The new institutionalism in the study of authoritarian regimes

Der Verfasser, der die sozialwissenschaftliche Diskussion der Bedeutung von Institutionen in Autokratien auf internationaler Ebene mit angestoßen und vorangetrieben hat, gibt einen fulminanten Überblick über den 'neuen Institutionalismus' in der vergleichenden Autokratieforschung, der Institutionen mit 'demokratischem Anstrich', wie Parteien, Parlamente, Gerichte und Wahlen in nicht-demokratischen Systemen ernst nimmt und systematisch untersucht. Der Autor, der für Autokratien, die Wahlen durchführen, den Begriff des 'elektoralen Autoritarismus' geprägt hat, bietet dabei eine analytische Synthese von vier Kernbereichen der Institutionenanalyse in autoritären Regimen: erstens der Forschung zur Funktionslogik autoritärer Institutionen, zweitens der Forschung zu den institutionellen Grundoptionen von Autokratien, drittens der Forschung zu autoritären Kontrollstrategien in unterschiedlichen institutionellen Feldern und viertens der Forschung zur Spannung zwischen regimestabilisierenden und destabilisierenden Effekten von nominell 'demokratischen Institutionen' in autokratischen Regimen. (ICF2

Expected stability: defining and measuring democratic consolidation

"The paper starts with a probabilistic definition of democratic consolidation. A democratic regime is consolidated, it claims, when it has acquired a high probability of survival. The article discusses some implications and complications of this definition: its probabilistic foundations and its continuous, cognitive, and subjective nature. This descriptive concept of democratic consolidation, the text argues in continuation, helps avoiding two common methodological pitfalls: etiological definitions (that fail to distinguish between defining features and causal variables) and operational definitions (that fail to distinguish between concepts and operational indicators). The essay concludes with some reflections on the observation and measurement of democratic consolidation. [author's abstract

Credible change exploring the bases of state reform in new democracies

The essay starts from the assumption that institutions can be conceived of as patterns of expectation and thus that changing institutions requires changing expectations. According to its central hypothesis, the key to such expectational changes reads credibility: People correct their predictions about the ways others behave only when they have good reasons to do so. It suggests that three conditions must be fulfilled to render institutional reforms credible and thus effective: First, institutional reformers have to devise sound incentives compatible with the assumption that actors are self-concerned utility maximizers. Second, institutional reformers need sound moral credentials. They have to build solid images of moral integrity. Third, new institutions have to be built upon sound material bases. They demand skills, money, and technology. Yet, as the paper lines out in its conclusion, the ultimate proof of any institutional cake is eating it. Inconsistent performance devalues ex post any investment of trust eventually granted ex ante

Das empirische Profil der "Politikverdrossenheit": Ein Annäherungsversuch (auf der Grundlage von Austrian Life Style 1992)

Abstract: In the public debate it is a commonplace observation that Austrian citizens are massively desenchanted with their political elite. Nevertheless, reliable survey data are extremely scarce. The present article analyzes, on a purely descriptive and non-mathematical basis, the data on political evaluations which were collected within the survey Austrian Life Style 1992 (n = 4.000). Its - tentative - conclusions are threefold. First, the results do not confirm the generalized existence of profound and indiscriminate political disaffaction. Second, political evaluations do not vary significantly with the socio-economic variables sex, age, education and ocupation. Third, "hard core" anti-establishment resentments are essentially to be found among voters of the neopopulist "liberal" Party FPÖ and, to a lesser degree, among non-voters and green voters.

Expected Stability: Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation

Abstract: The paper starts with a probabilistic definition of democratic consolidation. A democratic regime is consolidated, it claims, when it has acquired a high probability of survival. The article discusses some implications and complications ofthis definition: its probabilistic foundations and its continuous, cognitive, and subjective nature. This descriptive concept of democratic consolidation, the text argues in continuation, helps avoiding two common methodological pitfalls: etiological definitions (that fail to distinguish between defining features and causal variables) and operational definitions (that fail to distinguish between concepts and operational indicators). The essay concludes with some reflections on the observation and measurement of democratic consolidation.

Die Funktionsbedingungen konzertierter Politik: Überlegungen zu Lateinamerika

"Is "neocorporatist concertation" an exportable product? Invented and made in Europe, can it be adopted and adapted in contexts so radically different as in Latin America? And if so, under what conditions? Looking through the Latin American discussion on "social concertation", as well as the North American and European literature on "neocorporatism", the present article tries to provide some systematical insights to this question. It argues that "discoursive" forms of macroeconomic decisionmaking are conditional upon five sets of factors: (1) logical preconditions (the existence of actors and their mutual recognition), (2) conditions of entry (the prevalence of consensual policy styles and recognized relations of interdependence), (3) acceptability of outcomes (the functional and strategic rationality of negotiation results), (4) the successfull management of temporal constraints (scarcity of time and uncertainty) and finally (5) the overcoming of "external" political constraints (intrastate and intraorganizational limiting factors). All these conditions of "social concertation" are highly demanding. Consequently, the article concludes that efforts of "neocorporatist" poliy-making in Latin America are feasible – while their probability of success is rather modest." [author's abstract

The Dynamic Nationalisation of Voting for United Russia:the Stability / Instability of Regional Deviations from National Results

Based on the results of Duma and Presidential elections over the period 2003–2016, this article examines cross-regional variation in static and dynamic nationalisation of voting for United Russia (UR). The main finding is that in an overwhelming majority of Russian regions, a high level of static nationalisation is accompanied by a high level of dynamic nationalisation. In most of the regions, voting for UR rises or falls in a consistent manner across the elections. Cross-regional variations in both static and dynamic nationalisation of UR’s support are mostly explained by the degree of authoritarianism in Russian regions

Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22 years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian ‘regime breakdown’ and ‘regime maintenance’. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalise once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar’s always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalising in 2010, the regime sought to create a ‘disciplined democracy’ to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via ‘ceasefire capitalism’, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total ‘victory’ for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace