Testing the limits of international society? Trust, AUKUS and Indo-Pacific security

When Australia reneged on a AUD$90 billion submarine contract with France in 2021 as it joined AUKUS, a new trilateral military partnership between Australia, the UK and the US, it was accused of lying and breaching France\u27s trust. This perceived act of betrayal not only led to a deterioration in the diplomatic relationship between Australia and France, but it also drew attention to the consequences of violating the norm of pacta sunt servanda—agreements must be kept. Although it is recognized that breaches of trust undermine relationships, what has been underexplored is how a violation of norms can also undermine the presumption of trust in international society more broadly. Focusing on how Australia broke its contract with France after it joined AUKUS, this article argues that Australia\u27s conduct not only harmed its relationship with France, but it also led the European Union (EU) to raise questions about how much to trust AUKUS partners as it engages in the Indo-Pacific region. It posits that adherence to international norms is important for developing trust between states in international society and has the potential to facilitate cooperation and enhance security in the complex Indo-Pacific region and beyond

History and root causes of terrorism in Africa

The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, it explains briefly why it is difficult to find a universally acceptable definition of terrorism. Second, it describes how history is crucial to any explanation and understanding of terrorism in Africa. Third, it discusses how and why socio-economic factors, lack of social justice, porous borders and poor governance mechanisms and structures have triggered , and could still trigger, disaffection that could lead to terrorism in some parts of the continent. Fourth, it suggests three ways of responding to the threats of terrorism in Africa, bearing in mind the primary responsibility to protect the people and preserve their values, norms and institutions

Domestic terrorism in Asia and lessons for Africa

The purpose of this article is to examine the nature of terrorism in Asia and explore if there are lessons that African states and societies can learn from the Asian experience. The paper focuses on South-east Asia, in particular Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. It also refers to the role that Australia has played since 2001 to try to help South-east Asian states deal with terrorism

Hedley Bull and international security

Hedley Bull made a significant contribution to international security studies, but his role as a security theorist remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that Bull’s ideas went beyond the traditional international security agenda and helped establish the foundation for critical security theory. Although Bull did not describe himself as a critical security theorist, his work indirectly provided a basis on which the assumptions underpinning the traditional international security assumptions could be challenged. Bull was a trans-paradigm theorist who utilised realism, pluralism, classical solidarism and cosmopolitan solidarism not only to shed significant light on the traditional international security perspective, but also to lay the foundation for critical security theory. In his early work, Bull used realism and pluralism to address the traditional international security agenda, with its emphasis on threats to the states, power politics, and the use of military force. Classical solidarism provided a framework through which he explored ideas about collective security and the ability of the United Nations to deal with common threats to international order and security. Through cosmopolitan solidarism, Bull explained the need for international society and world society to deal with poverty and injustice in the world. It is through cosmopolitan solidarist ideas that Bull can be portrayed as a critical security theorist

Superpower involvement in the horn of Africa, 1974-1982

For the past 25 years, the Horn of Africa has been a microcosm of the tensions that beset the world. Domestic, regional and global forces have impinged on the the Horn's international politics. Somali irredentism has threatened to alter the regional territorial status quo. It also has largely been blamed for the conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, on the one hand, and between Kenya and Somalia, on the other. Somali irredentism and the Eritrean struggle for secession have constituted Ethiopia's main internal problem and have also had a big impact on Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours. Actors external to the region have also tried to exert influence in the region. Middle Eastern countries, namely Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic have supported one side or the other in the Horn. The Soviet Union and the United States also have established a presence in the region. The USSR had a military presence in Somalia between 1953 and 1977. Since then, it has had close political and military ties with Ethiopia. The US had a military communications station in Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977. It acquired in 1980 access to military facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. The involvement of the superpowers in the Horn between 1974 and 1982 was characterised by considerable competition and little cooperation. Although the policies of detente emphasised cooperation, the Soviet Union and the United States competed over the allegiance of Ethiopia and Somalia. They cooperated briefly in 1977 in the Indian Ocean arms limitation talks, but their attempts to supplant each other in the Horn, and in the Indian Ocean region as a whole, smacked of Cold War rivalry. Competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Horn and the Persian Gulf region acquired a new momentum following a succession of events in 1979: the fall from power of the Shah of Iran in January; the taking of American embassy personnel as hostages in Tehran in November; and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December. Those situations prompted the United States to establish in March 1980 a Rapid Deployment Force (later renamed Central Command). The motive behind the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force was to demonstrate the American resolve and readiness to intervene swiftly in the Persian Gulf in the event of a threat to vital American interests. While the force was equipped to deal with some local contingencies, it did not appear adequate to deal with instability that might result from unequal distribution of wealth, corruption and many other problems associated with modernisation in the Horn/Persian Gulf region. Soviet and American assistance programmes have benefited the local states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Ethiopia relied on Soviet and Cuban support to regain the territory which Somalia had occupied during the 1977-78 Ogaden war. Kenya used its connection with the United States and Britain to ask these countries and other Western nations to refrain from arming Somalia during the war. And Somalia utilised American military aid after 1980 to revamp its military force which had been weakened and demoralised in the Ogaden war. In spite of the Soviet and American aid programmes in the Horn, the superpowers did not exercise decisive influence on the decision-making processes in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. These countries often pursued their own goals irrespective of what the superpowers desired