Determinants of Expected Stock Returns: Large Sample Evidence from the German Market

This paper conducts a comprehensive asset pricing study based on a unique dataset for the German stock market. For the period 1963 to 2006 we show that value characteristics and momentum explain the cross-section of stock returns. Corresponding factor portfolios have significant premiums across various double-sorted characteristic-based test assets. In a horse race of competing asset pricing models the Fama-French 3-factor model does a poor job in explaining average stock returns. The Carhart 4-factor model performs much better, but a 4-factor model containing an earnings-to-price factor instead of a size factor does even slightly better

A New Empirical Approach to Explain the Stock Market Yield: A Combination of Dynamic Panel Estimation and Factor Analysis

This paper presents an empirical approach that combines competing paradigms of modeling in empirical capital market research. The approach simultaneously estimates the explanatory power of fundamentals, expectations, and historic yield patterns, making it possible to test the extent to which the efficient market hypothesis, fundamental data analysis, and behavioral finance contribute to explaining stock market yield. The core of the approach is a dynamic panel model (Arellano-Bond estimator with an MA restriction of the residuals), complemented with an upstream factor analysis to reduce multicollinearity. Due to the complexity of the data set, a great many parameters that influence the yield can be determined. Highly significant parameter estimates are possible even though the information in the data set is interdependent. For the German stock market (the 160 companies listed in DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX), the quarterly yield is analyzed for the period between 2004 and 2009. The model has high explanatory power for the entire observation period, even in light of the fact that the period includes the financial crisis of 2008

Overconfident Investors, Predictable Returns, and Excessive Trading

The last several decades have witnessed a shift away from a fully rational paradigm of financial markets toward one in which investor behavior is influenced by psychological biases. Two principal factors have contributed to this evolution: a body of evidence showing how psychological bias affects the behavior of economic actors; and an accumulation of evidence that is hard to reconcile with fully rational models of security market trading volumes and returns. In particular, asset markets exhibit trading volumes that are high, with individuals and asset managers trading aggressively, even when such trading results in high risk and low net returns. Moreover, asset prices display patterns of predictability that are difficult to reconcile with rational-expectations–based theories of price formation. In this paper, we discuss the role of overconfidence as an explanation for these patterns

Initial Public Offerings and the Firm Location

The firm geographic location matters in IPOs because investors have a strong preference for newly issued local stocks and provide abnormal demand in local offerings. Using equity holdings data for more than 53,000 households, we show the probability to participate to the stock market and the proportion of the equity wealth is abnormally increasing with the volume of the IPOs inside the investor region. Upon nearly the universe of the 167,515 going public and private domestic manufacturing firms, we provide consistent evidence that the isolated private firms have higher probability to go public, larger IPO underpricing cross-sectional average and volatility, and less pronounced long-run under-performance. Similar but opposite evidence holds for the local concentration of the investor wealth. These effects are economically relevant and robust to local delistings, IPO market timing, agglomeration economies, firm location endogeneity, self-selection bias, and information asymmetries, among others. Findings suggest IPO waves have a strong geographic component, highlight that underwriters significantly under-estimate the local demand component thus leaving unexpected money on the table, and support state-contingent but constant investor propensity for risk