"Fiscal Decentralization, Commitment and Regional Inequality: Evidence from State-level Cross-sectional Data for the United States"

While conventional approaches to fiscal decentralization suggest that decentralization lowers the power of redistribution among regions, recent theories argue that fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device. In this manner, where the budget in a given region is highly dependent on transfers from the central government, there is an incentive for effort following fiscal decentralization. The former effect is argued to increase regional inequality, while the latter suggests a decrease in regional inequality. However no known empirical work has directly examined the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality. In this paper, cross-sectional data for the United States, excluding the convergence of regional income, are used to derive the net relationship. It is also the case that the direction of this effect on regional inequality depends on how fiscal decentralization is promoted. While the former distribution effect directly depends on the central government's share of power, the latter incentive effect depends on autonomy. Two measures that represent the power of the central government and autonomy are used to identify these effects. The results indicate that local expenditure or revenue share in fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on regional inequality, while the achievement of autonomy by fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional inequality. This supports the theory that fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device. The results also show that how fiscal decentralization is promoted is important for how it impacts on regional inequality.

"Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States"

Theoretical studies suggest that corruption may counteract government failure and promote economic growth in the short run, given exogenously determined suboptimal bureaucratic rules and regulations. As the government failure is itself a function of corruption, however, corruption should have detrimental effects on economic growth in the long run. In this paper, we measure the rate of economic growth for various time spans - short (1998?2000), middle (1995-2000) and long (1991-2000) - using previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data for the United States. Our two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates with a carefully selected set of instruments show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is indeed negative and statistically significant in the middle and long spans but insignificant in the short span.

Short-run and long-run effects of corruption on economic growth: evidence from state-level cross-section data for the United States

Theoretical studies suggest that corruption may counteract government failure and promote economic growth in the short run, given exogenously determined sub optimal bureaucratic rules and regulations. As the government failure is itself a function of corruption, however, corruption should have detrimental effects on economic growth in the long run. In this paper, we measure the rate of economic growth for various time spans—short (1998–2000), middle (1995–2000) and long (1991–2000)—using previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data for the United States. Our two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates with a carefully selected set of instruments show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is indeed negative and statistically significant in the middle and long spans but insignificant in the short span

Formation of Monodispersed Polystyrene Particles by Spontaneous Emulsion Polymerization into Silica Particle Solutions without Surfactants

Nagasaki Symposium on Nano-Dynamics 2008 (NSND2008) 平成20年1月29日(火)於長崎大学 Poster Presentatio

Dissociation of Tau Deposits and Brain Atrophy in Early Alzheimer’s Disease: A Combined Positron Emission Tomography/Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

The recent advent of tau-specific positron emission tomography (PET) has enabled in vivo assessment of tau pathology in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). However, because PET scanners have limited spatial resolution, the measured signals of small brain structures or atrophied areas are underestimated by partial volume effects (PVEs). The aim of this study was to determine whether partial volume correction (PVC) improves the precision of measures of tau deposits in early AD. We investigated tau deposits in 18 patients with amyloid-positive early AD and in 36 amyloid-negative healthy controls using 18F-THK5351 PET. For PVC, we applied the SPM toolbox PETPVE12. The PET images were then spatially normalized and subjected to voxel-based group analysis using SPM12 for comparison between the early AD patients and healthy controls. We also compared these two groups in terms of brain atrophy using voxel-based morphometry of MRI. We found widespread neocortical tracer retention predominantly in the posterior cingulate and precuneus areas, but also in the inferior temporal lobes, inferior parietal lobes, frontal lobes, and occipital lobes in the AD patients compared with the controls. The pattern of tracer retention was similar between before and after PVC, suggesting that PVC had little effect on the precision of tau load measures. Gray matter atrophy was detected in the medial/lateral temporal lobes and basal frontal lobes in the AD patients. Interestingly, only a few associations were found between atrophy and tau deposits, even after PVC. In conclusion, PVC did not significantly affect 18F-THK5351 PET measures of tau deposits. This discrepancy between tau deposits and atrophy suggests that tau load precedes atrophy

Fiscal Decentralization, Commitment and Regional Inequality : Evidence from State-level Cross-sectional Data for the United States

While conventional approaches to fiscal decentralization suggest that decentralization lowers the power of redistribution among regions, recent theories argue that fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device. In this manner, where the budget in a given region is highly dependent on transfers from the central government, there is an incentive for effort following fiscal decentralization. The former effect is argued to increase regional inequality, while the latter suggests a decrease in regional inequality. However no known empirical work has directly examined the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality. In this paper, cross-sectional data for the United States, excluding the convergence of regional income, are used to derive the net relationship. It is also the case that the direction of this effect on regional inequality depends on how fiscal decentralization is promoted. While the former distribution effect directly depends on the central government\u27s share of power, the latter incentive effect depends on autonomy. Two measures that represent the power of the central government and autonomy are used to identify these effects. The results indicate that local expenditure or revenue share in fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on regional inequality, while the achievement of autonomy by fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional inequality. This supports the theory that fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device. The results also show that how fiscal decentralization is promoted is important for how it impacts on regional inequality.本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこ

Fiscal Decentralization, Commitment and Regional Inequality : Evidence from State-level Cross-sectional Data for the United States

While conventional approaches to fiscal decentralization suggest that decentralization lowers the power of redistribution among regions, recent theories argue that fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device. In this manner, where the budget in a given region is highly dependent on transfers from the central government, there is an incentive for effort following fiscal decentralization. The former effect is argued to increase regional inequality, while the latter suggests a decrease in regional inequality. However no known empirical work has directly examined the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality. In this paper, cross-sectional data for the United States, excluding the convergence of regional income, are used to derive the net relationship. It is also the case that the direction of this effect on regional inequality depends on how fiscal decentralization is promoted. While the former distribution effect directly depends on the central government's share of power, the latter incentive effect depends on autonomy. Two measures that represent the power of the central government and autonomy are used to identify these effects. The results indicate that local expenditure or revenue share in fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on regional inequality, while the achievement of autonomy by fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional inequality. This supports the theory that fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device. The results also show that how fiscal decentralization is promoted is important for how it impacts on regional inequality