William Godwin on the morality of freedom

© 2007 Imprint Academic. Published version reproduced with the permission of the publisher.This article argues that a commitment to individual freedom plays a crucial role in William Godwin's utilitarian political theory. In his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin argues that morality is grounded not in rights but rather in duties and that each individual has a constant obligation to act in the way most conducive to the general good. Yet, despite this apparently strict act-utilitarianism, he does defend one key individual entitlement: the right to a sphere of discretion in which agents can exercise their own private judgment, a right that directly informs Godwin's critique of various social and political institutions. I argue that though his defence of individual freedom is an ultimately utilitarian one, its value is not contingent on consequentialist calculations

The foundations of Godwinian impartiality

© 2006 Cambridge University PressWilliam Godwin is often cited in contemporary philosophical discussions of ethical impartiality, within which he functions as a sort of shorthand for a particularly crude and extreme act-utilitarianism, one that contains no foundational commitments other than the maximizing of some conception of the general good. This article offers a reinterpretation of Godwin's argument, by focusing closely on the ambiguous nature of its justificatory foundations. Although utilitarian political theories seem to have two possible justifications available to them – egalitarian and teleological – there has been little effort to establish which one of them Godwin's argument for impartiality relies on. This problem becomes more complicated when it is acknowledged that Godwin actually provides two different justifications for impartiality, only one of which is consequentialist. The other seems to make a case based on the recognition of moral worth and virtue. This is something confirmed through analysis of Godwin's writings on equality and suggests his political theory is more complex than most philosophers are willing to admit

Was William Godwin a Utilitarian?

Copyright © by Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 70, Number 1 (January 2009). All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of scholarly citation, none of this work may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. For information address the University of Pennsylvania Press, 3905 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112. Published version. 12 month embargo by the publisher. Article will be released January 2010.The aim of this article is to discuss whether the political thought of the late eighteenth-century British philosopher William Godwin--as expressed in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, published in three different editions during the 1790s--is best described as utilitarian. The significance of this issue and its resolution are threefold. First, it is important within Godwin scholarship. My objective is to rehabilitate the utilitarian reading. Second, attention to this issue informs understandings of late eighteenth-century utilitarianism. Third, it speaks to a methodological problem in the history of ideas because ascribing a utilitarian moral theory to Godwin involves a rejection of the claim, associated with the work of Quentin Skinner, that we cannot ascribe to past thinkers concepts that they lack the linguistic means to express

Quentin Skinner's revised historical contextualism: a critique

Copyright © 2009 by SAGE Publications. This is the authors final version, after peer-review. It has been accepted for publication in the journal later in 2009. 12 month embargo by the publisher. Article will be released August 2010.Since the late 1960s Quentin Skinner has defended a highly influential form of linguistic contextualism for the history of ideas, originally devised in opposition to established methodological orthodoxies like the ‘great text’ tradition and a mainly Marxist epiphenomenalism. In 2002, he published Regarding Method, a collection of his revised methodological essays that provides a uniquely systematic expression of his contextualist philosophy of history. Skinner’s most arresting theoretical contention in that work remains his well-known claim that past works of political theory cannot be read as contributions to ‘perennial’ debates but must instead be understood as particularistic, ideological speech-acts. In this article I argue that he fails to justify these claims and that there is actually nothing wrong at all with (where appropriate) treating past works of political theory as engaged in perennial philosophical debates. Not only do Skinner’s arguments not support the form of contextualism he defends, their flaws are actually akin to those he identified in his critique of previous methodological orthodoxies

Recent developments in the thought of Quentin Skinner and the ambitions of contextualism

This is the authors final version, after peer-review. It has been accepted for publication in the journal later in 2009

The Diagnosis and Treatment of Bacterial Meningitis

Abstract Not Provided