capabilitarianism

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice

"Notions such as wellbeing, freedom, and social justice are integral to evaluating social progress and developing policies. One increasingly influential way to think about these concepts is the capability approach, a theoretical framework which was pioneered by the philosopher and economist Amartya Sen in the 1980s. In this book Ingrid Robeyns orientates readers new to the capability approach through offering an explanation of this framework. Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice also endeavors to resolve historical disputes in the literature and thus will be equally engaging to those familiar with the field. The author offers a novel and illuminating account of how the capability approach can be understood in a variety of academic disciplines and fields of application. Special attention is paid to clarifying misunderstandings that have been caused by different disciplinary assumptions and the interpretive consequences they have for our consideration of the capability approach. Robeyns argues that respecting the distinction between the general capability approach, and more specific capability theories or applications, helps to clear up confusion and misinterpretation. In addition, the author presents detailed analyses of well-known objections to the capability approach, and also discusses how it relates to other schools of analysis such as theories of justice, human rights, basic needs, and the human development approach. Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice offers an original and comprehensive account of the field. The book will appeal to scholars of the capability approach as well as new readers looking for an interdisciplinary introduction.

Het vaderschap als incident – en andere onopgeloste problemen

De gelijkenissen tussen 1967 — het jaar dat Het onbehagen bij de vrouw verscheen — en 2011 zijn frappant, vindt Ingrid Robeyns: de beperkte ambities van de Nederlandse vrouw in de publieke sfeer, de moeizame combinatie van arbeid en zorg, en het bestaan van een conservatieve dominante ideologie over moederschap en vaderschap

A Universal Duty to Care

The most basic and fundamental need that human beings have is the need to be properly cared for. Already before their birth, human beings need proper care, for example by being provided with the right nutrition, not being exposed to toxics, and receiving the right professional care to check the health condition of the woman who carries the baby. Human beings who are just born are the most vulnerable of all human beings: they literally cannot survive more than a day if they do not receive the right kind of hands-on care: milk, warmth, comfort, protection and the tender love of caring adults

Capability ethics

The capability approach is one of the most recent additions to the landscape of normative theories in ethics and political philosophy. Yet in its present stage of development, the capability approach is not a full-blown normative theory, in contrast to utilitarianism, deontological theories, virtue ethics, or pragmatism. As I will argue in this chapter, at present the core of the capability approach is an account of value, which together with some other (more minor) normative commitments adds up to a general normative framework that can be further developed in a range of more specific and detailed normative theories. The aim of this chapter is both to describe the capability approach, as it has been developed so far, as well as briefly exploring how a capabilitarian ethical theory could look like if we were to develop it in full. So what is the capability approach? In its most general description, the capability approach is a flexible and multi-purpose normative framework, rather than a precise theory of well-being, freedom. At its core are two normative claims: first, that the freedom to achieve well-being is of central moral importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people’s valuable capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value. This framework can be used for a range of evaluative exercises, including most prominent the following: (1) the assessment of individual well-being; (2) the evaluation and assessment of social arrangements, including assessments of social and distributive justice; and (3) the design of policies and proposals about social change in society, which is at the core of social ethics. In all these normative endeavors, the capability approach prioritizes (a selection of) peoples’ beings and doings and their opportunities to realize those beings and doings, for example their genuine opportunities to be educated, their ability to move around or to enjoy supportive social relationships. This stands in contrast to normative frameworks which endorse other accounts of value, like mental states or which focus on instrumental values (e.g. resources)

The Capability Approach

In its most general description, the capability approach is a flexible and multi-purpose normative framework, rather than a precise theory of well-being, freedom or justice. At its core are two normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people’s capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value. This framework can be used for a range of evaluative exercises, including most prominent the following: (1) the assessment of individual well-being; (2) the evaluation and assessment of social arrangements, including assessments of social and distributive justice; and (3) the design of policies and proposals about social change in society. In all these normative endeavors, the capability approach prioritizes (a selection of) peoples’ beings and doings and their opportunities to realize those beings and doings (such as their genuine opportunities to be educated, their ability to move around or to enjoy supportive social relationships). This stands in contrast to other accounts of well-being, which focus exclusively on subjective categories (such as happiness) or on the means to well-being (such as resources like income or wealth)

Onzichtbare onrechtvaardigheden

Rede uitgesroken bij de aanvaarding van de leerstoel Bijzonder hoogleraar Praktische Filosofie aan de Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, op 5 november 2009. In Nederland hebben vrouwen zestien weken zwangerschapsverlof. Mannen hebben slechts twee dagen vrij na de geboorte van hun kind. Deze ongelijkheid is groot, maar leidt niet tot een grote maatschappelijke discussie. Met andere woorden, er is sprake van een onzichtbare onrechtvaardige situatie. Een nieuwe manier van denken binnen de filosofie kan een praktische oplossing voor dit soort onopvallende onrechtvaardigheden bieden. De onzichtbaarheid bij zwangerschapsverlof ontstaat onder meer door de benaming. Vrouwen krijgen zestien weken verlof; vier tot zes weken zwangerschapsverlof en tien tot twaalf weken bevallingsverlof. Vrouwen hebben geen tien weken nodig om te herstellen en daarom zou een deel van deze periode beter kunnen worden opgevat als geboorteverlof. Met die benaming wordt direct duidelijk dat de regeling onrechtvaardig is voor mannen. Door de regeling aan de hand van deze factoren en argumenten te definiëren, kunnen we zien dat deze onrechtvaardig is. Het 'oude' denken binnen de rechtvaardigheidsfilosofie is niet altijd even toepasbaar op dergelijke concrete sociale onrechtvaardigheden. Robeyns stelt vast dat dit denken verandert en de aandacht verschuift naar concrete onrechtvaardigheden die echt in de maatschappij voorkomen. Zij noemt deze nieuwe stroming het ‘aardse rechtvaardigheidsdenken’. Het ‘aardse rechtvaardigheidsdenken’ kijkt in de analyse van deze onrechtvaardigheid dus ook naar het genderverschil en de sturende positie die de overheid inneemt door haar beleid. Voorheen werden deze factoren niet meegenomen in een filosofische analyse. Door hier wel aandacht aan te besteden maakt dit nieuwe denken opties voor een rechtvaardiger beleid inzichtelijk

Capability

Capability is the core concept of the capability approach, which is a broad normative framework for the evaluation of individual well-being and social arrangements, and the development of policies and social change. The central claim of the capability approach is that these evaluations and proposals should rely upon an analysis of the (expected) changes in the capabilities of individuals or groups. Although the precise terminology has changed a little over time, the most widely-used description of capability is the real opportunity or freedom to be the person one wants to be, and do the things one wants to do. These beings and doings are called functionings. The expansion of people’s capabilities is the central normative goal of the human development approach, which is best known from the Human Development Reports which are annually published by the United Nations Development Programme

Zorg, arbeid, en man/vrouw-emancipatie

Het is al enkele jaren onrustig in het Nederlandse emancipatiedebat. Steeds vaker nemen vrouwen (die zichzelf meestal als feministen identificeren) assertief stelling tegen de keuzes en het gedrag van andere vrouwen, en schuwen daarbij geen polariserend taalgebruik. Voltijds werkende moeders wordt verweten hun kinderen te verwaarlozen en hun ‘natuurlijke verschil’ met mannen te ontkennen; vrouwen zonder baan of met een deeltijdbaan wordt verweten niet ambitieus genoeg te zijn of luie donders te zijn, en niet te beseffen hoe belangrijk het is financieel onafhankelijk te zijn van hun man. Moeders vinden dat de samenleving hun zorgarbeid onvoldoende waardeert. Een kleine maar groeiende groep vaders eist de ruimte om meer te kunnen zorgen voor hun kinderen. Ondertussen maakt de overheid zich zorgen over vergrijzing en groeiende tekorten op de arbeidsmarkt, en wil daarom meer vrouwen langer aan het werk. De overheid maakt zich echter ook zorgen over de oplopende overheidsschuld en onderschrijft een ideologie van ‘minder overheid’ en ‘meer eigen verantwoordelijkheid voor de burgers’, en wil daarom ouders meer zelf laten betalen voor kinderopvang, wat voor ouders betaalde arbeid netto minder lonend maakt

Are transcendental theories of justice redundant?

Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice is a very rich book, with many aspects worth discussing. I will limit myself here to one major claim that Sen makes, namely that transcendental theories of justice are redundant. I will argue that this ‘Redundancy Claim’ is mistaken, since for justice-enhancing actions we need both transcendental and non-transcendental theorising of justice. Nevertheless I endorse an implication of the Redundancy Claim, namely that theorists of justice should shift their focus from transcendental theorizing towards thinking about justice-enhancing change, thereby restoring the balance between transcendental and non-transcendental theorizing. I will argue that this ‘Rebalancing Claim’ not only follows from the (mistaken) Redundancy Claim, but also from another argument which Sen advances about the current practice of philosophers of justice. I will conclude that the Redundancy Claim has to be rejected, but that this is not a big loss, since what is really important is the Rebalancing Claim, which is vindicated