Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited Attention

In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless, regulation requiring greater disclosure can reduce observers' belief accuracies and welfare. A stronger tendency to neglect disclosed signals increases disclosure, whereas a stronger tendency to neglect failures to disclose reduces disclosure. Observer beliefs are influenced by the salience of disclosed signals, and disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in other fundamentally unrelated arenas.disclosure; disclosure regulation; limited attention; credulity

Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited Attention

In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless, regulation requiring greater disclosure can reduce observers' belief accuracies and welfare. A stronger tendency to neglect disclosed signals increases disclosure, whereas a stronger tendency to neglect failures to disclose reduces disclosure. Observer beliefs are influenced by the salience of disclosed signals, and disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in other fundamentally unrelated arenas

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research

On the lease rate, convenience yield and speculative effects in the gold futures market

By examining data on the gold forward offered rate (GOFO) and lease rates over the period 1996- 2009, we conclude that the convenience yield of gold is better approximated by the lease rate than the interest-adjusted spread of Fama & French (1983). Using the latter quantity, we study the relationship between gold leasing and the level of COMEX discretionary inventory and exhibit that lease rates are negatively related to inventories. We also show that Futures prices have increasingly exceeded forward prices over the period, and this effect increases with the speculative pressure and the maturity of the contracts

Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Evolutionary Objection: Rethinking the Relevance of Empirical Science

Neo-Aristotelian metaethical naturalism is a modern attempt at naturalizing ethics using ideas from Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics. Proponents of this view argue that moral virtue in human beings is an instance of natural goodness, a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the realm of non-human living things. Many critics question whether neo-Aristotelian naturalism is tenable in light of modern evolutionary biology. Two influential lines of objection have appealed to an evolutionary understanding of human nature and natural teleology to argue against this view. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of these two seemingly different lines of objection as raising instances of the same dilemma, giving neo-Aristotelians a choice between contradicting our considered moral judgment and abandoning metaethical naturalism. I argue that resolving the dilemma requires showing a particular kind of continuity between the norms of moral virtue and norms that are necessary for understanding non-human living things. I also argue that in order to show such a continuity, neo-Aristotelians need to revise the relationship they adopt with empirical science and acknowledge that the latter is relevant to assessing their central commitments regarding living things. Finally, I argue that to move this debate forward, both neo-Aristotelians and their critics should pay attention to recent work on the concept of organism in evolutionary and developmental biology

Deriving an underlying mechanism for discontinuous percolation

Understanding what types of phenomena lead to discontinuous phase transitions in the connectivity of random networks is an outstanding challenge. Here we show that a simple stochastic model of graph evolution leads to a discontinuous percolation transition and we derive the underlying mechanism responsible: growth by overtaking. Starting from a collection of $n$ isolated nodes, potential edges chosen uniformly at random from the complete graph are examined one at a time while a cap, $k$, on the maximum allowed component size is enforced. Edges whose addition would exceed $k$ can be simply rejected provided the accepted fraction of edges never becomes smaller than a function which decreases with $k$ as $g(k) = 1/2 + (2k)^{-\beta}$. We show that if $\beta < 1$ it is always possible to reject a sampled edge and the growth in the largest component is dominated by an overtaking mechanism leading to a discontinuous transition. If $\beta > 1$, once $k \ge n^{1/\beta}$, there are situations when a sampled edge must be accepted leading to direct growth dominated by stochastic fluctuations and a "weakly" discontinuous transition. We also show that the distribution of component sizes and the evolution of component sizes are distinct from those previously observed and show no finite size effects for the range of $\beta$ studied.Comment: 6 pages. Final version appearing in EPL (2012