47 research outputs found
Co-opetition models for governing professional football
In recent years, models for co-creating value in a business-to-business context have
often been examined with the aim of studying the strategies implemented by and
among organisations for competitive and co-operative purposes. The traditional
concepts of competition and co-operation between businesses have now evolved,
both in terms of the sector in which the businesses operate and in terms of the type
of goods they produce.
Many researchers have, in recent times, investigated the determinants that can
influence the way in which the model of co-opetition can be applied to the football
world. Research interest lies in the particular features of what makes a good football.
In this paper, the aim is to conduct an analysis of the rules governing the “football
system”, while also looking at the determinants of the demand function within
football entertainment. This entails applying to football match management the
co-opetition model, a recognised model that combines competition and co-operation
with the view of creating and distributing value. It can, therefore, be said that, for a
spectator, watching sport is an experience of high suspense, and this suspense, in turn,
depends upon the degree of uncertainty in the outcome. It follows that the rules
ensuring that both these elements can be satisfied are a fertile ground for co-operation
between clubs, as it is in the interest of all stakeholders to offer increasingly more
attractive football, in comparison with other competing products. Our end purpose is
to understand how co-opetition can be achieved within professional football
Balancing between coordination, cooperation and competition? A mixed-method approach for assessing the role ambiguity of local sports authorities
In recent years, the subsidiarity principle has been underlined in Sport-for-All policies in countries such as Germany, Austria and Belgium. According to this organising principle, issues need to be handled by the lowest possible political and administrative level, and as close to the citizens as possible. The 2007 decree concerning Sport-for-All policies at the local level in Flanders (Belgium) clearly referred to this. It emphasised the decentralisation of the Sport for All policy, and highlighted the regulatory and coordinating role of local sports authorities. As a consequence, they may face conflicting roles of being coordinator, regulator and provider of mass sport at the local level. In this paper, a mixed-method approach is used to give a closer insight in the role perceptions of local sports authorities in Flanders, and their position towards private sport providers. The results show that local sports authorities consider the coordination and regulation of mass sport in their municipality as their primary task. Yet, it appears that private sport providers also perceive competition from local sports authorities. Moreover, a considerable number of the local sports authorities believe they can combine the roles of provider and coordinator. As there appears to be considerable goal ambiguity, it is necessary for local sports authorities to formulate clear goals. Referring to the principle of subsidiarity, it is argued that sports authorities should only intervene when (non-)profit sport providers are not able to achieve the desirable outcomes with regard to sport and the welfare agenda
Evolutionarily stable strategies in sports contests
Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash’s strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS
Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance When Teams are not Wage Takers
Contest, Market for talent, Competitive balance, Revenue sharing, C72, K23, L83,