Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A Cross‐Cultural Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange

In four countries, levels of trust and reciprocity in direct-reciprocal exchange are compared with those in network-generalized exchanges among experimentally manipulated groups’ members (neighbors) or random experimental participants (strangers). Results show that cooperation decreases as social distance increases; and, that identical network-generalized exchanges generate different amounts of trusting behavior due solely to manipulated social identity between the actors. This study demonstrates the interaction of culture and social identity on the propensity to trust and reciprocate and also reveals differing relationships between trust and reciprocation in each of the four countries, bringing into question the theoretical relationship between these cooperative behaviors

On Getting People To Cooperate When Facing A Social Dilema: Moralizing Helps

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Scientific Standards of Psychological Practice: Issues and Recommendations

This volume was a result of a three-day conference held in Reno at the University of Nevada January 6-9, 1995. The conference was organized by the editors of this volume, along with Todd R. Risley. It brought together national leaders in applied psychology to explore the implications of scientific-based standards of practice. The conference attendees addressed such questions as: can we create such standards? Should we do it? How should it be done? What are some of the problems to be solved and pitfalls to be avoided? This volume challenges the discipline to begin to ensure that scientific knowledge is actually used in clinical practice

A Case for Humans-in-the-Loop: Decisions in the Presence of Erroneous Algorithmic Scores

The increased use of algorithmic predictions in sensitive domains has been accompanied by both enthusiasm and concern. To understand the opportunities and risks of these technologies, it is key to study how experts alter their decisions when using such tools. In this paper, we study the adoption of an algorithmic tool used to assist child maltreatment hotline screening decisions. We focus on the question: Are humans capable of identifying cases in which the machine is wrong, and of overriding those recommendations? We first show that humans do alter their behavior when the tool is deployed. Then, we show that humans are less likely to adhere to the machine's recommendation when the score displayed is an incorrect estimate of risk, even when overriding the recommendation requires supervisory approval. These results highlight the risks of full automation and the importance of designing decision pipelines that provide humans with autonomy.Comment: Accepted at ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (ACM CHI), 202

Social Preferences and the Efficiency of Bilateral Exchange

Under what conditions do social preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: Each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each player’s preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player’s. I identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the players’ preferences for the outcome of their interaction to be Pareto efficient. The results have implications for interpreting the rotten kid theorem, gift exchange in the laboratory, and gift exchange in the field