Selected pages from Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times.

3 v. illus., port. 2d. ed., corr. Some of the pages in this document were selected as part of a class project for Professor Garth Bond’s History of the Book seminar, Spring 2012. The abstract was prepared by Alexis VanZalen.https://lux.lawrence.edu/selections/1006/thumbnail.jp

Dobro i zło

Przekład i opracowanie:Adam GrzelińskiUniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniue-mail: [email protected]: 0000-0002-4007-6507Dawid WincławUniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniue-mail: [email protected]: 0000-0002-0738-4057Przekład i opracowanie:Adam GrzelińskiUniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniue-mail: [email protected]: 0000-0002-4007-6507Dawid WincławUniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniue-mail: [email protected]: 0000-0002-0738-405

Sensus communis. Esej o wolności dowcipu i humoru – część pierwsza

Przełożyła Monika Michałowic

The silence of self-knowledge

Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p

True Religion and Hume's Practical Atheism

The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion. Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both theseproposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form of atheism that Hume defends has a more modest and realistic aim, which is simply to restrict and limit the most pernicious forms of religion. Understood this way, Hume’s practical atheism is very different from the forms of “old” atheism associated with Spinoza and D’Holbach, as well as from the “new atheism” of thinkers such as Dawkins and Dennett. Reprinted in Paul Russell, "Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays" (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021): 340-383