Pod svetom lipom: nametanje neurotskih i psihotičkih sindroma kao srpska ratna strategija; 1986. - 1995.

This article looks at some of the recurrent themes in Serbian propaganda 1986–95, examining their operation in inculcating collective neurotic and psychotic syndromes and noting the relevance of those syndromes for the war against Croatia and Bosnia, 1991–95. Six pivotal themes in Serbian propaganda are examined: 1. Victimization, in which Serbs were constructed as collective victims first of the NDH, then of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and more specifically of Croats, Albanians, Bosniaks, and other non-Serbs. 2. Dehumanization of designated ‘others’, in which Croats were depicted as ‘genocidal’ and as ‘Ustaše’, Bosniaks were portrayed as ‘fanatical fundamentalists’, and Albanians were represented as not fully human. These processes of dehumanization effectively removed these designated ‘others’ from the moral field, sanctifying their murder or expulsion. 3. Belittlement, in which Serbia’s enemies were represented as beneath contempt. 4. Conspiracy, in which Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, the Vatican, Germany, Austria, and sometimes also the Bosniaks as well as the U.S. and other foreign states, were seen as united in a conspiracy to break up the SFRY and hurt Serbia. In this way, the Belgrade regime’s obstinate disregard for the fundamental standards of international law was dressed up as heroic defiance of an anti-Serb conspiracy. 5. Entitlement, in which the Serbs were constructed as ‘entitled’ to create a Greater Serbian state to which parts of Croatia and Bosnia would be attached, under the motto, ‘All Serbs should live in one state\u27. 6. Superhuman powers and divine sanction. The Serbs were told that they were, in some sense, \u27super\u27. They were the best fighters on the planet, they could stand up to the entire world, they were sanctioned by God himself, be cause of Tsar Lazar and the fact that Lazar had chosen the heavenly kingdom. Moreover, since Lazar had chosen the heavenly kingdom, the Serbs, encouraged to view themselves as Lazar’s heirs, were entitled to the earthly kingdom which Lazar had repudiated, as their patrimony.Ovaj se članak usredotočuje na neke od ponavljajućih tema srpske propagande u razdoblju od 1986. do 1995. godine. Promatrajući njihovo djelovanje u procesu nametanja kolektivnih neurotičnih i psihotičnih sindroma, zapaža se važnost ovih sindroma u ratu protiv Hrvatske i Bosne, 1991-95. godine. Rad razmatra šest k1jučnih tema srpske propagande: 1. Viktimizacija, kojom su Srbi konstruirani kao kolektivna žrtva najprije NDH, zatim Titove Jugoslavije, a posebno kao žrtva Hrvata, Albanaca, Bošnjaka i ostalih ne-Srba. 2. Dehumanizacija označenih \u27drugih\u27, kojom su Hrvati opisani kao "genocidni" i "ustaše", Bošnjaci kao "fanatični fundamentalisti", a Albanci kao niža vrsta ljudi. Ovi procesi dehumanizacije učinkovito su uklonili označene "druge" iz područja morala, sankcionirajući na taj način njihovo ubijanje i protjerivanje. 3. Omalovažavanje, kojim su neprijatelji Srbije prikazani kao dostojni prezira. 4. Urota, u kojoj se Hrvati Slovenci, Albanci, Vatikan, Njemačka, Austrija, a ponekad također i Bošnjaci te neke druge strane države poput SAD vide kao ujedinjene u namjeri da sruše Jugoslaviju i unište Srbiju. Na ovaj je način beogradski režim svoje posvemašnje ignoriranje temeljnih standarda međunarodnog prava prikazao kao herojski otpor anti-srpskoj zavjeri. 5. Polaganje prava, kojim su Srbi konstruirani kao oni kojima je "dano pravo" stvaranja Velike Srbije kao države koja bi pripojila dijelove Hrvatske i Bosne, pod motom "Svi Srbi u jednoj državi". 6. Nadljudske moći i božanski blagoslov. Srbima je rečeno da, su na neki način superiorni - najbolji su borci na planetu, mogu se suprostaviti čitavom svijetu, blagoslovljeni su od samoga Boga, zbog činjenice da je Car Lazar odabrao kraljevstvo Božje. Štoviše: upravo stoga što je Car Lazar odabrao kraljevstvo Božje, a odbacio ono zemaljsko, Srbi, poticani da se vide kao Lazarevi nasljednici, baštine pravo na ostvarenje ovoga posljednjega

Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic

Judith Armatta, a lawyer and journalist, attended the proceedings of the trial of former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević over a period of nearly three years. During this period, the court was in session for 466 days, interrupted by repeated breaks necessitated by the accused’s increasing health problems. Charged with sixty-six counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, Milošević declined to have counsel appointed, electing instead to defend himself. The court’s willingness to allow Milošević to do so and to do so on his own terms proved to be a huge mistake, as Armatta stresses. The fallen Serbian leader’s priority was not to defend himself but rather to portray himself as a martyr for Serbia, outline an alternative history of events in the post-Yugoslav region, and demolish, as far as he was able, the testimony of witnesses. But what is striking is that Milošević’s line of cross-examination repeatedly proved to be damaging to his case, his own witnesses often proved to be more useful to the prosecution that to the defense, and Milošević used up a lot of time with speeches and with lines of questioning entirely irrelevant to the charges against him. Milošević also did his best to intimidate witnesses, entering into arguments with them; one witness, Agim Zeqiri, a farmer, was so shaken after the first day that he refused to continue

Pod svetom lipom: nametanje neurotskih i psihotičkih sindroma kao srpska ratna strategija; 1986. - 1995.

This article looks at some of the recurrent themes in Serbian propaganda 1986–95, examining their operation in inculcating collective neurotic and psychotic syndromes and noting the relevance of those syndromes for the war against Croatia and Bosnia, 1991–95. Six pivotal themes in Serbian propaganda are examined: 1. Victimization, in which Serbs were constructed as collective victims first of the NDH, then of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and more specifically of Croats, Albanians, Bosniaks, and other non-Serbs. 2. Dehumanization of designated ‘others’, in which Croats were depicted as ‘genocidal’ and as ‘Ustaše’, Bosniaks were portrayed as ‘fanatical fundamentalists’, and Albanians were represented as not fully human. These processes of dehumanization effectively removed these designated ‘others’ from the moral field, sanctifying their murder or expulsion. 3. Belittlement, in which Serbia’s enemies were represented as beneath contempt. 4. Conspiracy, in which Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, the Vatican, Germany, Austria, and sometimes also the Bosniaks as well as the U.S. and other foreign states, were seen as united in a conspiracy to break up the SFRY and hurt Serbia. In this way, the Belgrade regime’s obstinate disregard for the fundamental standards of international law was dressed up as heroic defiance of an anti-Serb conspiracy. 5. Entitlement, in which the Serbs were constructed as ‘entitled’ to create a Greater Serbian state to which parts of Croatia and Bosnia would be attached, under the motto, ‘All Serbs should live in one state\u27. 6. Superhuman powers and divine sanction. The Serbs were told that they were, in some sense, \u27super\u27. They were the best fighters on the planet, they could stand up to the entire world, they were sanctioned by God himself, be cause of Tsar Lazar and the fact that Lazar had chosen the heavenly kingdom. Moreover, since Lazar had chosen the heavenly kingdom, the Serbs, encouraged to view themselves as Lazar’s heirs, were entitled to the earthly kingdom which Lazar had repudiated, as their patrimony.Ovaj se članak usredotočuje na neke od ponavljajućih tema srpske propagande u razdoblju od 1986. do 1995. godine. Promatrajući njihovo djelovanje u procesu nametanja kolektivnih neurotičnih i psihotičnih sindroma, zapaža se važnost ovih sindroma u ratu protiv Hrvatske i Bosne, 1991-95. godine. Rad razmatra šest k1jučnih tema srpske propagande: 1. Viktimizacija, kojom su Srbi konstruirani kao kolektivna žrtva najprije NDH, zatim Titove Jugoslavije, a posebno kao žrtva Hrvata, Albanaca, Bošnjaka i ostalih ne-Srba. 2. Dehumanizacija označenih \u27drugih\u27, kojom su Hrvati opisani kao "genocidni" i "ustaše", Bošnjaci kao "fanatični fundamentalisti", a Albanci kao niža vrsta ljudi. Ovi procesi dehumanizacije učinkovito su uklonili označene "druge" iz područja morala, sankcionirajući na taj način njihovo ubijanje i protjerivanje. 3. Omalovažavanje, kojim su neprijatelji Srbije prikazani kao dostojni prezira. 4. Urota, u kojoj se Hrvati Slovenci, Albanci, Vatikan, Njemačka, Austrija, a ponekad također i Bošnjaci te neke druge strane države poput SAD vide kao ujedinjene u namjeri da sruše Jugoslaviju i unište Srbiju. Na ovaj je način beogradski režim svoje posvemašnje ignoriranje temeljnih standarda međunarodnog prava prikazao kao herojski otpor anti-srpskoj zavjeri. 5. Polaganje prava, kojim su Srbi konstruirani kao oni kojima je "dano pravo" stvaranja Velike Srbije kao države koja bi pripojila dijelove Hrvatske i Bosne, pod motom "Svi Srbi u jednoj državi". 6. Nadljudske moći i božanski blagoslov. Srbima je rečeno da, su na neki način superiorni - najbolji su borci na planetu, mogu se suprostaviti čitavom svijetu, blagoslovljeni su od samoga Boga, zbog činjenice da je Car Lazar odabrao kraljevstvo Božje. Štoviše: upravo stoga što je Car Lazar odabrao kraljevstvo Božje, a odbacio ono zemaljsko, Srbi, poticani da se vide kao Lazarevi nasljednici, baštine pravo na ostvarenje ovoga posljednjega

To Recognize or not – the Policy of the United States toward Croatia, 1990-1991

Autorica je na temelju izvora i literature istražila pitanje odnosa Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prema ratu u Hrvatskoj, napose sa stajališta njezina priznanja kao neovisne države u razdoblju od početaka procesa osamostaljenja 1990. do 1992. Smatra da se američki predsjednik George Bush, unatoč njegovu javnom zauzimanju za novi svjetski poredak, prema stanju u istočnoj Europi odnosio iznimno konzervativno te je želio održati Sovjetski Savez i socijalističku Jugoslaviju kao da je stabilnost svijeta ovisila o njihovu opstanku. Autorica naglašava da je Bush smatrao da ratom u bivšoj Jugoslaviji nije ugrožen niti jedan ključni interes Amerike, koja je, osim toga, 1991. bila zaokupljena događajima u Kuvajtu i Sovjetskom Savezu. Na američko stajalište utjecala je i iskrivljena percepcija događaja iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, a što je koristila srpska promidžba koja je u daljnjem zamagljivanju stvarnosti optuživala hrvatskog predsjednika Tuđmana za antisemitizam. Osim toga, Srbi su u svom promidžbenom djelovanju neprestano upozoravali na ugroženost srpske zajednice u Hrvatskoj. Autorica zaključuje da je Busheva administracija bila nesposobna pravodobno odgovoriti na stanje u bivšoj Jugoslaviji pokazujući nezainteresiranost za stradanja u području koje je smatrano nevažnim za američke interese.The author examined the question of the attitude of the US to the war in Croatia, especially from the point of view of whether to recognize it as an independent state during the period from the beginning of the move to independence in 1990 until 1992. She considers that American President George Bush, despite his public support for a new world order, assumed a very conservative attitude toward the situation in Eastern Europe, inclining toward the preservation of the Soviet Union and Socialist Yugoslavia as if international stability depended on their continuation. In declining from recognizing Croatia, Bush was not in step with the European Union, as he at the time claimed he was, but was rather in opposition to it. The author stresses that the war in Yugoslavia did not affect any vital American interest, which was at the time instead focused on the events in Kuwait and the Soviet Union. The attitude toward Croatia was also influenced by a distorted perception of the events of World War Two as utilized in Serbian propaganda, which continued to distort reality and accused Croatian President Tuđman of anti-Semitism. As well, Serbian propaganda continually warned of the endangered condition of the Serb minority in Croatia. The author concludes that the Bush administration proved incompetent by not reacting in time to the situation in war-torn former Yugoslavia, ignoring the speeches and resolutions of the Senate and House of Congress, and displaying a lack of interest in the plight of people in a region considered unimportant to American interests

Kant on ethics and politics

Best known for his ethical works, Immanuel Kant was part of the liberal Enlightenment and addressed most of the principal political issues of his day. Several of his major works were written in the wake of the storming of the Bastille in Paris, while Europe was engaged in the French Revolutionary Wars. His rejection of revolution but endorsement of the principles for which the French revolutionaries were fighting, as well as his plea for a federation of European states that would settle disputes peacefully, reflected his engagement with the controversies raised by the Revolution. But, although he could not countenance revolution, he declared that, once a revolutionary government has succeeded in establishing itself, citizens should obey the new government, rather than try to restore the ousted authorities

Hegel, revolution, and the rule of law

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the philosophic giants of the nineteenth century. Well versed in both ancient and more recent philosophical tracts, he rejected the individualism of Hobbes and Locke, as well as their notion that the state was an agency set up in the first place to protect life and property, and, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, outlined a vision of the state as an agency bound, in the first place, to protect the weak and the powerless. Hegel further rejected Kant’s individualistic ethics and counseled that ethical behavior had to be understood as taking place in a social context, with real duties toward other people. For Hegel, an individual had rights and duties within the context of the family, in the community, and, as a citizen, vis-à-vis the state. He emphasized the network of duties in which each individual finds himself, urging political moderation and concern for the good of the entire community. He has been condemned as a proto-totalitarian, lauded as a democrat of sorts, and described variously as liberal, anti-liberal, authoritarian, conservative-monarchist, and constitutionalist. This essay will argue that Hegel came to champion a constitutional-legal order (Rechtsstaat) under an autocratic monarch, with protection for liberal values. The absolute authority of the monarch, thus, was limited to those powers which he needed in order to advance and protect the interests of the citizens of the realm

To Recognize or not – the Policy of the United States toward Croatia, 1990-1991

Autorica je na temelju izvora i literature istražila pitanje odnosa Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prema ratu u Hrvatskoj, napose sa stajališta njezina priznanja kao neovisne države u razdoblju od početaka procesa osamostaljenja 1990. do 1992. Smatra da se američki predsjednik George Bush, unatoč njegovu javnom zauzimanju za novi svjetski poredak, prema stanju u istočnoj Europi odnosio iznimno konzervativno te je želio održati Sovjetski Savez i socijalističku Jugoslaviju kao da je stabilnost svijeta ovisila o njihovu opstanku. Autorica naglašava da je Bush smatrao da ratom u bivšoj Jugoslaviji nije ugrožen niti jedan ključni interes Amerike, koja je, osim toga, 1991. bila zaokupljena događajima u Kuvajtu i Sovjetskom Savezu. Na američko stajalište utjecala je i iskrivljena percepcija događaja iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, a što je koristila srpska promidžba koja je u daljnjem zamagljivanju stvarnosti optuživala hrvatskog predsjednika Tuđmana za antisemitizam. Osim toga, Srbi su u svom promidžbenom djelovanju neprestano upozoravali na ugroženost srpske zajednice u Hrvatskoj. Autorica zaključuje da je Busheva administracija bila nesposobna pravodobno odgovoriti na stanje u bivšoj Jugoslaviji pokazujući nezainteresiranost za stradanja u području koje je smatrano nevažnim za američke interese.The author examined the question of the attitude of the US to the war in Croatia, especially from the point of view of whether to recognize it as an independent state during the period from the beginning of the move to independence in 1990 until 1992. She considers that American President George Bush, despite his public support for a new world order, assumed a very conservative attitude toward the situation in Eastern Europe, inclining toward the preservation of the Soviet Union and Socialist Yugoslavia as if international stability depended on their continuation. In declining from recognizing Croatia, Bush was not in step with the European Union, as he at the time claimed he was, but was rather in opposition to it. The author stresses that the war in Yugoslavia did not affect any vital American interest, which was at the time instead focused on the events in Kuwait and the Soviet Union. The attitude toward Croatia was also influenced by a distorted perception of the events of World War Two as utilized in Serbian propaganda, which continued to distort reality and accused Croatian President Tuđman of anti-Semitism. As well, Serbian propaganda continually warned of the endangered condition of the Serb minority in Croatia. The author concludes that the Bush administration proved incompetent by not reacting in time to the situation in war-torn former Yugoslavia, ignoring the speeches and resolutions of the Senate and House of Congress, and displaying a lack of interest in the plight of people in a region considered unimportant to American interests

Civil conflict, federalism and strategic delegation of leadership

This article analyzes negative externalities that policymakers in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighboring regions or groups. These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological (in the form of envy). The latter form of externality may arise from the production of 'conspicuous' public goods. As a result, decentralized provision of conspicuous public goods may be too high. Potentially, a centralized legislature may internalize negative externalities. However, in a model with strategic delegation, we argue that the median voter in each jurisdiction may anticipate a reduction in local public goods supply and delegate to a policymaker who cares more for public goods than she does herself. This last effect mitigates the expected benefits of policy centralization. The authors' theory is then applied to the setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after significant institutional changes that affected the degree of centralization. These case studies provide support for the authors' theoretical predictions