Clustering Properties of Merger Waves: Space, Time or Industry?

We study the degree of agglomeration of acquisition activity within clusters of temporal, geographic and industrial proximity based on almost 600,000 individual transactions. The findings indicate that significant clustering occurs in time and across industries, while the results on geographic clustering are mixed. This supports the view that merger waves are mostly driven by neoclassical motives

Conceptualizing and measuring strategy implementation – a multi-dimensional view

Through quantitative methodological approaches for studying the strategic management and planning process, analysis of data from 208 senior managers involved in strategy processes within ten UK industrial sectors provides evidence on the measurement properties of a multi-dimensional instrument that assesses ten dimensions of strategy implementation. Using exploratory factor analysis, results indicate the sub-constructs (the ten dimensions) are uni-dimensional factors with acceptable reliability and validity; whilst using three additional measures, and correlation and hierarchical regression analysis, the nomological validity for the multi-dimensional strategy implementation construct was established. Relative importance of ten strategy implementation dimensions (activities) for practicing managers is highlighted, with the mutually and combinative effects drawing conclusion that senior management involvement leads the way among the ten key identified activities vital for successful strategy implementation

Economic consequences of near-patient test results: the case of tests for the Helicobacter Pylori bacterium in dyspepsia

Cost-effectiveness, Laboratory tests, General practice, Probabilistic sensitivity analysis,

Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting

In this paper we review some of the literature on R&D collective arrangements using game theoretical concepts and considering various settings, involving either complete or incomplete contracts. Patent protection, licensing in various industry contexts as well as the role of various factors such as product differentiation, innovation magnitude and asymmetric information are considered. The relation of innovative activity to the intensity of competition is reconsidered and the benefit of various types of cooperative R&D-agreements in presence of externalities are reviewed. The last two sections are devoted to contracting issues

Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment

Proponents of Approval Voting argue that this electoral rule leads to more centrist outcomes compared to Plurality Voting. This claim has been substantiated by scholarly work using spatial models of political competition. We revisit this issue in the context of a model of political competition in which (1) candidates are policy-motivated; (2) candidacy decisions are endogenous; and (3) candidates can credibly commit to implementing any policy. Under these assumptions we find the opposite to be true – Plurality Voting yields convergence to the median voter’s ideal policy but Approval Voting may not. We argue that this result is driven by the differential incentives for candidate entry under the two voting rules. Our results suggest that whether Approval Voting yields more centrist outcomes vis-á-vis Plurality Voting depends on the possibility of policy commitment on the part of the candidates.Arnaud Dellis and Mandar Oa

Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers in the Eco-Industry

This paper considers the environmental policy and welfare implications of a merger between environment firms (i.e., firms managing environmental resources or supplying pollution abatement goods and services). The traditional analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopolies is extended in two ways. First, we show how environmental policy affects the incentives of environment firms to merge. Second, we stress that mergers in the eco-industry impact welfare beyond what is observed in other sectors, due to an extra effect on pollution abatement efforts; this might lead to disagreements between an anti-trust agency seeking to limit market concentration which can be detrimental to consumer surplus and a benevolent regulator who maximizes total welfare