14 research outputs found

    Biosafety standards for working with Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus

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    In countries from which Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is absent, the causative virus CCHF virus (CCHFV) is classified as a hazard group 4 agent and handled in containment level 4. In contrast, most endemic countries out of necessity have had to perform diagnostic tests under biosafety level (BSL) 2 or 3 conditions. In particular, Turkey and several of the Balkan countries have safely processed more than 100000 samples over many years in BSL-2 laboratories. It is therefore advocated that biosafety requirements for CCHF diagnostic procedures should be revised, to allow the required tests to be performed under enhanced BSL-2 conditions with appropriate biosafety laboratory equipment and personal protective equipment used according to standardized protocols in the affected countries. Downgrading of CCHFV research work from Cl- 4,BSL-4 to Cl-3 ,BSL-3 should also be considered.Funding was received through CCH Fever Network (Collaborative Project) supported by the European Commission under the Health Cooperation Work Program of the 7th Framework Program (Grant agreement no. 260427) (http://www.cch-fever.eu/).http://vir.sgmjournals.orghb2017Veterinary Tropical Disease

    On the Aetiology of Bovine Farcy in the Sudan

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    Protective efficacy of a prime-boost protocol using H5-DNA plasmid as prime and inactivated H5N2 vaccine as the booster against the Egyptian avian influenza challenge virus

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    In this study, a recombinant DNA plasmid was constructed, encoding for HA1 of a selected Egyptian H5N1 virus (isolated during the 2012 outbreaks). In the immunization and challenge experiments, SPF chickens received 1 or 2 doses of H5-DNA plasmid prime, and boosted with the inactivated H5N2 vaccine. Haemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers, protection levels, and the magnitude of virus shedding were compared to that of the chickens that received either DNA plasmid or inactivated H5N2 vaccine alone. H5N1 virus A/chicken/Egypt/128s/2012 (H5N1) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) clade 2.2.1/C was used for the challenge. Chickens immunized with 1 or 2 doses of H5-DNA vaccine failed to overcome the challenge with 0% and 10% protection, respectively. Quantitative real-time reverse transcription-PCR revealed virus shedding of 2.2 x 104 PCR copies/ml 3 days post challenge (dpc) in the only surviving bird from the group that received 2 doses of plasmid. However, chickens immunized with 1 or 2 doses of H5-DNA plasmid as prime and inactivated H5N2 vaccine as booster, showed 80% protection after challenge, with a viral shedding of 1.2 x 104 PCR copies/ml (1 dose) and 1.6 x 104 PCR copies/ml (2 doses) 3 dpc. The surviving birds in both groups did not shed the virus at 5 and 7 dpc. In H5N2-vaccinated chickens, protection levels were 70% with relatively high virus shedding (1.8 x 104 PCR copies/ml) 3 dpc. HI titers were protective to the surviving chickens. This study reports the efficacy of H5-DNA plasmid to augment reduction in viral shedding and to provide better protection when applied in a prime-boost program with the inactivated AI vaccine

    Current technologies and location based services

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    This paper examines the benefits and drawbacks of these services, reviewing differences in infrastructure, power requirements, sensing devices, and other factors. Technologies covered include Radio Frequency Identification, GSM, GPS, A-GPS, Smart Antennas, Distributed Antenna Systems, Localization by Cell-ID, Localization by Prediction (Dead Reckoning method), Angle of Arrival (AOA), Localization by Finger Printing, Localization by Time of Arrival (TOA), Localization by Observed Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA), and Hybrid Localization-based AOA-TOA
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