European Union agencies: explaining EU agency behaviour, processes, and outputs

The institutional development of European Union (EU) agencies is striking. Over the past decades, forty-six EU agencies have been established to support the European Commission and member states in their regulatory and executive tasks. Today, EU agencies are a vital part of the EU’s administrative capacity. EU agencies have received considerable scholarly attention that used a myriad of theoretical approaches—ranging from institutional, organizational, and bureaucratic reputation to interest group theories—to explain why EU agencies have been created; how they develop over time; whether they are wielders of supranational or intergovernmental power; how they legitimize themselves and cultivate a positive bureaucratic reputation; and how they form alliances or insulate themselves from specific stakeholders. This chapter reviews the rise of EU agencies and introduces a selection of theoretical perspectives that have been used by EU agency scholars to study EU-level agencification and EU agency behaviour, regulatory processes, and outputs.NWOVI.Veni.191R.078The politics and administration of institutional chang

Chapter 32: Expertise and regulatory agencies

Expertise is the raison d'etre of regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies are created to generate regulatory policy solutions that are based on technical data and scientific knowledge. However, regulatory agencies' technical activities - i.e., the ways in which scientific knowledge and technical data are used in regulatory policy-making - can vary considerably. While the extant literature has provided relevant insights into how and why regulatory agencies arrive at conflicting technical conclusions, its potential could be unlocked by (1) integrating the novel theoretical insights from bureaucratic reputation theory to explain agency technical conduct and their effort to legitimize their activities; (2) considering a multi-disciplinary research agenda that suggests focusing on the influence of expert knowledge in regulatory policy-making; (3) addressing the challenges that regulatory agencies face to provide neutral bureaucratic competencies and expertise amidst the rise of populism and democratic backsliding.NWOVI.Veni.191R.078The politics and administration of institutional chang

Building organizational reputation in the European regulatory state: An analysis of EU agencies' communications

The politics and administration of institutional chang

Organizational reputation and risk regulation: The effect of reputational threats on agency scientific outputs

This article aims to explain the variation in the scientific risk assessments conducted by two regulatory agencies: the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES). To explain the merits of scientific risk assessments that have caused polarization within the EU, this article draws on bureaucratic reputation theory. The theory argues that regulators are political organizations that are active in protecting their unique organizational reputations. The findings obtained from interviews, direct observations, and primary documents yield support for this framework: depending on reputational threats, agencies choose to emphasize either their role as guardians of the prevailing social values, or send strong professional signals by delivering a scientifically rigorous risk assessment.The politics and administration of institutional chang

EU Rules Beyond its Borders: The Policy‐specific Effects of Transgovernmental Networks and EU Agencies in the European Neighbourhood

The politics and administration of institutional chang

Transferring the acquis through EU agencies: the case of the European neighbourhood policy countries

The politics and administration of institutional chang

Meeting expectations in the EU regulatory state? Regulatory communications amid conflicting institutional demands

Horizon 2020(H2020)716439The politics and administration of institutional chang

When do bureaucrats respond to external demands?: A theoretical framework and empirical test of bureaucratic responsiveness

NWOVeni.191R.078; Vidi.201.128The politics and administration of institutional chang

A behavioral view on responsibility attribution in multi-level governance:: upward and downward responsibility attribution in response to performance below aspirations

Multi-level governance systems provide decision-makers with many avenues for external responsibility attribution in response to lacking performance. This study provides a behavioral perspective that examines responsibility attribution to the national government (upward) and policy implementers (downward) as a function of performance relative to decision-makers' aspiration levels. The study proposes that perceived accountability increases the propensity of external responsibility attribution, and that decision-makers' political alignment to actors on other governance levels explains when responsibility is deflected upwards or downwards. Using a survey experiment that presents factual information on youth care overspending to 1086 elected local government officials, the study finds consistent evidence that performance below aspirations increases upward responsibility attribution. Accountability strengthens responsibility attribution for negative performance downward to policy implementers. Finally, responsibility is attributed upward less frequently by decision-makers who are politically aligned with the national government, but information that signals performance below aspirations attenuates this tendency.NWO016.Veni.175.178The politics and administration of institutional chang

Strategic silence or regulatory talk? Regulatory agency responses to public allegations amidst the glyphosate controversy

How do regulatory agencies manoeuvre to diffuse potential risk endangering their organisational reputation in the eyes of relevant stakeholders and what explains the substantial variation in the reputational repertoire on which agencies draw to legitimise their conduct? This study relies on a bureaucratic reputation account to enhance our understanding of the strategic behaviour of regulatory agencies and their endeavours to justify their outputs and processes vis-à-vis public allegations. We focus on the glyphosate case to examine whether diverse reputational vulnerabilities encourage agencies to opt for strategic silence or, on the contrary, issue a public response justifying their technical, performative, legal-procedural, and/or moral conduct. Interviews with agency officials and primary document analysis suggest that to respond to stakeholder allegations agencies with an evolving reputation engage in extensive communication activities to warrant their outputs and processes, whereas agencies with a strong reputation tend to be less responsive and opt for strategic silence.The politics and administration of institutional chang