Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments

In this article the authors study delegation problems within multiparty coalition governments. They argue that coalition parties can use the committee system to “shadow” the ministers of their partners; that is, they can appoint committee chairs from other governing parties, who will then be well placed to monitor and/or check the actions of the corresponding ministers. The authors analyze which ministers should be shadowed if governing parties seek to minimize the aggregate policy losses they suffer as the result of ministers pursuing their own parties’ interests rather than the coalition’s. Based on data from 19 mostly European parliamentary democracies, the authors find that the greater the policy disagreement between a minister’s party and its partners, the more likely the minister is to be shadowed

ARCH 14 - International Conference on Research on Health Care Architecture - November 19-21, 2014, Espoo, Finland - Conference Proceedings

Healthcare Architecture has grown rapidly in recent years. However, there are still many questions remaining. The commission, therefore, is to share the existing research knowledge and latest results and to carry out research projects focusing more specifically on the health care situation in a variety of contexts. The ARCH14 conference was the third conference in the series of ARCH conferences on Research on Health Care Architecture initiated by Chalmers University. It was realized in collaboration with the Nordic Research Network for Healthcare Architecture .It was a joint event between Aalto University, Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) and National Institute of Health and Welfare (THL International).The conference gathered together more than 70 researchers and practitioners from across disciplines and countries to discuss the current themes

Committee autonomy in parliamentary systems – coalition logic or congressional rationales?

The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020

Institutional constraints on profligate politicians: the conditional effect of partisan fragmentation on budget deficits

The literature on the common pool resource problem in budgeting has thus far not explored the likely interaction between size fragmentation (the number of decision makers) and procedural fragmentation (the structure of the process in which they interact).The argument put forward in this article is that the effects of these two types of fragmentation should not be additive, but multiplicative, because theory suggests that the impact of size fragmentation on fiscal policy is conditional on the extent of procedural fragmentation. Using panel data for 57 countries over the period of 1975 to 1998, the author empirically investigates this interaction in the legislative context and finds strong evidence that partisan fragmentation is associated with higher deficits only when it is not moderated by limits on parliamentary amendment authority