Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities

In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.One-to-one matching Stability Externalities Rationalizability

A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium

Cataloged from PDF version of article.We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

LiDAR Buoy Detection for Autonomous Marine Vessel Using Pointnet Classification

Maritime autonomy, specifically the use of autonomous and semi-autonomous maritime vessels, is a key enabling technology supporting a set of diverse and critical research areas, including coastal and environmental resilience, assessment of waterway health, ecosystem/asset monitoring and maritime port security. Critical to the safe, efficient and reliable operation of an autonomous maritime vessel is its ability to perceive on-the-fly the external environment through onboard sensors. In this paper, buoy detection for LiDAR images is explored by using several tools and techniques: machine learning methods, Unity Game Engine (herein referred to as Unity) simulation, and traditional image processing. The Unity Game Engine (herein referred to as Unity) simulation data was used for the training and testing of a Pointnet neural network model while the labeled real-world maritime environment point cloud data was used for the model validation. Fitting the Pointnet model on the simulation data, after some data alignment with the LiDAR images allowed for accurate classification of buoys on the real-world data with the 93% of accuracy. A traditional image processing approach using 2D occupancy maps to detect the buoys by shape was used as well and is outlined in the paper

Independence of spin-orbit torques from the exchange bias direction in Ni81_{81}Fe19_{19}/IrMn bilayers

We investigated a possible correlation between spin Hall angles and exchange bias in Ni$_{81}$Fe$_{19}$/IrMn samples by performing spin torque ferromagnetic resonance measurements. This correlation is probed by patterning of Ni$_{81}$Fe$_{19}$/IrMn bilayers in different relative orientations with respect to the exchange bias direction. The measured voltage spectra allow a quantitative determination of spin Hall angles, which are independent of the orientation around 2.8\pm0.3%.Comment: 10 page

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed in similar settings with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. Despite similar theoretical predictions for these games, we observe systematic differences in experiments. In particular, while non-conflicting messages are observed less frequently under sequential communication due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender, the frequency of the second sender being truthful when the first sender lies is considerably higher in the Sequential Game in comparison to the truth-telling level in the Simultaneous Game. Moreover, in the Choice Game receiver prefers simultaneous mode of communication slightly more often than the sequential one. We explain the observed behavior of the players, estimating a logit quantal response equilibrium model and additionally running some logistic regressions. We find that the mode of communication is critical in design problems where a second opinion is available

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed in similar settings with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. Despite similar theoretical predictions for these games, we observe systematic differences in experiments. In particular, while non-conflicting messages are observed less frequently under sequential communication due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender, the frequency of the second sender being truthful when the first sender lies is considerably higher in the Sequential Game in comparison to the truth-telling level in the Simultaneous Game. Moreover, in the Choice Game receiver prefers simultaneous mode of communication slightly more often than the sequential one. We explain the observed behavior of the players, estimating a logit quantal response equilibrium model and additionally running some logistic regressions. We find that the mode of communication is critical in design problems where a second opinion is available

Susac’s Syndrome

We have read the interesting article by Raets and Gelin, entitled “Susac’s syndrome: a clinical and radiological challenge” which was published in the 95 (6) issue of the Journal in 2012 (1). The article included fairly important information which was very useful for us. However, we would like to make a few contributions