Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.Strategic information transmission, truth-telling, trust, sender-receiver game.

On the Social Value of Disclosed Information and Environmental Regulation

This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competitive market with private information. We examine how environmental taxes should be optimally levied when the regulator faces asymmetric information about production and abatement costs in an irreversible observable policy commitment game. Under our setting, the paper investigates how information disclosure can improve the efficiency of the tax setting process and may offer an efficient complement to conventional regulatory approaches. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that access to publicly disclosed information improves the ability of the regulator to levy Örmsí specific environmental taxes. Despite its advantages, however, informational disclosure may harm the environmental policy it purports to enhance since it facilitates collusive behavior. We show that information sharing may occur and thus leads to a superior outcome in terms of industry output and emissions. Disclosure may undermine market performance and environmental policy

Molecular structure, vibrational spectral investigation and the confirmation analysis of 4-Methylesculetin molecule

WOS: 000333614200003In this work, FT-IR, FT-Raman, and FT-NMR spectra of 4-Methylesculetin molecule are presented for the first time. FT-IR, FT-Raman, and FT-NMR spectra of 4MEC have been recorded and analyzed. The FT-IR and FT-Raman spectra of this molecule are recorded at 4000-400 cm(-1) and 50-3500 cm(-1), respectively. The infrared vibrational frequencies, absolute intensities, potential energy profile, HOMO-LUMO plot and NBO analysis of the molecule have been also predicted using Becke's three-parameter hybrid B3LYP method in the density functional theory DFT method. Calculated and experimental data are in good agreement.Ahi Evran University Research FundAhi Evran University [FEN.4003.12.013]Y. Erdogdu would like to thank Ahi Evran University Research Fund for its financial support. Project Numbers: FEN.4003.12.013. Computing resources used in this work were provided by the National Center for High Performance Computing of Turkey (UYBHM)

Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the behavior of the players both theoretically and experimentally. We examine games where senders are assumed to communicate with the receiver either simultaneously or sequentially as well as a game where the receiver chooses one of these two communication methods. The theoretical predictions for truth-telling, non-conflicting messages observed and trust frequencies are the same for both the simultaneous and sequential plays; however, we observe systematic differences between the treatments of these plays. While the truth-telling frequencies stay above the theoretical prediction of the one half during all the experiments, the nature of truth-telling seems to differ between sequential and simultaneous plays. Under simultaneous communication, the messages of senders are non-conflictive more than half of the time, while the non-conflicting messages are significantly more likely to be correct than not. The frequency of non-conflicting messages is lower under sequential plays due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender. We observe that subjects who prefer to get non-conflicting messages prefer simultaneous mode of communication more often. When acting as senders, these subjects also adjust their truth-telling frequencies so as to generate conflictive messages

Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the behavior of the players both theoretically and experimentally. We examine games where senders are assumed to communicate with the receiver either simultaneously or sequentially as well as a game where the receiver chooses one of these two communication methods. The theoretical predictions for truth-telling, non-conflicting messages observed and trust frequencies are the same for both the simultaneous and sequential plays; however, we observe systematic differences between the treatments of these plays. While the truth-telling frequencies stay above the theoretical prediction of the one half during all the experiments, the nature of truth-telling seems to differ between sequential and simultaneous plays. Under simultaneous communication, the messages of senders are non-conflictive more than half of the time, while the non-conflicting messages are significantly more likely to be correct than not. The frequency of non-conflicting messages is lower under sequential plays due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender. We observe that subjects who prefer to get non-conflicting messages prefer simultaneous mode of communication more often. When acting as senders, these subjects also adjust their truth-telling frequencies so as to generate conflictive messages

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed in similar settings with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. Despite similar theoretical predictions for these games, we observe systematic differences in experiments. In particular, while non-conflicting messages are observed less frequently under sequential communication due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender, the frequency of the second sender being truthful when the first sender lies is considerably higher in the Sequential Game in comparison to the truth-telling level in the Simultaneous Game. Moreover, in the Choice Game receiver prefers simultaneous mode of communication slightly more often than the sequential one. We explain the observed behavior of the players, estimating a logit quantal response equilibrium model and additionally running some logistic regressions. We find that the mode of communication is critical in design problems where a second opinion is available

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed in similar settings with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. Despite similar theoretical predictions for these games, we observe systematic differences in experiments. In particular, while non-conflicting messages are observed less frequently under sequential communication due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender, the frequency of the second sender being truthful when the first sender lies is considerably higher in the Sequential Game in comparison to the truth-telling level in the Simultaneous Game. Moreover, in the Choice Game receiver prefers simultaneous mode of communication slightly more often than the sequential one. We explain the observed behavior of the players, estimating a logit quantal response equilibrium model and additionally running some logistic regressions. We find that the mode of communication is critical in design problems where a second opinion is available

Diffusion-weighted magnetic resonance imaging to detect synchronous uterine endometrial and endocervical adenocarcinoma

Synchronous endometrial and cervical cancer is a very rare condition. This report describes a case of a 46-year-old woman who presented with a cervical mass that measured 5.6 cm along its longest diameter, whose biopsy analysis revealed an endocervical mucinous adenocarcinoma. She was classified as having an IB2 cervical carcinoma and treated with concurrent chemoradiation plus hysterectomy. Pathological and immunohistochemical analysis of the surgical specimens revealed a synchronous endometrioid grade 2 adenocarcinoma in the endometrium, and a well-differentiated mucinous adenocarcinoma in the cervix. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies performed prior to treatment were reviewed and apparent diffusion coefficient (ADC) maps were generated. The ADC values demonstrated distinct signal intensity differences between the endometrial and endocervical tumors. In conclusion, diffusion-weighted MRI and ADC maps can help to distinguish the site of origin of synchronous tumors