Absence of Safe Assets and Fiscal Crisis

This paper provides a fiscal crisis model that explains the low interest rates of Japanese government bonds. The key ingredient is the absence of safe assets in the sense that investors have no access to any asset that hedges fiscal risk. The interest rate is insensitive to any change in fiscal conditions and does not fully reflect the risk premium. This finding explains the low interest rates of Japanese government bonds even though the risk of fiscal default looks fairly high. The poorly-functioning bond market created in this way contributes to the low interest rate followed by a low default probability, and allows the government to sustain its large debt. This finding explains the mechanism under which the low interest rate coexists with Japan’s large outstanding debt. Welfare implications are mixed. The well-functioning bond market does not always contribute to welfare enhancement because the market makes it difficult to sustain the debt. We show the implications for fiscal sustainability of some policies, such as financial market reforms and growth enhancement policies

Productivity and the Business Cycle in Japan: Evidence from Japanese Industry Data

Constructing thirty-seven industries database, we examines whether measured productivity in Japan is procyclical and investigates the sources of that procyclicality using the production function approach employed by Hall (1990) and Basu and Fernald (1995). At the aggregate level, the measured Solow residual shows procyclicality. Large numbers of industries show constant returns to scale. No significant evidence for the presence of thick-market externalities is found. Our results also hold when we consider labor hoarding, part-time employment, and the adjustment cost of investment. The results suggest policies to revitalize the Japanese economy should concentrate on promoting productivity growth.

Monetary Policy and Transmission of Bubbles

The aim of this paper is to investigate the optimal monetary policy when bubbles boost and burst. The monetary policy in the form of open market operation has real effects, that is, influences the growth in investment and the size of bubbles. The central bank faces a trade-off between stimulating investment and appreciating bubbles. The optimal policy is contingent on the state of bubbles. When bubbles arise, the central bank may maintain or gives up easing, depending on how it puts weight on the state of the bursting of bubbles, while when bubbles burst, the central bank takes an easing policy. The optimal policy is the same irrespective of whether foreign capital inflows are allowed for unless capital markets are severely restricted

Bubbles and crowding-in of capital via a savings glut

This paper uncovers a novel mechanism by which bubbles crowd in capital investment. If capital is initially depressed by a binding credit constraint, injecting a bubble triggers a savings glut. Higher returns in a new bubbly equilibrium attract additional investors who expand investment at the extensive margin. We demonstrate that crowding-in through this channel is a robust phenomenon that occurs along the entire time path after bubbles are injected