Role of antibiotic ligand in nascent peptide-dependent ribosome stalling

Specific nascent peptides in the ribosome exit tunnel can elicit translation arrest. Such ribosome stalling is used for regulation of expression of some bacterial and eukaryotic genes. The stalling is sensitive to additional cellular cues, most commonly the binding of specific small-molecular-weight cofactors to the ribosome. The role of cofactors in programmed translation arrest is unknown. By analyzing nascent peptide- and antibiotic-dependent ribosome stalling that controls inducible expression of antibiotic resistance genes in bacteria, we have found that the antibiotic is directly recognized as a part of the translation modulating signal. Even minute structural alterations preclude it from assisting in ribosome stalling, indicating the importance of precise molecular interactions of the drug with the ribosome. One of the sensors that monitor the structure of the antibiotic is the 23S rRNA residue C2610, whose mutation reduces the efficiency of nascent peptide- and antibiotic-dependent ribosome stalling. These findings establish a new paradigm of the role of the cofactor in programmed translation arrest in which a small molecule is recognized along with specific nascent peptide sequences as a composite structure that provokes arrest of translation. A similar mechanism could be used by the ribosome to sense a variety of cellular metabolites

Who Benefits from Building Insurance Groups? A Welfare Analysis Based on Optimal Group Risk Management

This paper compares the shareholder-value-maximizing capital structure and pricing policy of insurance groups against that of stand-alone insurers. Groups can utilise intra-group risk diversification by means of capital and risk transfer instruments. We show that using these instruments enables the group to offer insurance with less default risk and at lower premiums than is optimal for standalone insurers. We also take into account that shareholders of groups could find it more difficult to prevent inefficient overinvestment or cross-subsidisation, which we model by higher dead-weight costs of carrying capital. The tradeoff between risk diversification on the one hand and higher dead-weight costs on the other can result in group building being beneficial for shareholders but detrimental for policyholders