Ocean Acidification in the Arctic in a Multi-regulatory, Climate Justice Perspective

The latest IPCC report on Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, which builds upon previous IPCC's reports, established a causal link between anthropogenic impacts and ocean acidification, by noting a significant decrease in the Ocean's uptake of CO2, with consequent damage to Earth's ecosystems, which in turn has traceable repercussions on the Arctic Ocean and then from the Arctic to the Planet Earth. The impact of ocean acidification is not only in the biological ecosystem but also on human activities, such as livelihood, food security, socio-economic security and developing communities. However, who can possibly be held ethically/legally responsible for ocean acidification from a climate justice perspective? Since what happens in the Arctic does not stay there, a more systematic law and policy approach to study options and responses in a multi-level, climate- ethical, global perceptive is needed. This paper sheds light on the legal responses available at global, regional and national levels to ocean acidification in a law of the sea and ocean context, both in the Arctic and from the Arctic. The gaps in legal and policy responses in connection to the ethical climate component will be identified. It will shed light on the planetary limits that humanity needs to stay within in order to maintain the future of the Earth. Since it touches upon questions of legal responsibility, on who is responsible for ocean acidification, it will connect to the “supply side” of fossil fuels production and global extraction projects causing anthropogenic CO2 emissions, one of the major causes of ocean acidification. It will also identify which actors, be they “officials” or “non-officials” (such as international organizations, states, regional institutes, Arctic citizens or even forums) should be held ethically responsible, and who should take action

Cyber threats, harsh environment and the European High North (EHN) in a human security and multi-level regulatory global dimension: Which framework applicable to critical infrastructures under “Exceptionally critical infrastructure conditions” (ECIC)?

Business opportunities in the European High North (EHN) are accompanied by the danger of cyber-threats, especially to critical infrastructures which in these Arctic regions become “extra critical” because of the harsh environmental climatic conditions and remoteness of distances. Critical infrastructures (CI) in the EHN are crucial for numerous sectors, such as the energy sector which is completely depended on digitalization, internet and computers’ commands. Such a new condition of extra criticality should also include human security concerns to avoid human disasters. An effective legal framework under “exceptionally critically infrastructure conditions” (ECIC) for this technology is important not only in terms of national legislation, but also in view of a regional, international and global networks character. This paper links for the first time, law, internet and cybersecurity, environment and society in a global human security dimension in a multi-regulatory contextual analysis. The aim is to trace the legal framework for response to a cyber-attack to critical infrastructure in the energy sector and takes Norway as a case study because this country is highly dependent on cyber technology and on critical infrastructures. The question of research is: using a human security focus in the case of cyber-threats under ECIC in the EHN, what ways can an assessment recommend to improve international, and regional law? Five analytical tasks are undertaken: 1) the concept of critical infrastructure vulnerability to cyber-attacks under “exceptionally critically infrastructure conditions” (ECIC) in the EHN with focus on the energy sector is explained in connection to the notion of human security, 2) a backdrop of regional and international collaboration is followed, 3) a trajectory of multilevel contextual analysis of the different sources of law and policy applicable to cyber-threats to CI is outlined, and 4) an examination of cooperation under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)