Field-dependent quantum nucleation of antiferromagnetic bubbles

The phenomenon of quantum nucleation is studied in a nanometer-scale antiferromagnet with biaxial symmetry in the presence of a magnetic field at an arbitrary angle. Within the instanton approach, we calculate the dependence of the rate of quantum nucleation and the crossover temperature on the orientation and strength of the field for bulk solids and two-dimensional films of antiferromagnets, respectively. Our results show that the rate of quantum nucleation and the crossover temperature from thermal-to-quantum transitions depend on the orientation and strength of the field distinctly, which can be tested with the use of existing experimental techniques.Comment: 21 pages, 5 figures, Final version and accepted by Eur. Phys. J

Lookahead Strategies for Sequential Monte Carlo

Based on the principles of importance sampling and resampling, sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) encompasses a large set of powerful techniques dealing with complex stochastic dynamic systems. Many of these systems possess strong memory, with which future information can help sharpen the inference about the current state. By providing theoretical justification of several existing algorithms and introducing several new ones, we study systematically how to construct efficient SMC algorithms to take advantage of the "future" information without creating a substantially high computational burden. The main idea is to allow for lookahead in the Monte Carlo process so that future information can be utilized in weighting and generating Monte Carlo samples, or resampling from samples of the current state.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/12-STS401 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Evolution of cooperation in spatial traveler's dilemma game

Traveler's dilemma (TD) is one of social dilemmas which has been well studied in the economics community, but it is attracted little attention in the physics community. The TD game is a two-person game. Each player can select an integer value between $R$ and $M$ ($R < M$) as a pure strategy. If both of them select the same value, the payoff to them will be that value. If the players select different values, say $i$ and $j$ ($R \le i < j \le M$), then the payoff to the player who chooses the small value will be $i+R$ and the payoff to the other player will be $i-R$. We term the player who selects a large value as the cooperator, and the one who chooses a small value as the defector. The reason is that if both of them select large values, it will result in a large total payoff. The Nash equilibrium of the TD game is to choose the smallest value $R$. However, in previous behavioral studies, players in TD game typically select values that are much larger than $R$, and the average selected value exhibits an inverse relationship with $R$. To explain such anomalous behavior, in this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in spatial traveler's dilemma game where the players are located on a square lattice and each player plays TD games with his neighbors. Players in our model can adopt their neighbors' strategies following two standard models of spatial game dynamics. Monte-Carlo simulation is applied to our model, and the results show that the cooperation level of the system, which is proportional to the average value of the strategies, decreases with increasing $R$ until $R$ is greater than the threshold where cooperation vanishes. Our findings indicate that spatial reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation in TD game and the spatial TD game model can interpret the anomalous behavior observed in previous behavioral experiments