The Grizzly, December 9, 1983

Ursinus Continues Excellence in Chemistry • Letters to the Editor • Heads\u27 Album Hits Charts • Aquabears Triumphant in Warrender\u27s Last Meet • Women\u27s Basketball Hustles to Two Victories • Mercer Wins Fencing Tourney • Thoma Leads Bears Over Haverfordhttps://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/grizzlynews/1110/thumbnail.jp

Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council, through the PETROPOL research programme, is gratefully acknowledged. The paper has been greatly improved by the suggestions of two anonymous referees. We also thank Hisashi Hokari and Frode Meland for valuable comments and suggestions

Minimum wages and welfare in a Hotelling duopsony

Hotelling, Duopsony, Minimum wages, D43, E24, J48,