazione commerciale in grado di rafforzare il legame tra le imprese e i mercati serviti. Nelle politiche industriali quindi non sempre è appropriato puntare su incentivi alla sola innovazione tecnologica, nei settori maturi. Particolarmente interessante è l'esperienza dell'Agenzia NUTEK svedese che sostiene le innovazioni ad elevato impatto commerciale.innovation; firm's growth; factors of business success

Job flows in Italian SMEs: a longitudinal analysis of growth, size and age.

The paper proposes an empirical investigation of job flows for continuing manufacturing firms in Italy from 1996 to 2004 using high quality data on work forces and other characteristics of the firm. The magnitude of the job flows for small and medium-sized limited liability companies in Italy is lower than what observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, but it is still in line with evidence for firms in the Euro area. Second, the magnitude of job flows significantly shrunk in the aftermath of the economic downturn in 2001. Firms fared worse than in the late nineties and the labour market became less efficient in allocating job flows. Third, gross job creation and gross job destruction decrease as firm get larger, but when added to compute an indicator of net employment growth, size does not seem to affect firms' expansion. On the contrary, age significantly hinges on the growth opportunities of small and medium-sized enterprises. The econometric analysis corroborates the major findings of our descriptive investigation referring to the role of size and age. In particular, it shows that classification methods used to define size classes strongly influence the estimated relationship between growth and size industrial regimes play a role in shaping job flows. Our result show that firms in supplier dominated industries fared significantly lower than enterprises in other sectors during the sample period.job creation; job destruction; persistence of jobs; firm growth

Timing of Investment and Dynamic Pricing in Privatized Sectors

In equipment-intensive sectors - such as water utilities, power generation, gas - billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. We discuss and characterize the optimal policy of a profit-maximizing firm and compare it with the optimal policy of a welfare-maximizing planner. When there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a private firm. With technical progress, we show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs. Under some conditions we also show that when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is shorter for a public firm than for a private firm.Dynamic investment, privatization

Nuove tecnologie e cambiamenti organizzativi: alcune implicazioni per le imprese italiane

The recent literature on the productivity gains due to the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT) has stressed the importance of the complementarities between ICT and organizational change. The ICT enable to process and diffuse a large amount of information. The reduction in information costs facilitates a higher level of coordination. The organizational implementation of ICT requires two prerequisites: the codification of the organization processes and their standardization, necessary to allow a full information exchange among the different processes. The introduction of ICT is less costly and more effective in those kinds of internal and external corporate activities that prior to the change are already formalized. ICT diffusion is therefore faster in large firms and in the supply chains they dominate. The 2001 Survey on the investment of industrial firms with more than 50 employees (Invind) by the Bank of Italy shows a high degree of diffusion of the PCs, and other types of hardware in the Italian firms; most of them seem to use the Internet. There seems to be a clear link between firm size and the rate of adoption of the new technologies. The impact of new technologies on organizational change is still moderate and appears strongly related to firm size.Information and Communication Technologies, organizational change, firm size

Pyramidal groups, in Italy and elsewhere, represent a model of separation of ownership and control. Pyramids typically have blockholders which extract private benefits of control at the expenses of minority shareholder. This paper focuses on the Italian case where the number of pyramids is reducing but are still largely diffused. Groups are a form of entrenchment and may have negative effects on firm growth. They are characterized by conflicts of interest and self-dealing practices which reduced external financing opportunities. In this paper legal regulation of groups in Italy is discussed, which has positive aspects (art. 2497 ss. c.c.) but some weaknesses on self-dealing practices (artt. 2391 and 2391-bis c.c.). Future reforms should take into consideration the guidelines given at European level (for instance, by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts and the European Commission), which have been set aside from the political agendas of mostly European governments. Moreover, we suggest to strengthen the process of (not only formal) disclosure of relevant information to the company shareholders’ as well, in order not to dismantle pyramids, but to make them “shorter” (when that is the case), more transparent and reciprocally competitive.

gruppi piramidali, corporate governance, conflitti di interesse, diritto societario, operazioni con parti correlate