33 research outputs found
Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of
bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents
is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out.
Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial
ones which return a fixed outcome.
This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof
mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested
construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are
tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible
bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.Comment: Extended abstract accepted to SAGT 2016. This ArXiv version corrects
typos in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Claims 28-29 of prior ArXiv versio
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality
Differentiable Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Private and Public Goods in Domains that are Not Necessarily Large or Quasi-Linear.
Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
Second price mechanism (Vickrey mechanism), Quasi-linear preference, Strategy-proofness, Envy-freeness, D44, D63, C72,