Has the fed reacted asymmetrically to stock prices?

Yes. Existing studies of the possible role of asset prices in monetary policy implicitly assume that central banks respond to asset price movements in a fully symmetric way. This paper offers a new perspective by allowing for different policy reactions to stock price increases and decreases, respectively. To avoid endogeneity problems, I employ the method of identification through heteroskedasticity. I then demonstrate that the reaction of the Federal Reserve has indeed been asymmetric during the period 1998- 2008. While a 5% drop in the S&P 500 index is shown to increase the probability of a 25 basis point interest rate cut by 1/3, no significant reaction to stock price increases can be identified

The effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate: The case of Denmark

We study the empirical effects of fiscal policy in Denmark since the adoption of a fixed exchange rate policy in 1982. We demonstrate that fiscal stimulus has a rather large impact on economic activity in the very short run, with a government spending multiplier of 1.3 on impact in our preferred specification. Denmark's fixed exchange rate implies that the nominal interest rate remains fixed after a fiscal expansion, facilitating a substantial impact of the fiscal stimulus on the real economy. On the other hand, the large degree of openness of the Danish economy means that a sizeable share of the fiscal stimulus will be directed towards imported goods. Our results suggest that the 'monetary accomodation channel' dominates the 'leakage effect'. We also find that the effects of fiscal stimulus are very short-lived in Denmark, with the effect on output becoming insignificant after around a year. The fiscal multiplier is above 1 only in the first quarter, and drops to 0.6 one year after the shock. We further demonstrate that the fiscal multiplier is far from constant over time. While the multiplier was below 1 in the 1970's and 1980's, it has been above 1 in the 1990's and the 2000's, when Denmark has had a credibly fixed exchange rate and sound public finances

What drives the business cycle in a small open economy? Evidence from an estimated DSGE Model of the Danish economy

Estimated DSGE models have become the standard workhorse model for empirically based macroeconomic analysis in recent years. In this paper, we present an estimated DSGE model for Denmark. The model has been estimated using Bayesian methods and a dataset consisting of 23 macroeconomic variables. We use the model to identify the most important determinants of business cycle fluctuations in Denmark. Our results indicate that foreign shocks explain more than 50 pct. of the variation in Danish real GDP. As an example, the recession that hit Denmark in the wake of the recent financial crisis was to a large extent caused by foreign factors. Shocks originating abroad also played an important role in the build-up to the crisis. However, domestic factors also contributed substantially to the boom in Danish GDP in the years before the crisis, while fiscal policy was not sufficiently contractionary during the boom

Asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market: A DSGE approach

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it has been argued that a guideline for future policy should be to take the 'a' out of 'asymmetry' in the way monetary policy deals with asset price movements. Recent empirical evidence has suggested that the Federal Reserve may have followed an asymmetric policy towards the stock market in the pre-crisis period. The present paper studies the effects of such a policy in a DSGE model. The asymmetric policy rule introduces an important non-linearity into the model: Booms in output and inflation will tend to be amplified, while recessions will be dampened. I further investigate to what extent an asymmetric stock price reaction could be motivated by the desire of policymakers to correct for inherent asymmetries in the way stock price movements affect the macroeconomy

Leverage and deepening business cycle skewness

We document that the U.S. and other G7 economies have been characterized by an increasingly negative business cycle asymmetry over the last three decades. This finding can be explained by the concurrent increase in the financial leverage of households and firms. To support this view, we devise and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model with collateralized borrowing and occasionally binding credit constraints. Improved access to credit increases the likelihood that financial constraints become non-binding in the face of expansionary shocks, allowing agents to freely substitute intertemporally. Contractionary shocks, on the other hand, are further amplified by drops in collateral values, since constraints remain binding. As a result, booms become progressively smoother and more prolonged than busts. Finally, in line with recent empirical evidence, financially-driven expansions lead to deeper contractions, as compared with equally-sized non-financial expansions

Leverage and deepening business cycle skewness

Documentamos que la economía de Estados Unidos se ha caracterizado por una asimetría del ciclo económico cada vez más negativa durante las últimas tres décadas. Este hallazgo puede explicarse por el aumento del apalancamiento financiero de hogares y empresas. Para mostrar esto, diseñamos y estimamos un modelo dinámico de equilibrio general con préstamos garantizados y restricciones de crédito ocasionalmente vinculantes. Un mayor apalancamiento aumenta la probabilidad de que las restricciones financieras se relajen ante perturbaciones expansivas, mientras que las perturbaciones contractivas se amplifican al hacerse estas restricciones más vinculantes. Como resultado, las expansiones se vuelven progresivamente más suaves y prolongadas que las recesiones. Por tanto, es posible conciliar una mayor asimetría negativa en el ciclo económico junto con la Gran Moderación en la volatilidad cíclica. Finalmente, de acuerdo con la evidencia empírica reciente, encontramos que las expansiones financieras llevan a contracciones más profundas que expansiones no financieras de igual tamañoWe document that the U.S. economy has been characterized by an increasingly negative business cycle asymmetry over the last three decades. This finding can be explained by the concurrent increase in the financial leverage of households and firms. To support this view, we devise and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model with collateralized borrowing and occasionally binding credit constraints. Higher leverage increases the likelihood that constraints become slack in the face of expansionary shocks, while contractionary shocks are further amplified due to binding constraints. As a result, booms become progressively smoother and more prolonged than busts. We are therefore able to reconcile a more negatively skewed business cycle with the Great Moderation in cyclical volatility. Finally, in line with recent empirical evidence, financially-driven expansions lead to deeper contractions, as compared with equally-sized non-financial expansion

A Taylor rule for fiscal policy in a fixed exchange rate regime

We study fiscal policy in Denmark in the period 2004-2012 and compare the actual policy to counterfactual, rule-based alternatives. Given Denmark's fixed exchange rate towards the euro, it is the job of fiscal policymakers to stabilise fluctuations in output and inflation. However, we find that fiscal policy had the 'wrong sign' in the years leading up to the recent crisis, i.e. that fiscal policy contributed positively to the output gap when a contractionary policy was called for. In fact, our rule-based approach to fiscal policy would have prescribed a very substantial fiscal tightening by as much as 1.5 pct. of GDP in each of the years 2006-08. Furthermore, we show that even based on real-time data, which significantly underestimated the ongoing boom during those years, a substantial tightening of fiscal policy was called for. A tighter fiscal policy during the boom years would have helped Denmark avoid a large loss of competitiveness, thereby dampening and shortening the subsequent economic crisis in Denmark significantly, and could have made room for greater fiscal expansions during the crisis if desired