The prosecution of multi-theatre warfare : an analysis of the German military leadership's attempt to direct war in simultaneous theatres : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University

On 1 September 1939 Adolf Hitler convened a session of the Reichstag to announce war with Poland. Dressed in a grey field tunic, he declared that Polish aggression would be suppressed, and that he would wear the tunic until "victory is ours, or, I shall not live to see the day!"1 Germany did not win the war, and Hitler did not live to see the day of its defeat. The established record of the Second World War adequately portrays what happened, and the chronology is ingrained. Nevertheless, aspects of the war have been neglected, especially in relation to command issues within the German armed forces. Because of the prominence of Hitler in all accounts, the actions of those below him have traditionally been marginalised. The purpose of this thesis is to address this 'gap' in history by evaluating the overall German military leadership's attempt to direct war in simultaneous theatres. Using primary sources such as war diaries, memoirs, and various accounts of Führer conferences, this study will analyse how the unique German command structure eventually contributed heavily to Germany's defeat. While many authors hold Hitler solely responsible for defeat, and thus overlook the role of others, my work is primarily concerned with analysing the German High Command structure and its attempt to direct war on multiple fronts at the same time. Responsibility for eventual German defeat cannot be laid at Hitler's feet alone because while he maintained sole executive powers, he remained open to the suggestions of those in his inner circle. In the end, those figures, who will be discussed in this study, failed Germany because they were unable to present a united front against Hitler when the situation became critical for the armed forces after 1941

Modelling the Spoon IRS diagnostic diagram

We explore whether our models for starbursts, quiescent star-forming galaxies and for AGN dust tori are able to model the full range of IRS spectra measured with Spitzer. The diagnostic plot of 9.7 mu silicate optical depth versus 6.2 mu PAH equivalent width, introduced by Spoon and coworkers in 2007, gives a good indication of the age and optical depth of a starburst, and of the contribution of an AGN dust torus. However there is aliasing between age and optical depth at later times in the evolution of a starburst, and between age and the presence of an AGN dust torus. Modeling the full IRS spectra and using broad-band 25-850 mu fluxes can help to resolve these aliases. The observed spectral energy distributions require starbursts of a range of ages with initial dust optical depth ranging from 50-200, optically thin dust emission ('cirrus') illuminated by a range of surface brightnesses of the interstellar radiation field, and AGN dust tori with a range of viewing angles.Comment: Accepted for publication by MNRAS. 8 pages, 10 figure

Cosmological Parameters: do we already know the final answer ?

Some of the arguments which support the strong concensus for an $\Omega_o$ = 0.3, $\lambda_o$ = 0.7 model are reexamined. Corrections for Malmquist bias, local flow and metallicity suggest a revised value for $H_o$ of 63 $\pm$ 6 km/s/Mpc, improving the age problems for an $\Omega_o$ = 1 universe. The latest CMB results may require a high baryon density and hence new physics, for example a strong lepton asymmetry. Difficulties for the $\Omega_o$ = 1 model with cluster evolution, the baryon content of clusters, and the evidence from Type Ia supernovae favouring low $\Omega_o$, $\Lambda > 0$ models, are discussed critically.Comment: 10 pages, 3 figures. To appear in 'IDM2000: 3rd International Workshop on Identification of Dark Matter', ed N.Spooner (World Scientific