Timor-Oriental : le combat pour la paix et pour la réconciliation

Timor-Oriental : le combat pour la paix et pour la réconciliation Roland BLEIKER et Rodd MCGIBBON Quelle est la part du passé dont il faut garder le souvenir et faire le récit ? Quelle est la part qu’il faut oublier et pardonner ? Septembre 1999 : le résultat du référendum organisé au Timor-Oriental est très largement favorable à l’indépendance. Grâce à CNN, gouvernements et simples citoyens du monde entier assistent alors, scandalisés, aux exactions perpétrées par les milices anti-indépenda..

Plural society in peril : migration, economic change, and the Papua conflict

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/This study examines the ways in which large-scale migration and rapid economic change have resulted in separatist and ethnic conflict in Papua. Through a wide-ranging historical overview, this study outlines Papua's experience of socioeconomic change. In the first part of the discussion, Papua's history of contact with the colonial and postcolonial state and the demographic shifts that resulted in an evolving plural society are examined. The second part of the study draws on statistical data to describe the basic features of contemporary society. It identifies the main fault lines of class, ethnicity, tribalism, and religion along which conflict has surfaced in recent years. The main argument advanced here is that rapid modernization and demographic change have resulted in the displacement and dislocation of Papua's indigenous population, fueling Papuan resentment and persistent demands for independence. Better-educated settlers have dominated the growing market economy and, in the process, sidelined Papuans from the resulting economic benefits. Large-scale flows of migration into the province have also sharpened Papuans' sense of shared identity. Together these processes of marginalization and mass migration have given rise to a collective sense among Papuans that they are facing a serious threat to their demographic and cultural survival. This study supplements other research on Papua that has focused on the territory's troubled decolonization process in the 1960s and the emergence of a Papuan political identity. In addition to the importance of these processes, socioeconomic change—especially mass migration—represents a key element in explaining the contemporary conflict in Papua. If the earlier experiences of decolonization were constitutive of a distinct political identity, the alienating impact of Indonesian rule has galvanized Papuan opposition to the state while sharpening ethnic boundaries between Papuans and outsiders. The study analyzes recent census data to show how hundreds of thousands of migrants from other parts of Indonesia have resettled in the territory since 1970 either through official transmigration programs or as unsponsored economic migrants. The rapid social change resulting from these processes has been experienced by Papua's indigenous people in terms of economic dislocation, growing pressure on resources, environmental degradation, and above all, a sense of being overwhelmed by the influx of migrants. The state's promotion of rapid socioeconomic change in Papua has been based on a dual strategy of exploiting the rich resources of the outer islands while promoting mobility from labor-surplus regions. This strategy has resulted in a major movement of labor into the outer islands. It has also encouraged the development of large resource projects as well as the entry of smaller commercial interests into the extractive industry in Papua. This resource mobilization strategy has had interlocking economic and security objectives. Not only is it meant to boost national development, but such policies have sought to stimulate economic interactions across ethnic and regional lines and thereby promote a sense of belonging to a single nation. Movements of labor—both official transmigration and unsponsored migration—are intended to mix people together and dilute primordial ethnic affiliations seen as a threat to the unity of a state. Far from enhancing national integration, however, the government's policy of modernization has spurred local resistance. The resource mobilization strategy was translated on the ground into what many Papuans saw as a resource grab by outsiders. The security forces' role in protecting resource companies against local demands for traditional rights has become a deep source of resentment. Belying the assimilationist aspirations of the Indonesian government, modernization has sharpened ethnic divisions in Papua and undermined the territory's integration into the state. In fact the growth in Papuan resentment has given rise, not only to a sense of ethnic discrimination by the state, but to a specific set of grievances related to indigenous rights and the encroachment of external forces on traditional lands and resources. Papuan leaders argue that the government has pursued a deliberate policy of populating the province with migrants in order to dilute Papua's indigenous culture and overwhelm its people. These criticisms have been at the core of Papuan agitation for independence internationally as well as the mobilization of pro-independence support domestically. But rapid social change has not only fueled Papuan nationalist mobilization. It has given rise to ethnic and tribal tensions in the province as well. Large-scale migration and rapid economic growth have been accompanied by increasing competition for land and resources between settlers and local communities, heightening ethnic divisions in Papua. Not only has Papuan/settler conflict surfaced, but divisions within the Papuan community itself have been sharpened as internal migration and local competition over economic opportunity have exacerbated traditional tribal rivalries. Recent state policies have deepened such ethnic and tribal tensions. In fact, key elements within the state have exploited communal and tribal sentiments by adopting a divide-and-rule strategy to weaken Papuan resistance to resource exploitation and central government rule. The most controversial element of this strategy has been the attempt to create new provinces—a measure that has set off a scramble for resources and competition over new government positions with tribal overtones. In fact, both the Suharto regime and post-Suharto governments have pursued highly divisive policies in Papua that have themselves been a major source of conflict. Such divisive forces have contributed to persistent social conflict in Papua. Now there is a threat that social conflict could trigger a widespread outbreak of communal and ethnic conflict as in other regions of Eastern Indonesia. So far Papua has proved relatively resistant to efforts to widen the conflict. It remains unclear, however, whether further inflows of settlers will overwhelm the mechanisms for social management of ethnic relations that have so far kept conflict from spiraling out of control. This study concludes with a set of recommendations. The most pressing task before the government is to improve basic welfare and public services for the vast majority of Papuans who live in isolated communities. Without an improvement in basic education in remote areas, Papuans will continue to be marginalized from the economy, exacerbating local resentment and alienation. Furthermore, the government should abandon plans to resume a large-scale transmigration program to Papua and commit to consulting with the provincial government and local leaders in developing a comprehensive population policy for Papua. This policy should take into account the deleterious effect that mass migration has had on the indigenous people

Secessionist challenges in Aceh and Papua : is special autonomy the solution?

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/This study examines the drafting and implementing of special autonomy laws for Aceh and Papua as part of the Indonesian government's broader response to secessionist challenges in both provinces. The background to the political decision to grant special autonomy to Aceh and Papua is examined while also presenting a detailed examination of each law. The objective of this analysis is to provide a case study for policymakers and academics seeking to understand the dynamics of separatism. The analysis seeks appropriate policy responses to the challenge of secessionist movements and outlines the conditions under which granting autonomy may or may not be conducive to addressing separatist conflict. As this study illustrates, special autonomy laws were drafted in Indonesia as a response to rapidly growing independence movements in Aceh and Papua that followed the collapse of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998. Responding to mounting violence, the government offered special autonomy laws in a bid to divert secessionist demands. This offer of "asymmetric" autonomy in fact contained significant and special concessions for Aceh and Papua. Special autonomy was the product of an opportune moment of Indonesia's democratic transition in which the government faced multiple crises and central authority was at a weak point. With pro-independence movements intensifying their pressure on Jakarta, the government was impelled to make major concessions as a way of staving off crisis and keeping the country together. It was not long, however, before the government was able to close down the political space for independence leaders and their supporters, and address other crises challenging the state. As the government reconstituted central authority, the imperatives that had driven the decision to grant special autonomy eased. And as the government's commitment to special autonomy faltered, it soon turned to more coercive measures to respond to separatist demands. By 2003, the government was pursuing an alternative strategy of imposing martial law in Aceh and subdividing Papua, a strategy that eclipsed special autonomy and signaled a return to a more coercive, less accommodating, posture. In presenting the case study of Aceh and Papua, this essay confirms a central theme of the comparative literature on autonomy: the fragility of such arrangements and their vulnerability to reversal. Special autonomy arrangements are exceedingly difficult to entrench as national elites almost always resist demands to devolve political authority and are suspicious of any initiative that may set a precedent for other regions. This is particularly the case in large multiethnic countries such as Indonesia where the state faces an array of possible challenges to its authority. A driving force in the Indonesian government's backsliding, for instance, was the official concern that special autonomy was fuelling separatism rather than resolving it. In conceding special rights to Papua and Aceh, officials feared a cascade of similar demands from other regions. All of this suggests that special autonomy, in and of itself, does not represent a solution to separatist conflict. Rather, the concessions that are offered under special autonomy must be part of a broad process of bargaining and negotiation. In the absence of official negotiation with popular elements, autonomy arrangements typically fail to generate widespread support. In this context, central governments, which have many incentives to roll back autonomy, incur few costs in doing so. As this study illustrates, the provincial elites and national parliamentarians that formulated and enacted special autonomy in Indonesia did so largely in isolation from popular elements in both provinces. Special autonomy represented a unilateral concession on the part of Jakarta that lacked any links to the main political forces advocating independence in either province. What has been missing to date is a systematic bargaining process between Jakarta and the regions—one that links concessions granted under the laws with a wide-ranging dialogue involving key elements of Papuan and Acehnese society. This study concludes by examining these comparative themes while also discussing the future prospects for special autonomy in Indonesia. Neither ad hoc unilateral concession making nor the subsequent shift to coercive measures has resolved separatist conflict in Aceh or Papua. In fact, the adoption of more coercive means has not only failed to address the underlying causes of injustice driving both conflicts but has actually exacerbated the alienation of local populations from the state. As a result, the government may again turn to special autonomy as a means to address separatism. The laws remain in place and revenues from autonomy continue to be allocated. But even if Jakarta does strike a more committed posture toward special autonomy, the government will need to move beyond the ad hoc policy responses of the past. At a bare minimum, a link must be established between, on the one hand, the unilateral concessions offered under the laws and, on the other, a systematic bargaining process between Jakarta and the regions to build support for resolving the conflicts. Without linking concessions to dialogue, Aceh and Papua are likely to represent a continuing source of conflict and secessionism for the Indonesian state

Pacifications. Réconciliations (2)

Les articles de ce numéro invitent à la prudence et signalent les tensions entre des exigences morales et des contraintes politiques concomittantes de toute entreprise de pacification. La réconciliation se heurte aux impératifs souvent contradictoires de l’équilibre entre anciens ennemis…Avec des contributions concernant le Timor-oriental, les Harkis et l’Algérie et l’Intifada d’Al Aqsa. Pacifications, Reconciliations. Pacifications and Reconciliations ? The articles in this issue are an incentive to prudence. They highlight the tensions, inseparable from any attempt to pacify social relations, between moral standards and political constraints. The principle of reconciliation ought to be considered both as an aim in itself and as a contributing factor to the stabilisation of peace. However, it constantly collides with the often contradictory imperatives of finding a suitable balance between former enemies. The political aim of these ambiguous processes of reconciliation is to create a space for bargaining and for political discussion both on ethical questions and on very practical institutional matters. This space, as far as it can be maintained, represents through its mere existence a radical transformation of the relations of enmity to be pacified. However, the violence and the profoundness of these latter relations call for reconciliation while simultaneously making it impossible