Democratization, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth

There are two innovations in the paper as compared to the previous literature on democracy and growth. First, we consider not only the level of democracy, but also changes in this level in the 1970s-1990s as measured by increments of Freedom House political rights indices. Second, the distinction is made between democracy and law and order (order based on legal rules); the latter is measured by the rule of law, investors' risk and corruption indices. We discuss two interconnected threshold hypotheses: (1) in countries where law and order is strong enough, democratization stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor law and order democratization undermines growth; (2) if democratization occurs under the conditions of poor law and order (so that illiberal democracy emerges), then shadow economy expands, quality of governance worsens, and macroeconomic policy becomes less prudent. We adduce a number of stylized facts to support our hypotheses. However our econometric findings are mixed: we report results that support the hypotheses as well as regressions that contradict them

Integration Dilemmas of the Common Economic Space

The paper addresses key political economy dilemmas associated with the formation of the Common Economic Space (CES) by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Analysis is focused on alternative integration strategies, prospects of the CES enlargement, and elimination of trade and investment barriers. Unification of regulatory norms and technical standards using the EU experience as well as negotiating free trade agreements with the EU and countries of the Asia-Pacific are shown to be crucial for the future of the CES project