Standard Bearers

In both ethics and epistemology an important question is whether justification is a fully internal or a partly external matter. In view of analogies between relevant considerations in each area, I recommend distinguishing, as basic and independent subjects of normative status, (i) people and (ii) what they do. Evaluations of subjects, on one hand, and of their beliefs and actions, on the other, are less intimately related than is presupposed. This helps resolve internalism/externalism controversies in both domains. An important related advantage of the distinction is its effect on our understanding of normative luck, both moral and epistemic

Dirac Structures and Hamilton-Jacobi Theory for Lagrangian Mechanics on Lie Algebroids

This paper develops the notion of implicit Lagrangian systems on Lie algebroids and a Hamilton--Jacobi theory for this type of system. The Lie algebroid framework provides a natural generalization of classical tangent bundle geometry. We define the notion of an implicit Lagrangian system on a Lie algebroid $E$ using Dirac structures on the Lie algebroid prolongation \T^EE^*. This setting includes degenerate Lagrangian systems with nonholonomic constraints on Lie algebroids.Comment: 22 pages. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:0706.278

Development of a ROV titanium manipulator for light work class ROV vehicles

This paper shows the development of a high technical equipment to be used as tooling of submersible ROV (Remote Operated Vehicles) for offshore operations, particularly the design and fabrication by Additive Manufacturing (AM) of a Titanium Manipulator for ROVs. From the initial concept and design until a new formed company “TITANROB”, this document shortly describes the fabrication of hydraulic titanium manipulators for mid size ROV vehicles, the TitanRob series M501, G500 and the M700.Peer Reviewe

Technological Discontinuities and the Comparative Strategic Value of New Capabilites: Evidence from the Comparison of Small- and Large-Molecule Targeted Anti-Cancer Drug Discovery

Traditional creative destruction theories distinguish disruptions as competence-destroying or competence-enhancing to incumbents’ capabilities, with the former case resulting in incumbents’ loss of competitive advantage in in-house R&D performance (even if complementary assets aid in retaining final market share). In this paper, I propose that attention to the extent of competence destruction is necessary but not sufficient for analyses of competitive advantage in R&D through a technological discontinuity. A full analysis requires the comparison of the value added and ease of access (i.e., strategic value) of all capabilities, old and new. In other words, an analysis of competition during a transition requires assessment not only of how many of the old capabilities were lost but also what it takes to acquire the new ones. I find evidence for this proposition in qualitative and quantitative data from the transition of anti-cancer drug discovery from standard chemotherapy to targeted therapies. Among targeted therapies, I compare two variants, small- vs. large-molecule drugs, which though equally competence-destroying to chemotherapy-based drug discovery, differ in that large-molecule drugs require one more new capability: expertise in biopharmaceutical technology. By tracing the origin and evolution of biopharmaceutical technology, as well as its comparative value added, I can show a contrast in results: incumbents led in small-molecule targeted drug discovery; but they fell behind biopharmaceutical technology pioneers in large-molecule targeted drug discovery, where one of the new capabilities (i.e., expertise in biopharmaceutical technology) had higher value added and was more difficult to acquire than other new capabilities.R&D capabilities; incumbents; technological disruption; competence enhancing

Virtuous Insightfulness

Insight often strikes us blind; when we aren’t expecting it, we suddenly see a connection that previously eluded us—a kind of ‘Aha!’ experience. People with a propensity to such experiences are regarded as insightful, and insightfulness is a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. What’s not clear, however, is just what it is in virtue of which being such that these experiences tend to happen to one renders one intellectually virtuous. This paper draws from both virtue epistemology as well as empirical work on the psychology of problem solving and creativity to make some inroads in accounting for insightfulness as an intellectual virtue. Important to the view advanced is that virtuously insightful individuals manifest certain skills which both cultivate insight experiences (even if not by directly bringing them about) and enable such individuals to move in an epistemically responsible way from insight experience to epistemic endorsement

The Proper Work of the Intellect

There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. This traditional picture has faced numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting of these is an argument that rests on the nearly universally accepted view that this truth goal, as it is known, is at heart two distinct goals that are in tension with one another. This paper will look more closely at the standard way of understanding the truth goal, drawing out both its explicit and implicit features. My aim will be to show that this conception of the truth goal is deeply mistaken, to propose and defend an alternative model, and to show how this alternative model restores the unity of the goal and its potential to ground and explain the normative dimensions of belief