For the past 25 years, the Horn of Africa has been a microcosm of
the tensions that beset the world. Domestic, regional and global forces
have impinged on the the Horn's international politics. Somali
irredentism has threatened to alter the regional territorial status
quo. It also has largely been blamed for the conflicts between Ethiopia
and Somalia, on the one hand, and between Kenya and Somalia, on the
other. Somali irredentism and the Eritrean struggle for secession have
constituted Ethiopia's main internal problem and have also had a big
impact on Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours.
Actors external to the region have also tried to exert influence
in the region. Middle Eastern countries, namely Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Yemen
and Yemen Arab Republic have supported one side or the other in the
Horn. The Soviet Union and the United States also have established a
presence in the region. The USSR had a military presence in Somalia
between 1953 and 1977. Since then, it has had close political and
military ties with Ethiopia. The US had a military communications
station in Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977. It acquired in 1980 access to
military facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.
The involvement of the superpowers in the Horn between 1974 and
1982 was characterised by considerable competition and little
cooperation. Although the policies of detente emphasised cooperation,
the Soviet Union and the United States competed over the allegiance of
Ethiopia and Somalia. They cooperated briefly in 1977 in the Indian Ocean arms limitation talks, but their attempts to supplant each other
in the Horn, and in the Indian Ocean region as a whole, smacked of Cold
War rivalry.
Competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in the
Horn and the Persian Gulf region acquired a new momentum following a
succession of events in 1979: the fall from power of the Shah of Iran
in January; the taking of American embassy personnel as hostages in
Tehran in November; and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in
December. Those situations prompted the United States to establish in
March 1980 a Rapid Deployment Force (later renamed Central Command).
The motive behind the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force was to
demonstrate the American resolve and readiness to intervene swiftly in
the Persian Gulf in the event of a threat to vital American interests.
While the force was equipped to deal with some local contingencies, it
did not appear adequate to deal with instability that might result from
unequal distribution of wealth, corruption and many other problems
associated with modernisation in the Horn/Persian Gulf region.
Soviet and American assistance programmes have benefited the local
states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Ethiopia relied on Soviet and
Cuban support to regain the territory which Somalia had occupied during
the 1977-78 Ogaden war. Kenya used its connection with the United
States and Britain to ask these countries and other Western nations to
refrain from arming Somalia during the war. And Somalia utilised
American military aid after 1980 to revamp its military force which had
been weakened and demoralised in the Ogaden war. In spite of the Soviet and American aid programmes in the Horn,
the superpowers did not exercise decisive influence on the
decision-making processes in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. These
countries often pursued their own goals irrespective of what the
superpowers desired
