Demand for Macro Projects and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The importance of projects in economic development in Palestine is indicated by Palestinians and Israelis as being necessary to the success of the planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza

Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink

Throughout years of uprising and Israeli military actions, siege of West Bank cities and President Arafat's de facto house arrest, it was hard to imagine the situation getting worse for Palestinians. It has. On all fronts -- Palestinian/Palestinian, Palestinian/Israeli and Palestinian/ international -- prevailing dynamics are leading to a dangerous breakdown. Subjected to the cumulative effects of a military occupation in its 40th year and now what is effectively an international sanctions regime, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA) government cannot pay salaries or deliver basic services. Diplomacy is frozen, with scant prospect of thaw -- and none at all of breakthrough. And Hamas's electoral victory and the reactions it provoked among Fatah loyalists have intensified chaos and brought the nation near civil war. There is an urgent need for all relevant players to pragmatically reassess their positions. This report is also available in Arabic at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4171&l=6

The 2014 Gaza war and the elusive peace in Palestine

Neither Hamas nor Israel pay the cost of their episodic Gaza wars. Israel gets weapons and funds from the U.S. government and from the American Jewish community. Hamas gets weapons, funds and reconstruction funds from Iran, Qatar, and the international humanitarian community; i.e. the U.S., UK, EU, and Nordic states via the UN agencies they fund. Israel’s Gaza blockade has since 2007 allowed more than a hundred truckloads of food and humanitarian aid a week into Gaza, even during times of fighting. Israel has curtailed dual-use goods like cement and pipes which Hamas diverted for war purposes. In 2014, as previously, both sides repeatedly violated the Geneva Convention. To stop repetition of the Gaza wars, outsider financing for the adversaries has to be reduced and weapons must be removed and banned from Gaza. Gaza should be demilitarized in a “weapons-to-end-the-blockade” cease-fire deal. Israel should pay rent to the Palestine Authority for West Bank settlements, access roads, military bases and other occupied real estate. Suggestions are made in this paper about how to accomplish this goal

The Miserable Loss from Yemeni Conflict: Can International Law Provide Reparation for Mental Injury?

As the home of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, Yemen can be an example to reveal how horrifying the mental health issues in conflicting areas can be. Since 2014, the ongoing conflict in Yemen has been resulting not merely in physical losses and injuries, but also mental catastrophe as its inevitable consequence. This article is a legal research that aims to analyze how mental injuries or psychological damages are being acknowledged as a real impact of armed conflict, to further be considered as a precondition for the reparation at the end of the conflict. The article suggests that the acknowledgment of the mental impacts of armed conflict needs to be taken into concern and consideration, especially from the perspective of  hard laws related to the IHL. Besides, the approach of soft law can be applied in attribution with the ongoing conflict in Yemen

Reflexiones de los Think Tanks norteamericanos sobre el Irak post Sadam

Después de la llegada al poder de la Administración Bush, y en particular tras los sucesos del 11-S, los principales think tanks norteamericanos han reflexionado sobre cómo debería de ser el Irak post Sadam, partiendo de la idea de que la caída del régimen iraquí era uno de los objetivos esenciales de la actual presidencia y de que el final de ese régimen, con o sin guerra, servía a los intereses estratégicos de Washington en Oriente Medio. Los analistas de los think tanks norteamericanos coinciden en las oportunidades y ventajas estratégicas que representa el Irak post Sadam. En algunos casos, de marcado perfil unilateralista, se dejan llevar por el voluntarismo optimista de los precedentes históricos de Alemania y Japón. Otros, en nombre del pragmatismo, aconsejan no obviar enfoques multilateristas y recomiendan grandes dosis de prudencia en la gestión del complejo mosaico político, social y económico iraquí. En cualquier caso, la mayoría de los analistas no reservan un papel de primera línea a las Naciones Unidas en la postguerra iraquí. O bien no concretan demasiado sobre cuál sería ese papel o parecen compartir la tesis del Departamento de Defensa: “UN role, yes. UN rule, no”