Tigres azules de J. L. Borges. Lógica, verdad y mundos imposibles

The aim of this text is show how Borges, in his story Tigres azules, develops several interesting ideas about logic, language and mathematics. The starting point is Borgesian skepticism about the ability of classical logic to take the problem of truth and impossible worlds. It is defended that inconsistent and even self-contradictory objects do not necessarily give rise to physically or logically impossible worlds. It is suggested that the paradoxes that Borges constructs in the story are not paradoxes of self-reference, but variants of Moore’s paradox and paradoxes of material implication, so to overcome them requires a non-classical approach that neutralizes ECQ, this is, a paraconsistent logic system.El propósito de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que Borges, en su relato Tigres azules, desarrolla varias ideas interesantes en torno a la lógica, el lenguaje y las matemáticas. El punto de partida es el escepticismo borgeano sobre la capacidad de la lógica clásica para abordar el problema de la verdad y los mundos imposibles. Se defiende que objetos inconsistentes e, incluso, autocontradictorios no necesariamente dan lugar a mundos física o lógicamente imposibles. Se sugiere que las paradojas que Borges construye en el cuento no son paradojas de autorreferencia, sino variantes de la paradoja de Moore y de las paradojas de implicación material, por lo que para superarlas se requiere un enfoque no-clásico que neutralice ECQ, esto es, un sistema de lógica paraconsistente

Mixing in anharmonic potential well

We prove phase-space mixing for solutions to Liouville’s equation for integrable systems. Under a natural non-harmonicity condition, we obtain weak convergence of the distribution function with rate ⟨time⟩−1. In one dimension, we also study the case where this condition fails at a certain energy, showing that mixing still holds but with a slower rate. When the condition holds and functions have higher regularity, the rate can be faster

Intrahepatic cholestasis of pregnancy

Intrahepatic cholestasis of pregnancy (ICP) is a cholestatic disorder characterized by (i) pruritus with onset in the second or third trimester of pregnancy, (ii) elevated serum aminotransferases and bile acid levels, and (iii) spontaneous relief of signs and symptoms within two to three weeks after delivery. ICP is observed in 0.4–1% of pregnancies in most areas of Central and Western Europe and North America, while in Chile and Bolivia as well as Scandinavia and the Baltic states roughly 5–15% and 1–2%, respectively, of pregnancies are associated with ICP. Genetic and hormonal factors, but also environmental factors may contribute to the pathogenesis of ICP. Intrahepatic cholestasis of pregnancy increases the risk of preterm delivery (19–60%), meconium staining of amniotic fluid (27%), fetal bradycardia (14%), fetal distress (22–41%), and fetal loss (0.4–4.1%), particularly when associated with fasting serum bile acid levels > 40 μmol/L. The hydrophilic bile acid ursodeoxycholic acid (10–20 mg/kg/d) is today regarded as the first line treatment for intrahepatic cholestasis of pregnancy. Delivery has been recommended in the 38th week when lung maturity has been established

Carta suya al Iicenciado Don Manuel Gomez, en México, para que influya con el Ministro de la Guerra, Don Miguel Blanco, para que le paguen a Escobedo los 78 pesos pues el, P. Rioseco , no puede. Tambien, que le recuerde al Presidente el ofrecimiento hecho de darle una orden para la Jefatura de Hacienda en Guadalajara, menciona la Division de San Luis, de 15 batallones.

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Tigres azules de J. L. Borges. Lógica, verdad y mundos imposibles

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que Borges, en su relato Tigres azules, desarrolla varias ideas interesantes en torno a la lógica, el lenguaje y las matemáticas. El punto de partida es el escepticismo borgeano sobre la capacidad de la lógica clásica para abordar el problema de la verdad y los mundos imposibles. Se defiende que objetos inconsistentes e, incluso, autocontradictorios no necesariamente dan lugar a mundos física o lógicamente imposibles. Se sugiere que las paradojas que Borges construye en el cuento no son paradojas de autorreferencia, sino variantes de la paradoja de Moore y de las paradojas de implicación material, por lo que para superarlas se requiere un enfoque no-clásico que neutralice ECQ, esto es, un sistema de lógica paraconsistente.The aim of this text is show how Borges, in his story Tigres azules, develops several interesting ideas about logic, language and mathematics. The starting point is Borgesian skepticism about the ability of classical logic to take the problem of truth and impossible worlds. It is defended that inconsistent and even self-contradictory objects do not necessarily give rise to physically or logically impossible worlds. It is suggested that the paradoxes that Borges constructs in the story are not paradoxes of self-reference, but variants of Moore’s paradox and paradoxes of material implication, so to overcome them requires a non-classical approach that neutralizes ECQ, this is, a paraconsistent logic system

Tigres azules de J. L. Borges. Lógica, verdad y mundos imposibles

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que Borges, en su relato Tigres azules, desarrolla varias ideas interesantes en torno a la lógica, el lenguaje y las matemáticas. El punto de partida es el escepticismo borgeano sobre la capacidad de la lógica clásica para abordar el problema de la verdad y los mundos imposibles. Se defiende que objetos inconsistentes e, incluso, autocontradictorios no necesariamente dan lugar a mundos física o lógicamente imposibles. Se sugiere que las paradojas que Borges construye en el cuento no son paradojas de autorreferencia, sino variantes de la paradoja de Moore y de las paradojas de implicación material, por lo que para superarlas se requiere un enfoque no-clásico que neutralice ECQ, esto es, un sistema de lógica paraconsistente.The aim of this text is show how Borges, in his story Tigres azules, develops several interesting ideas about logic, language and mathematics. The starting point is Borgesian skepticism about the ability of classical logic to take the problem of truth and impossible worlds. It is defended that inconsistent and even self-contradictory objects do not necessarily give rise to physically or logically impossible worlds. It is suggested that the paradoxes that Borges constructs in the story are not paradoxes of self-reference, but variants of Moore’s paradox and paradoxes of material implication, so to overcome them requires a non-classical approach that neutralizes ECQ, this is, a paraconsistent logic system

THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF JOHN R. SEARLE AND OF MAURIZIO FERRARIS. CRITICAL NOTES.

En este trabajo presentamos una versión detallada de las teorías de John Searle y Maurizio Ferraris sobre la ontología social como ontología regional. En primer lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de la teoría intencional y representacional de Searle, mostrando sus aciertos y elementos problemáticos. A continuación, analizamos la teoría de la documentalidad de Ferraris, en especial, las nociones de huella y registro, cuya genealogía arranca de las distinciones conceptuales de Jacques Derrida en De la grammatalogie. En la conclusión, esperamos mostrar que ninguna de las teorías analizadas constituye una explicación suficiente de los problemas ontológicos, semánticos y epistemológicos que plantea la ontología social.In this work we present a detailed version of the theories of John Searle and Maurizio Ferraris on social ontology as regional ontology. First, we offer a critique of Searle’s intentional and representational theory, showing its successes and problematic elements. Next, we analyze Ferraris’ documentary theory, especially the notions of trace and register, whose genealogy starts from the conceptual distinctions of Jacques Derrida in de la grammatalogie. In conclusion, we hope to show that none of the analyzed theories constitutes a sufficient explanation of the ontological semantic and epistemological problems posed by social ontology