The turn of the valve: representing with material models

Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a general definition of what makes something a scientific model, and formulating a novel account of how they represent. We call the result the DEKI account of representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay of, denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models

Passing the Turing Test Does Not Mean the End of Humanity

In this paper we look at the phenomenon that is the Turing test. We consider how Turing originally introduced his imitation game and discuss what this means in a practical scenario. Due to its popular appeal we also look into different representations of the test as indicated by numerous reviewers. The main emphasis here, however, is to consider what it actually means for a machine to pass the Turing test and what importance this has, if any. In particular does it mean that, as Turing put it, a machine can “think”. Specifically we consider claims that passing the Turing test means that machines will have achieved human-like intelligence and as a consequence the singularity will be upon us in the blink of an eye