A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear security systems face. All of the cases of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders; given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well. Similarly, disgruntled workers from inside nuclear facilities have perpetrated many of the known incidents of nuclear sabotage. The most recent example of which we are aware is the apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear plant in the United States in 2012; the most spectacular was an incident three decades ago in which an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then detonated them.While many such incidents, including the two just mentioned, appear to have been intended to send a message to management, not to spread radioactivity, they highlight the immense dangers that could arise from insiders with more malevolent intent. As it turns out, insiders perpetrate a large fraction of thefts from heavily guarded non-nuclear facilities as well. Yet organizations often find it difficult to understandand protect against insider threats. Why is this the case?Part of the answer is that there are deep organizational and cognitive biases that lead managers to downplay the threats insiders pose to their nuclear facilities and operations. But another part of the answer is that those managing nuclear security often have limited information about incidents that have happened in other countries or in other industries, and the lessons that might be learned from them.The IAEA and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) produce"best practices" guides as a way of disseminating ideas and procedures that have been identified as leading to improved security. Both have produced guides on protecting against insider threats.5 But sometimes mistakes are even moreinstructive than successes.Here, we are presenting a kind of "worst practices" guide of serious mistakes made in the past regarding insider threats. While each situation is unique, and serious insider problems are relatively rare, the incidents we describe reflect issues that exist in many contexts and that every nuclear security manager should consider. Common organizational practices -- such as prioritizing production over security, failure to share information across subunits, inadequate rules or inappropriate waiving of rules, exaggerated faith in group loyalty, and excessive focus on external threats -- can be seen in many past failures to protect against insider threats

Kettles of hawks: public opinion on the nuclear taboo and noncombatant immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel

Recent scholarship has established that a majority of Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of noncombatant immunity when American lives are on the line. Some scholars contend, however, that these hawkish American attitudes are an outlier and that other Western democratic publics have more fully internalized the nuclear taboo, as well as the prohibition on deliberately killing civilians. To investigate cross-national attitudes on these important norms, we conducted a survey experiment of American, British, French, and Israeli citizens. We find that American attitudes are not exceptional. Rather, Israeli respondents display the most hawkish preferences; French and American citizens are roughly equally hawkish; and the British public is consistently the least supportive of nuclear use or targeting civilians. Categorical prohibitions—against nuclear use and targeting civilians—do little to shape public opinion in these four countries. Instead, public opinion in each state follows the same consequentialist logic: a majority or near majority of respondents are willing to support using nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but support declines when collateral civilian deaths rise. Respondents’ preferences for compatriots over foreign civilians and respondents’ retributiveness help explain individual-level variation in attitudes

Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate

Presents Sagan's 2009 paper calling for rethinking the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between articles in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with seven response papers by international scholars about how to pursue nuclear disarmament

The blameworthiness of health and safety rule violations

Man-made disasters usually lead to the tightening of safety regulations, because rule breaking is seen as a major cause of them. This reaction is based on the presumptions that the safety rules are good and that the rule-breakers are wrong. The reasons the personnel of a coke factory gave for breaking rules raise doubt about the tenability of these presumptions. It is unlikely that this result would have been achieved on the basis of a disaster evaluation or High-Reliability Theory. In both approaches, knowledge of the consequences of human conduct hinders an unprejudiced judgement about the blameworthiness of rule breaking

Optimizing quantum process tomography with unitary 2-designs

We show that weighted unitary 2-designs define optimal measurements on the system-ancilla output state for ancilla-assisted process tomography of unital quantum channels. Examples include complete sets of mutually unbiased unitary-operator bases. Each of these specifies a minimal series of optimal orthogonal measurements. General quantum channels are also considered.Comment: 28 page

Earth: Atmospheric Evolution of a Habitable Planet

Our present-day atmosphere is often used as an analog for potentially habitable exoplanets, but Earth's atmosphere has changed dramatically throughout its 4.5 billion year history. For example, molecular oxygen is abundant in the atmosphere today but was absent on the early Earth. Meanwhile, the physical and chemical evolution of Earth's atmosphere has also resulted in major swings in surface temperature, at times resulting in extreme glaciation or warm greenhouse climates. Despite this dynamic and occasionally dramatic history, the Earth has been persistently habitable--and, in fact, inhabited--for roughly 4 billion years. Understanding Earth's momentous changes and its enduring habitability is essential as a guide to the diversity of habitable planetary environments that may exist beyond our solar system and for ultimately recognizing spectroscopic fingerprints of life elsewhere in the Universe. Here, we review long-term trends in the composition of Earth's atmosphere as it relates to both planetary habitability and inhabitation. We focus on gases that may serve as habitability markers (CO2, N2) or biosignatures (CH4, O2), especially as related to the redox evolution of the atmosphere and the coupled evolution of Earth's climate system. We emphasize that in the search for Earth-like planets we must be mindful that the example provided by the modern atmosphere merely represents a single snapshot of Earth's long-term evolution. In exploring the many former states of our own planet, we emphasize Earth's atmospheric evolution during the Archean, Proterozoic, and Phanerozoic eons, but we conclude with a brief discussion of potential atmospheric trajectories into the distant future, many millions to billions of years from now. All of these 'Alternative Earth' scenarios provide insight to the potential diversity of Earth-like, habitable, and inhabited worlds.Comment: 34 pages, 4 figures, 4 tables. Review chapter to appear in Handbook of Exoplanet