Cereal Supplies in Rural Families of the Senegalese Groundnut Basin. Who is Responsible for Meeting Family Food Needs?

In the traditional operation of production-consumption groups in rural areas of Senegal, the group chief, or Borom njël, has a social duty to make sure family food needs are met. His ability to do this is supported by certain social rules governing these groups, and by a favourable environment. However, various changes have now adversely affected the environment. These changes prompted us to assess the Borom njël's current ability to go on playing his social rule as a food provider. From data collected in two villages of the Senegalese Groundnut Basin, using multivariate analysis, we identified three production-consumption group profiles according to how the Borom njël ensured main cereal supplies: (i°) market purchase with migrants' remittances; (ii°) home production and (iii°) market purchase with own resources. The ability of the Borom njël to ensure cereal supplies differed according to the profile. We used a multivariate logit model to study the determinants affecting the Borom njël's ability to ensure cereal supplies for the production-consumption group. We found that physical assets and wage labour employment increased this ability. We also found that agricultural income, including livestock, was positively correlated to the likelihood of the Borom njël successfully ensuring cereal supplies, particularly those depending heavily on own production. Additional income earned by the Borom njël from non-agricultural activity had the same positive effect, particularly when ensuring cereals provision through market purchase. We end with some thoughts on the increasing reliance of Borom njëls on migrants' remittances to ensure that family cereal needs are met. ...French Abstract : Dans le passé, le fonctionnement traditionnel des populations rurales du Bassin arachidier Sénégalais regroupées au sein de groupes de production-consommation, reposait sur un système de droits et obligations gouvernant l'allocation des ressources en terre, en travail et en nourriture entre les différents membres de groupes familiaux. Ainsi, le chef du groupe familial de production-consommation, encore appelé Borom njël en wolof, avait l'obligation de satisfaire les besoins alimentaires des autres membres essentiellement, grâce à sa production agricole. En contrepartie ceux-ci travaillaient sur ses parcelles alors que chaque adulte dépendant avait un droit de culture sur une parcelle d'arachide dont il gardait les revenus. Vu tous les changements qui ont affecté le contexte socio-économique de ces populations rurales, il est devenu plus difficile pour les Borom njël d'honorer leurs obligations. Et, nous nous sommes plus particulièrement intéressés à la capacité du Borom njël à assurer l'approvisionnement en céréales et satisfaire les besoins alimentaires des différents membres. A partir de données collectées dans deux villages du Bassin Arachidier, nous avons procédé à une analyse multivariée qui nous a permis d'identifier trois profils de groupes de production-consommation, suivant que les besoins alimentaires sont principalement assurés avec: i°) les achats sur le marché grâce aux transferts d'argent des migrants ; ii°) la production agricole du Borom njël permettant ainsi l'autoconsommation ; iii°) les achats sur le marché grâce aux revenus du Borom njël. Ensuite, nous avons utilisé un modèle de logit multivarié pour étudier les déterminants qui affectent la capacité du Borom njël à assurer l'approvisionnement en céréales du groupe de production-consommation. Les résultats montrent que la possession d'actifs physiques ainsi que l'emploi de salariés agricoles augmentent cette capacité à assurer l'approvisionnement en céréales. En outre, le revenu agricole -y compris celui de l'élevage- est positivement corrélé à la probabilité du Borom njël à assurer l'approvisionnement en céréales, particulièrement pour ceux qui dépendent de leurs propres productions agricoles. Quant aux revenus non agricoles obtenus grâce à la diversification locale, ils augmentent aussi cette probabilité, mais uniquement à l'intérieur des groupes où l'approvisionnement en céréales est assuré grâce aux achats sur le marché avec les revenus du Borom njël.CEREAL SUPPLIES; CONSUMPTION-PRODUCTION GROUPS; MULTINOMIAL LOGIT; GROUNDNUT BASIN; SENEGAL

Formalisation of charcoal value chains and livelihood outcomes in Central- and West Africa

This paper examines the link between formalisation of charcoal institutions and livelihoodoutcomes in Central- and WestAfrica. The woodfuel trade generally commenced informally, little controlled by legal or bureaucratic means. Developing formal institutions is often considered as a way of managing charcoal production more sustainably. However, formalisation can have adverse effects for charcoal producers and traders when this hinders their capacity to access the resource or markets. In order to assess the relations between the formalisation of charcoal institutions and socio-economic outcomes for those involved, this study combines a valuechain and livelihoods perspective. A review of case studies and empirical data show that (1) West African countries, with a longer history of dealing with woodfuel issues, have more formal mechanisms in place to deal with charcoal management and these are more embedded into cross-sectorial energy and environmental policies; (2) Despite regulatory mechanisms dealing with woodfuel in all countries, institutions are mainly embedded in informal institutions and based upon customary rules, which allows large numbers of actors to be involved, but also leads to substantial unsustainable and unofficial production, corrupt practises and loss of tax revenues; (3) Formal mechanisms can have negative consequences, such as: conflicts of interests over tax revenues, difficulties in avoiding ‘free riders’ from sustainable management initiatives, and disproportional benefits reaped by more powerful urban-based actors. Comparing the West African countries with Central African countries where attention is relatively new, indicates that conditions for successful charcoal institutions are: devolving power and responsibilities for woodfuel management to a local level, monitoring woodfuel trade, (tax) incentives for sustainably produced charcoal and reinvesting taxes in social and environmental aim