Power, norms and institutional change in the European Union: the protection of the free movement of goods

How do institutions of the European Union change? Using an institutionalist approach, this article highlights the interplay between power, cognitive limits, and the normative order that underpins institutional settings and assesses their impact upon the process of institutional change. Empirical evidence from recent attempts to reinforce the protection of the free movement of goods in the EU suggests that, under conditions of uncertainty, actors with ambiguous preferences assess attempts at institutional change on the basis of the historically defined normative order which holds a given institutional structure together. Hence, path dependent and incremental change occurs even when more ambitious and functionally superior proposals are on offer

The choice for EU theorists: Establishing a common framework for analysis

European Union (EU) studies have entered a highly contentious and, arguably, creative phase. A range of theoretical perspectives, seemingly quite highly differentiated from one another, now compete for influence and lsquospacersquo. However, the questions remain: is EU studies developing theories which are truly competing theories? Or is it developing theories that do not compete so much as they aim to explain distinctly different pieces of the EU puzzle? This paper responds directly to these two questions, while reviewing recent literature on EU governance. It argues, first, that we lack theories of EU governance that are true rivals; and, second, that leading models explain different outcomes at different levels in a multi-level system of governance. The result is somewhat phoney debates between compatible theories masquerading as rivals, and between lsquocomparative politicsrsquo and lsquointernational relationsrsquo approaches. Above all, perhaps, we find middle range theories posing as general or lsquometa-theoriesrsquo. In the absence of a plausible general theory of EU governance, theorists must choose precisely which type of outcome theywish to explain

Means versus ends in opaque institutional fields: Trading off compliance and achievement in sustainability standard adoption

__Abstract__ The long-standing discussion on decoupling has recently moved from adopters not implementing the agreed-upon policies to compliant adopters not achieving the goals intended by institutional entrepreneurs. This “means-ends decoupling” prevails especially in highly opaque fields, where practices, causality, and performance are hard to understand and chart. I conceptualize the conditions under which the adoption of institutions in relatively opaque fields leads to the achievement of the envisaged goals. Voluntary sustainability standards governing socioenvironmental issues illustrate these arguments. I argue that the lack of field transparency drives institutional entrepreneurs to create and maintain concrete and uniform rules, apply strong incentives, and disseminate “best practices” to ensure substantive adopter compliance. However, such rigid institutions are ill-equipped to deal with the causal complexity and practice multiplicity underlying opacity while they smother adopter agency. The ensuing tension between substantive compliance and goal achievement leads to an inherent trade-off: institutional entrepreneurs who remedy the policy-practice decoupling may enhance the disparity between means and ends, and vice versa. While sustainability standards and other institutions in highly opaque fields can, therefore, not fully achieve the envisaged goals, the trade-off can be reduced through systemically designed institutions that promote goal internalization and contain niche institutions

Oil shale project run summary, large retort: Run L-1

reportThe overall goals were to study oil yield loss and operating characteristics in combustion retorting of a rubble bed with physical characteristics comparable to some of those anticipated in field retorts. Shale particle size range and bed porosity were the two parameters selected for simulation (along with shale grade which had been in the typical range in previous experiments). This run confirmed the important roles of rubble bed structure and particle size range in retort performance. Oil yield losses result when oil generation in the interiors of large particles lags behind that in the surrounding smaller particle matrix and when non-uniform permeability produces fingering of oxygen into regions which have not finished kerogen decomposition. In the first case, oil emerges from the blocks into a degrading environment in which thermal cracking, oxidative degradation and burning can occur. In the second case, high permeability flow paths carry oxygen into regions which are still producing oil and bypass regions of unburned char (solid fuel). Oil yield from lean shales, those which provide only enough residual char to fuel the process (or even less), will be most sensitive to char bypass. L-l demonstrated that reasonable oil yields (72 percent of Fischer assay) can be achieved even from rubble beds which induce complex non-uniform gas flow patterns. This, in turn, implies that more severe yield losses noted in other laboratory and field retort operations stem from additional causes (e.g., poor sweep efficiency or inordinate heat losses)