The ACIGA Data Analysis programme

The Data Analysis programme of the Australian Consortium for Interferometric Gravitational Astronomy (ACIGA) was set up in 1998 by the first author to complement the then existing ACIGA programmes working on suspension systems, lasers and optics, and detector configurations. The ACIGA Data Analysis programme continues to contribute significantly in the field; we present an overview of our activities.Comment: 10 pages, 0 figures, accepted, Classical and Quantum Gravity, (Proceedings of the 5th Edoardo Amaldi Conference on Gravitational Waves, Tirrenia, Pisa, Italy, 6-11 July 2003

Robust Bayesian detection of unmodelled bursts

A Bayesian treatment of the problem of detecting an unmodelled gravitational wave burst with a global network of gravitational wave observatories reveals that several previously proposed statistics have implicit biases that render them sub-optimal for realistic signal populations.Comment: 9 pages, 1 figure, submitted to CQG Amaldi proceedings special issu

"How May I Help You?": Modeling Twitter Customer Service Conversations Using Fine-Grained Dialogue Acts

Given the increasing popularity of customer service dialogue on Twitter, analysis of conversation data is essential to understand trends in customer and agent behavior for the purpose of automating customer service interactions. In this work, we develop a novel taxonomy of fine-grained "dialogue acts" frequently observed in customer service, showcasing acts that are more suited to the domain than the more generic existing taxonomies. Using a sequential SVM-HMM model, we model conversation flow, predicting the dialogue act of a given turn in real-time. We characterize differences between customer and agent behavior in Twitter customer service conversations, and investigate the effect of testing our system on different customer service industries. Finally, we use a data-driven approach to predict important conversation outcomes: customer satisfaction, customer frustration, and overall problem resolution. We show that the type and location of certain dialogue acts in a conversation have a significant effect on the probability of desirable and undesirable outcomes, and present actionable rules based on our findings. The patterns and rules we derive can be used as guidelines for outcome-driven automated customer service platforms.Comment: 13 pages, 6 figures, IUI 201

The bloodstream differentiation - division of Trypanosoma brucei studied using mitochondrial markers

In the bloodstream of its mammalian host, the African trypanosome Trypanosoma brucei undergoes a life cycle stage differentiation from a long, slender form to a short, stumpy form. This involves three known major events: exit from a proliferative cell cycle, morphological change and mitochondrial biogenesis. Previously, models have been proposed accounting for these events (Matthews & Gull 1994a). Refinement of, and discrimination between, these models has been hindered by a lack of stage-regulated antigens useful as markers at the single-cell level. We have now evaluated a variety of cytological markers and applied them to investigate the coordination of phenotypic differentiation and cell cycle arrest. Our studies have focused on the differential expression of the mitochondrial enzyme dihydrolipoamide dehydrogenase relative to the differentiation-division of bloodstream trypanosomes. The results implicate a temporal order of events: commitment, division, phenotypic differentiation

The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology

The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed that indeterministic causal processes pervade the action-implementation apparatus employed by the agent. The metaphysical libertarians differ among themselves on the question of whether the indeterministic causal relation exists between the series of intentional states and processes, both conscious and unconscious, and the action, making claim for what has come to be known as the event-causal view, or between the agent and the action, arguing that a sort of agent causation is at work. In this paper, I have tried to propose that certain features of both event-causal and agent-causal libertarian views need to be combined in order to provide a more defendable compatibilist account accommodating deliberative actions with deterministic causation. The ‘‘agent-executed-eventcausal libertarianism’’, the account of agency I have tried to develop here, integrates certain plausible features of the two competing accounts of libertarianism turning them into a consistent whole. I hope to show in the process that the integration of these two variants of libertarianism does not challenge what some accounts of metaphysical compatibilism propose—that there exists a broader deterministic relation between the web of mental and extra-mental components constituting the agent’s dispositional system—the agent’s beliefs, desires, short-term and long-term goals based on them, the acquired social, cultural and religious beliefs, the general and immediate and situational environment in which the agent is placed, etc. on the one hand and the decisions she makes over her lifetime on the basis of these factors. While in the ‘‘Introduction’’ the philosophically assumed anomaly between deterministic causation and the intentional act of deciding has been briefly surveyed, the second section is devoted to the task of bridging the gap between compatibilism and libertarianism. The next section of the paper turns to an analysis of folk-psychological concepts and intuitions about the effects of neurochemical processes and prior mental events on the freedom of making choices. How philosophical insights can be beneficially informed by taking into consideration folk-psychological intuitions has also been discussed, thus setting up the background for such analysis. It has been suggested in the end that support for the proposed theory of intentional agency can be found in the folk-psychological intuitions, when they are taken in the right perspective

Targeted search for continuous gravitational waves: Bayesian versus maximum-likelihood statistics

We investigate the Bayesian framework for detection of continuous gravitational waves (GWs) in the context of targeted searches, where the phase evolution of the GW signal is assumed to be known, while the four amplitude parameters are unknown. We show that the orthodox maximum-likelihood statistic (known as F-statistic) can be rediscovered as a Bayes factor with an unphysical prior in amplitude parameter space. We introduce an alternative detection statistic ("B-statistic") using the Bayes factor with a more natural amplitude prior, namely an isotropic probability distribution for the orientation of GW sources. Monte-Carlo simulations of targeted searches show that the resulting Bayesian B-statistic is more powerful in the Neyman-Pearson sense (i.e. has a higher expected detection probability at equal false-alarm probability) than the frequentist F-statistic.Comment: 12 pages, presented at GWDAW13, to appear in CQ

Bayesian detection of unmodeled bursts of gravitational waves

The data analysis problem of coherently searching for unmodeled gravitational-wave bursts in the data generated by a global network of gravitational-wave observatories has been at the center of research for almost two decades. As data from these detectors is starting to be analyzed, a renewed interest in this problem has been sparked. A Bayesian approach to the problem of coherently searching for gravitational wave bursts with a network of ground-based interferometers is here presented. We demonstrate how to systematically incorporate prior information on the burst signal and its source into the analysis. This information may range from the very minimal, such as best-guess durations, bandwidths, or polarization content, to complete prior knowledge of the signal waveforms and the distribution of sources through spacetime. We show that this comprehensive Bayesian formulation contains several previously proposed detection statistics as special limiting cases, and demonstrate that it outperforms them.Comment: 18 pages, 3 figures, revisions based on referee comment

Cognitive Computation sans Representation

The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is extrinsic to formal procedures as such, and the intended interpretation of syntax makes no difference to the execution of an algorithm. So the unique 'content' postulated by RTM is superfluous to the formal procedures of CTM. And once these procedures are implemented in a physical mechanism, it is exclusively the causal properties of the physical mechanism that are responsible for all aspects of the system's behaviour. So once again, postulated content is rendered superfluous. To the extent that semantic content may appear to play a role in behaviour, it must be syntactically encoded within the system, and just as in a standard computational artefact, so too with the human mind/brain - it's pure syntax all the way down to the level of physical implementation. Hence 'content' is at most a convenient meta-level gloss, projected from the outside by human theorists, which itself can play no role in cognitive processing

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account

The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and pragmatic goals. Hence there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the ‘anti-realist’ conclusion that computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, but rather upon interest-relative human conventions. Hence physical computation is a ‘conventional’ rather than a ‘natural’ kind