Emergence, hierarchy and top-down causation in evolutionary biology

The concept of emergence and the related notion of ‘downward causation’ have arisen in numerous branches of science, and have also been extensively discussed in philosophy. Here, I examine emergence and downward causation in relation to evolutionary biology. I focus on the old, but ongoing discussion in evolutionary biology over the ‘levels of selection’ question: which level(s) of the biological hierarchy natural selection acts at, e.g. the gene, individual, group or species level? The concept of emergence has arisen in the levels-of-selection literature as a putative way of distinguishing between ‘true’ selection at a higher level from cases where selection acts solely at the lower level but has effects that percolate up the biological hierarchy, generating the appearance of higher level selection. At first blush, this problem seems to share a common structure with debates about emergence in other areas, but closer examination shows that it turns on issues that are sui generis to biology

On the Interpretation of Decision Theory

Abstract:This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with.</jats:p

Methodological Individualism in Evolutionary Biology and in Social Science

Methodological individualism is a doctrine in the philosophy of social science, according to which all social phenomena should be explained in terms of the actions of individuals. This paper explores a parallel between methodological individualism in the social science and the debate in evolutionary biology over ‘levels of selection’, with particular reference to the arguments of G.C. Williams against group-selectionism. A number of facets of the parallel are examined