Le cogito en 1634-1635

Je m’intéresse au cogito au XVIIe siècle avant sa formulation officielle par Descartes. Les raisonnements avancés par Jean de Silhon, correspondant de Descartes, et par le Jésuite Antoine Sirmond, publiés en 1634-1635, peuvent éclairer le cogito cartésien et l’atmosphère générale de l’augustinisme au XVIIe siècle. Cela peut nous permettre de mieux comprendre en quoi consiste la contribution de Descartes au cogito et d’interpréter ses critiques ultérieures.What I am concerned with here is the cogito in the 17th century before Descartes’ official formulation of it. The arguments published in 1634-1635, by Descartes’ correspondent Jean de Silhon and the Jesuit Antoine Sirmond, can help us understand Descartes’ conception of the cogito and the general Augustinian atmosphere in the 17th century; they provide us also with a better understanding of what was Descartes’ contribution to the cogito and of how to interpret the criticisms it received subsequently

A “Calvinist” Theory of Matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res extensa

In the Dutch debates on Cartesianism of the 1640s, a minority believed that some Cartesian views were in fact Calvinist ones. The paper argues that, among others, a likely precursor of this position is the Aristotelian Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), who held a reductionist view of accidents and of the essential extension of matter on Calvinist grounds. It seems unlikely that Descartes was unaware of these views. The claim is that Descartes had two aims in his Replies to Arnauld: to show the compatibility of res extensa and the Catholic transubstantiation but also to differentiate the res extensa from some views of matter explicitly defended by some Calvinists. The association with Calvinism will be eventually used polemically against Cartesianism, for example in France. The paper finally suggests that, notwithstanding the points of conflict, the affinities between the theologically relevant theories of accidents, matter and extension ultimately facilitated the dissemination of Cartesianism among the Calvinists

Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory

This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow Duhem's recommendation, which was essentially to rely on the passing of time to make many experiments and arguments available, and evebntually strike a balance between competing theories on the basis of this improved knowledge. Although Duhem's solution seems disappointingly vague, relying as it does on "bon sens" to bring an end to the temporal process, I do not think there is any better one in the philosophical literature, and I apply it here for what it is worth. In this perspective, EU theorists were justified in resisting the first attempts at refuting their theory, including Allais's in the 50s, but they would have lacked "bon sens" in not acknowledging their defeat in the 80s, after the long process of pros and cons had sufficiently matured. This primary Duhemian theme is actually combined with a secondary theme - normativity. I suggest that EU theory was normative at its very beginning and has remained so all along, and I express dissatisfaction with the orthodox view that it could be treated as a straightforward descriptive theory for purposes of prediction and scientific test. This view is usually accompanied with a faulty historical reconstruction, according to which EU theorists initially formulated the VNM axioms descriptively and retreated to a normative construal once they fell threatened by empirical refutation. From my historical study, things did not evolve in this way, and the theory was both proposed and rebutted on the basis of normative arguments already in the 1950s. The ensuing, major problem was to make choice experiments compatible with this inherently normative feature of theory. Compability was obtained in some experiments, but implicitly and somewhat confusingly, for instance by excluding overtly incoherent subjects or by creating strong incentives for the subjects to reflect on the questions and provide answers they would be able to defend. I also claim that Allais had an intuition of how to combine testability and normativity, unlike most later experimenters, and that it would have been more fruitful to work from his intuition than to make choice experiments of the naively empirical style that flourished after him. In sum, it can be said that the underdetermination process accompanying EUT was resolved in a Duhemian way, but this was not without major inefficiencies. To embody explicit rationality considerations into experimental schemes right from the beginning would have limited the scope of empirical research, avoided wasting resources to get only minor findings, and speeded up the Duhemian process of groping towards a choice among competing theories

A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person\u27s theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations

Figures du cogito

Figures du cogito. Sous ce titre, on présente dans ce numéro des Cahiers de philosophie de l’Université de Caen sept études, historiques ou analytiques. Jaakko Hintikka met en perspective dans un texte inédit la stratégie cartésienne qui implique le passage d’un système d’identification individuelle à un système d’identification publique. De très grands spécialistes de Descartes ont également offert des contributions originales. Roger Ariew revient sur les antécédents de la formule « Je pense, donc je suis » et Theo Verbeek s’arrête sur sa réception néerlandaise. Jean-Christophe Bardout en identifie pour sa part une transposition originale chez Rousseau et Christophe Perrin explicite les enjeux de son interprétation heideggérienne. Elena Dragalina-Chernaya revient sur les enjeux de l’interprétation performative du cogito et Xavier Kieft travaille la distinction opérée par Descartes entre l’acte de pensée par lequel je prends conscience que j’existe et son explicitation verbale. Autant de lectures et de mises en perspective du fameux cogito qui en renouvellent l’intelligence